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BULL RUN 

Its Strategy and Tactics 



BULL RUN 

Its Strategy and Tactics 



BY 



R. M. JOHNSTON ^ 

Author of The Roman Theocracy and the Republic, etc., etc. 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 

(^tt fHittt^iiit pceji? Cambridge 



•IK 



c 



p:i 



COPYRIGHT, 1913, BY R. M. JOHNSTON 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 

Published November iqis 



©CI.A35 7 02 4 V 



TO 

MY GALLANT FRIENDS OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE 

AND GENERAL STAFF (jUNE, I913) 



PREFACE 

Half a century after the event, the campaigns of the 
Civil War may well pass out of the domain of remi- 
niscence to enter that of military history. As that term 
is now understood in other countries, it means the dis- 
passionate, minute, and technical investigation of every 
form of military activity, from the organization of a mule 
train to the psychology of a general-in-chief ; it cares 
little for eloquence, the picturesque, and the glorification 
or depreciation of individual heroes. 

From the point of view of the military art one can 
mark off, in the history of the Civil War, three periods. 
In the first, we find little but crudeness ; in the second, 
crudeness is flanked by great daring and brilliancy ; in 
the third, brilliancy sobers down to a ripe and masterly 
exposition of military science ; first was Bull Run, then 
came the Second Manassas, and last of all the terrific 
struggle from the Wilderness to Appomattox. That is 
why one is tempted to begin at the beginning, to examine 
the conditions under which was fought the first conflict 
of the Civil War. By investigating its crudities, we shall 
understand better the brilliancy and the maturity that 
followed. 

Bull Run was a lamentable illustration of the awful 



viii PREFACE 

calamities invariably attending nations that lack or neg- 
lect an army. Fortunate it was for us that our brother, 
not our enemy, smote us. Yet Bull Run was just as inevi- 
table in 1861 as something similar would be to-day had 
we to face a military power in the field. With our form 
and traditions of government, it is futile to lay at the door 
of those who for the moment held office, the fact that the 
United States had no army, that there were no means 
for repressing sedition before it could be organized into 
revolt, that no armed force could be raised after the crisis 
had arisen save by the devious and wasteful arts of polit- 
ical persuasion. Had President Lincoln at the outset 
known so much of military aiiairs and so little of public 
opinion as to demand not 75,000 three months' volunteers 
but 300,000 regulars, he would instantly have lost all his 
hold on the country ; and it is disheartening to reflect that 
no other politician could have acted very differently in 
his place. Some will answer that, this is the price that 
this country has paid and will continue to pay willingly 
to escape from the burden of such military establishments 
as those under which European countries groan. It is 
really the price of ignorance, — ignorance of our na- 
tional needs, of what constitutes an efficient army, of 
what stability an army insures ; ignorance of our long 
record of inefficiency, disaster, and disgrace ; ignorance 
of the state of the world, of where it is moving, of how 
our interests are involved ; ignorance of how we might 



PREFACE ix 

suffer attack and of how we might repel it. What we 
need above all is to get away from glittering generali- 
ties, from empty and ignorant sentimentalism, to become 
businesslike, to add up profit and loss, to estimate what 
the lack of an army cost us in 1861, to take enough 
pains to investigate the facts that surround us at the 
present day. 

In narrating the events of the Bull Run campaign I 
have said little of the political conditions that underlay 
the struggle of the contending armies. Yet in one sense 
the foundations of strategy are always to be sought for 
in such conditions ; — von Clausewitz is perhaps sounder 
on this point than some more modern theorists. I have 
not thought it worth while to demonstrate at length that 
the advance of McDowell's army on Manassas might be 
a mistake as a purely military step, but inevitable as a 
political one ; and that war is a phase of politics. And 
had McDowell won, which, in view of the composition 
of the Confederate army, was always possible, Lincoln 
and the political argument would have appeared justi- 
fied. It seemed better to indicate in a few brief refer- 
ences only the salient facts of the political situation that 
led Scott, McDowell, and their Southern opponents to 
take measures not always in accord with the strict canons 
of the military art. For there was danger of being led 
away at inordinate length into non-military considera- 
tions, and it is true to say that a book might well be written 



X PREFACE 

on the topic of the political organization of the American 
Republic in relation to military problems. The best course 
seemed to be to leave this aspect of things, so far as it 
was not absolutely relevant, for special treatment by 
others. 

To Captain A. L. Conger, U.S.A., a profound student 
of military history and theory, I owe an unusually heavy 
debt of gratitude for reading the book in proof. His vig- 
orous and independent views have influenced what I 
have had to say to an extent which I gratefully acknowl- 
edge. Where I have not been able to accept his opin- 
ions it has been with reluctance and misgiving ; and I 
have tried, so far as the form would permit, to convey to 
the reader in footnotes and otherwise that a divergent 
view might well be taken. Perhaps we were furthest 
apart in our estimate of General Scott, in whom, as I 
understand. Captain Conger will admit no weakening. 
The unevenness or petulance of his dispatches to Patter- 
son would mark nothing more than natural impatience 
with an incompetent subordinate ; the suggested con- 
centration at Leesburg would be defensible on military 
grounds, and was promptly abandoned not because it 
was an ill-considered move, as I believe, but because 
Scott's subordinates were disinclined for it, which, of 
course, was the case. This is not the place to put before 
the reader lengthy explanations of events that will be 
set forth in their proper order. Scott's correspondence 



PREFACE xi 

and actions, viewed as a whole, give me the impression 
of a man for the most part able and vigorous, but too old 
to maintain his strength and clearness of view consistently. 
The convergent march on Leesburg and the advance 
thence to the Manassas Railroad appear to me far more 
dangerous and time-consuming than the advance from 
Alexandria ; while the possible retreat to Point of Rocks, 
where there were no fortifications, might have been in- 
finitely more disastrous than the one in which McDowell 
was actually involved. 

The operations in the Shenandoah Valley have been 
treated as subsidiary to the main theme, and the details 
for this part of the work have been cut down as far as 
possible. 

A point of some interest, perhaps, to special students 
of the epoch, is that the newspapers are of little value 
as historical evidence in connection with military affairs. 
For the political side, Mr. Rhodes has demonstrated in 
his History what use may be made of newspaper sources. 
For the military side, I have found them consistently 
inaccurate. 

The book is based mainly on the evidence given before 
the Committee on the Conduct of the War and on the 
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (cited 
O. R.). I have tried not to overload my pages with foot- 
notes, and therefore here emphasize that almost every 
paragraph goes back to many places in these two pri- 



xii PREFACE 

mary sources. (For Bibliography, see Appendix A.) 1 
have further had the good fortune to study the battle- 
ground in the company of several distinguished field offi- 
cers of our army, among whom I may mention General 
Crozier, General Liggett, and Colonel Hasbrouck. To 
my friend, Major J. W. McAndrew, Instructor at the Army 
War College, I am under special obligations. 

I have further to thank for various services the Trus- 
tees of the Confederate Museum, Miss McKenney, of 
Richmond, Miss Martin, of the Virginia State Library, 
and the librarians of Harvard University, the Massachu- 
setts Society of Military History, the Loyal Legion, and 
other institutions. 



CONTENTS 

I. Military and Political Conditions at the Out- 
break OF the Civil War i 

Strategic Considerations 13 

II. Early Movements and Plans 

The Federals cross the Potomac 17 

Strategic Considerations, North, June 3-15 ... 24 

Strategic Considerations, South, June 3-15 ... 31 

III. Operations and Plans, June 16 to July 16 

North 52 

The Confederates in the Shenandoah 77 

Critique of the Valley Operations 80 

The Confederates at Manassas 82 

IV. Organization of the Armies 

North 90 

South 103 

V. McDowell's March to Centreville, July 
16-18 

The Advance . . '. ■ 114 

The Confederate Retirement from Fairfax, July 17 . 127 
The Skirmish at Blackburn's Ford, July 18 . . . 130 

VI. From the i8th to the 2ist of July 

McDowell •. . 136 

Beauregard 148 

Johnston 150 

VII. The Battle; Preliminary Movements 

North 164 

South 170 



xiv CONTENTS 

VIII. McDowell turns the Confederate Left 

North 182 

South 195 

IX. The Fight at the Henry House 

North 210 

South 224 

The Federals at Stone Bridge 233 

X. At Centreville, and back to Washington 

North 237 

South 243 

XI. Statistics 

North, losses 253 

South, losses 260 

Numbers engaged 266 

XII. Conclusion 269 

Appendix. Bibliography of books and maps .... 277 
Index 285 



MAPS 

Details from General McDowell's Map of North- 
eastern Virginia Inside of covers 

Theatre of Operations 13 

Roads and Railways between Manassas Junction 
AND Washington 33 

Johnston's Positions at Various Dates .... 77 

McDowell's Camps, July i6th and 17TH . . . .115 

Position, July i8th, 8 p.m 137 

Position, July 2ist, 6.30 a.m 165 

Miles at Centreville, July 2Ist, 8 a.m 169 

McDowell opens the Action by shifting to his 
Right 183 

The Attack on the Henry House Hill . . . .199 



(A Bibliography of contemporary and other maps will be found at 
page 282.) 



BULL RUN 

ITS STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
I 

MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS AT THE 
OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR 

This book is concerned with a campaign only, and not 
with the struggle that broke out between North and 
South in the year 1861. That campaign was, however, 
the first in a protracted conflict, and for this reason it 
will not be possible to draw a rigid line excluding from 
consideration preliminary matters that really belong to 
the Civil War viewed as a whole. And it must first of 
all be pointed out that it was the military feebleness of 
the United States that made this atrocious war inevi- 
table and so extraordinary a military operation as that 
of Bull Run possible. Had the country possessed a 
regular force of no more than 150,000 men, the South- 
ern cities would have been at once occupied and no 
rising could have occurred. Had the country possessed 
even 50,000 men, a regular division would have been 
in the field at Bull Run, and few .who read this account 
will doubt that the result of that battle would have been 



2 BULL RUN 

reversed, and the whole course of the war thereby al- 
tered. 

At that epoch the army of the United States was 
a force of less than 17,000 men, mostly distributed 
in small detachments over the Far West, an immense 
tract as yet unpierced by railroads. There were about 
600 commissioned officers, and a good many gradu- 
ates of West Point in civil life who might be expected 
to re-enter the service in a national emergency.^ This 
force, of which little was immediately available, might 
fairly be described as non-existent for the purpose in 
hand when it is considered that its commander-in- 
chief, when the crisis arose, advised his Government 
that the Northern States would have to raise some 
300,000 men to put down the South, — a very conserv- 
ative estimate as it proved. The Government was not 
disposed, however, to follow the advice of competent 
authority on a matter in which journalists and politi- 
cians have too often had more to say than professional 
soldiers. Yet it was from the outset admitted that for 
all practical purposes a new army would have to be cut 
out of whole cloth. In the South there was a similar 
situation. The old army, however, was to supply some 
valuable leadership for the two new armies, Federal 
and Confederate. 

* Of those in active service 279, almost one half, followed their States 
when they seceded. 



MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS 3 

The corps of officers was very well grounded in the 
rudiments of the military art, an intelligent, efficient, 
select group of men ; but it was without experience in 
staff work and in handling masses. The technical serv- 
ices were of good quality, though very small in num- 
bers. When the crisis came the body of officers split 
into two unequal halves, but the South was more for- 
tunate than the North, as it secured among its recruits 
General J. E. Johnston, quartermaster-general of the 
army. Colonel R. E. Lee, and Colonel A. S. Johnston, 
reputed the three best soldiers in the service after the 
veteran commander-in-chief, Winfield Scott. The reg- 
ular troops, however, did not follow this example, but 
stuck to their colors. They suffered a great weakening 
by the sudden resignation of so many of their officers 
and by the detaching of many others to assist in form- 
ing new battalions both of regulars and of volunteers. 
Even so weakened they were steady and valuable 
troops, much superior to volunteers at the outbreak of 
the war. But the regulars were mostly in the Far West, 
and by the end of the month of June, 1861, only one 
provisional battalion of infantry had been brought to- 
gether at Washington; it was made up of companies 
drawn from the 2d, 3d, and 8th Infantry. There were in 
addition a battalion of 300 marine recruits mustered in 
on the ist of July, and a provisional regiment of horse 
drawn from the ist and 2d Cavalry, with a squadron of 



4 BULL RUN 

dragoons. The artillery was stronger, amounting, when 
the first campaign opened, to nine batteries. ^ These 
troops, less than 2500 in all, actually made up the 
whole regular contingent that took part in the first 
campaign of the war. 

Failing regulars, volunteers had to be employed, and 
on the Northern side political, not military, considera- 
tions dictated the Government's policy. A call was 
made on the 15th of April for 75,000 volunteers to 
serve for three months ;2 and it may be remarked that 
the men who enrolled that very day actually earned 
their discharge nearly a week before Bull Run was 
fought, on the 21st of July. In May, 40,000 more 
volunteers were called for, and at the same time an 
increase of 40,000 men in the personnel of the army and 
navy was ordered. These two steps, however, had little 
real bearing on the first campaign of the war, which is 
all that this book is concerned with, for that was fought 
almost wholly by insufficiently trained and organized 
volunteers and against the judgment of the military 
authorities. The volunteers came largely from the ex- 
isting militia organizations, which in some cases went to 
the front in a body. These organizations were not very 
valuable for real military purposes, except in some parts 

^ Batteries: G, I, ist reg.; A, D, E, G, M, 2d reg.; E, 3d reg^'; D, 5th reg. 
* Some States refused their quota, and less than 45,000 were actually 
mustered in. 



MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS 5 

of the South where the fear of a possible negro revolt 
stimulated them to a higher standard of efficiency than 
existed in the North. 

To equip, arm, drill, organize, make mobile, and place 
in the field these volunteers in any considerable numbers, 
was a formidable task; especially with the bulk of the 
men serving on a three months' time limit ; and had this 
been the Government's reason for rejecting the advice 
of raising an army of 300,000 men, it might in a way have 
been defensible. Recruiting produced in many cases 
wholly undesirable results ; in the great Northern cities it 
was too often colored by politics, so that many regiments, 
from colonel to drummer boy, suggested ward organiza- 
tions in uniform ; in the South there were too many cases 
of enlistment of workingmen made practically compul- 
sory owing to the stoppage of employment. It was the 
North undoubtedly that got the worse results from a mili- 
tary point of view in respect of the armies that fought 
at Bull Run. The loafer was encouraged to believe he 
was off for a military picnic ; and there is a case on 
record in which the recruiting officer guaranteed, as a 
special inducement to the would-be defenders of their 
country, that they were to be stationed at Washington 
and would not have to face the privations of the camp.^ 
Scarcely more convincing were the fancy uniforms in 
which several of these corps bedecked themselves. There 
was little distinction to be drawn between officers and 

^ Cte. de Paris, Guerre Civile, i, 314. 



6 BULL RUN 

men, though here and there a West Pointer, or a civilian 
of character and convictions, served to leaven the mass. 
The transition from the arts of political persuasion to the 
practice of military discipline could not be said to have 
been entered on before the battle of Bull Run was fought. 
The colonels and quartermasters sometimes treated the 
whole business as part of the political game, and set to 
work to earn their little profits out of the provisioning 
and outfitting of their men. 

Having thus stated the bad side of the picture, — and 
it was a very bad side, — the good one may be more safely 
added. Scattered in varying proportion through the 
ranks were men who had come to serve a cause, who 
had faith and courage. From the West came a few regi- 
ments of farmers' sons, that sturdiest and best of all 
materials for the fighting line. Through all the ranks 
coursed the native American virtues, quickness, adapt- 
ability, intelligence, self-reliance, resourcefulness, cohe- 
sive qualities of the first order when retreat has to be 
faced and morale is shaken. 

The tactical instruction given to these troops need not 
be viewed in any detail so far as it afifects the operations 
of the Bull Run campaign.^ The fundamental evolutions 
were the regimental manoeuvre by column of divisions 
and deployment in line of battle on a depth of three 

^ The tactical systems, North and South, were based on the French drill 
books of 1 83 1 and 1845. 



MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS 7 

ranks. 1 There were few drillmasters available, and the 
three months' volunteers had attained very little profi- 
ciency even in these fundamental manoeuvres when they 
finally went out to meet the foe. In loading, aiming, and 
firing properly, they showed little proficiency, either not 
charging their musket at all, charging it improperly, or 
charging it over and over again. When, by chance or 
by application, they succeeded in discharging it, they 
generally missed the object aimed at; for it is calculated 
that from 8,000 to 10,000 bullets were fired for every 
man killed or wounded, which is probably a conserva- 
tive estimate.2 Volleys at command were unusual ; the 
troops generally fired at will. 

In the North equipment was forthcoming in most of 
the States, and arms too, and in this matter there was less 
fault to find. The Springfield percussion cap rifle, calibre 
58, was sighted to 1000 yards and was theoretically accu- 
rate up to 650. It loaded through the muzzle, however, and 
was soon to be displaced by the breech-loader which the 
Prussian army was then already introducing. The Ord- 
nance Department worked with efficiency, as is witnessed 
by the fact that during the year 1 861 it supplied : 1,276,686 

* Sherman actually marched his brigade from the Carter house to 
Young's branch according to Guibert's famous principle of the ordre mixte, 
line and column. 

* Tippitt, Tactical Use of the Three Arms, 29. There is nothing surpris- 
ing in these figures. Archibald Forbes reckoned that at Plevna the Turk- 
ish infantry fired 60,000 rounds for every Russian who went into hospital. 



8 BULL RUN 

firearms; 1926 field and siege guns; 1206 guns of posi- 
tion; and 214,000,000 cartridges. The Southern States 
were less well off in this respect, for although they started 
with a considerable stock of arms sent South by Floyd, 
Secretary of War under Buchanan, they were later under 
a severe handicap for equipment, munitions and arms, 
owing to the blockade and to their lack of manufacturing 
resources. The infantry was at first supplied with the 
old smoothbore percussion cap musket, calibre 69, and 
* to a certain extent used even old flintlocks. As to the 
artillery, it is said that during the siege of Richmond 
the men of the ist Connecticut Artillery picked up shells 
of no less than thirty-six different models that the Con- 
federates had fired. 

The field artillery at the outbreak of the war was 
armed with smoothbore six- and twelve-pounder muzzle- 
loaders, but rifled guns were just coming in. The detail 
of the artillery used in the Bull Run campaign will be given 
presently. Here it will suffice to say that the smooth- 
bores, six's and twelve's, had an effective range of 750 and 
of 1 100 yards,! while the rifling about doubled the range. 
Grapeshot and case might be used at 600 yards, and 
was effective at 400 yards, while canister ranged from 
300 yards down. It may be added that at short ranges, 
and this covers the case of the fighting on the Henry 

* This is a minimum figure; some authorities rating their fire effective 
up to about 400 yards more. 



MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS 9 

house plateau, the smoothbore six-pounders were per- 
haps more effective than the rifled, as shells from the 
latter, owing to their high velocity, were apt to bury 
themselves in the ground on striking instead of continu- 
ing en ricochet. 

The Engineer Department was not to play any essen- 
tial part in the Bull Run campaign and hardly requires 
notice in that limited connection, but the transportation 
service was of greater importance. The most character- 
istic quality of a field army is mobility, and while this 
depends largely on the skill and experience of its staff 
and even of officers of subordinate rank, the chief factor 
is of necessity mechanical, — that is, wagons, horses, 
mules, in short, all means of transport. To keep a large 
body of troops moving through a country of slight re- 
sources at a rapid pace and supplied with all it needs, is 
therefore a large and complicated operation. Neither in 
the North nor in the South was there any transport serv- 
ice worth mentioning, nor any experienced transport 
corps. The transportation problem was a big one. Mc- 
Clellan, in 1862, got 3 days' rations into 1830 wagons ; 
Grant, in 1864, got 10 days' rations into 4300 w^agons. 
Another line on the problem was the computation that 
each man required per day 4 pounds of transport and 
each animal 25 pounds ; at which rate about 2000 wagons 
might keep supplied an army of 100,000 men at two 
marches from its base, so long as it made no advance. 



lo BULL RUN 

These calculations would always vary with the complex 
factors governing each particular problem ; but enough 
has been said to show how difficult it might be. It is 
hardly necessary to add that it takes even more skill 
and experience to manoeuvre hundreds of wagons and 
cattle than it does to handle troops on the march. 

At the outbreak of the Civil War the armies were as 
far from the point of mobility as could well be imag- 
ined. A large part of J. E. Johnston's men in the Shen- 
andoah brought along their trunks, and had neither 
knapsacks nor wagons ; it would have required the com- 
bined efforts of several city express companies to move his 
army for a day's journey in its then condition. His artil- 
lery caissons were for the most part boxes fitted on to 
the running parts of farm wagons. Johnston and every 
other general had to improvise a transport service, and 
few officers had any experience whatever in dealing with 
this fundamental problem on anything like a large 
scale.^ 

In the enumeration of these deficiencies no space has 
yet been found for the greatest one of all, that of the 
higher organization of the armies. There were no bri- 
gade, division, and corps organizations ; there were no 
officers who had ever handled a brigade, division, or 

^ Exception must be made of Colonel A. S. Johnston, ist U.S. Cavalry, 
who had solved a great transportation problem in his march to Salt Lake 
City. 



MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS ii 

corps ; 1 there was no staff for such bodies, nor officers 
trained to do such staff work. How lamentably both 
armies, North and South, broke down at Bull Run for 
lack of this higher organization will be shown at length 
presently. 

We have already noted where the conditions did not 
apply equally to North and South. But a few of the 
points of difference between the two sections deserve 
emphasis. 

The South suffered from certain disadvantages : — 

1. Although the officers of the regular army split in 
about equal numbers and the South secured the services 
of almost her fair proportion of them, the rank and file, 
mostly Irish and German, stuck to their colors and their 
paymaster. There was no nucleus of regular troops in 
the Southern armies. The real importance in this matter 
lay in the artillery service. 

2. Armament was less good owing largely to the fact 
that the great manufacturing centres were in the North, 
and that the blockade operated unfavorably to the South ; 
but this difference did not materially affect the operations 
of the Bull Run campaign, save again in the matter 
of the artillery, in which the Federals had a marked 
superiority. 

3. The white population of the Southern States was 

1 Except a very few veteran officers who played no real part, and the 
commander-in-chief, Winfield Scott. 



12 BULL RUN 

roughly only about a quarter of that of the Northern 
States. This disadvantage was in part neutralized by the 
greater demand that was made on the Southern popula- 
tion. 

4. The South could not control the sea ; this fact 
played no appreciable part in the Bull Run campaign. 

The advantages of the South were : — 

1. The defensive was in many ways easier to sustain 
than the offensive, over the vast distances involved, and 
by raw, half-organized armies. 

2. The Southern militia was more efficient than the 
Northern owing to a variety of reasons, among others 
the constant though latent fear of having to cope with 
a negro insurrection. The Confederate Government re- 
plied to the Northern call of 75,000 men for three months, 
by calling up 100,000 men for twelve months. If not a 
sound step, it made, at all events, a better starting- 
point. 

3. The Government, unlike that of the North, was 
brought together with a rebellion, and therefore a war, as 
its immediate policy. A soldier, Jefferson Davis, gradu- 
ate of West Point, Secretary of War under Pierce, chair- 
man of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, who 
had seen active service in the rank of colonel, was made 
chief executive . officer, and whatever his mistakes, this 
undoubtedly helped the Southern States to create a mil- 
itary organization. 



MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS 13 

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 

The strategical situation, as it appeared during the 
first few weeks of the war, before either side had as yet 
armies fit for field operations, may be summed up as 
follows : — 

North. Washington, the Federal capital, lay on the 
north bank of the Potomac. Across that river was 
Virginia, greatest and most important of the seceding 
States. From the heights of Arlington on the Virginia 
side, the Capitol itself lay within long cannon range. 
There was therefore urgent need for the North to carry 
hostilities into Virginia at this point, if only for the sake 
of preserving the Federal capital. 

About one hundred miles away, almost due south, lay 
Richmond, capital of Virginia and of the Confederate 
States, and for that and other reasons one of the chief 
cities of the South. If it was urgently necessary for the 
North to invade Virginia, then Richmond, almost inev- 
itably, became the objective of an invading force, and 
consequently any army formed by the Confederacy to 
protect Richmond. The main line of shock between 
North and South clearly lay between these two cities. 

Fifty miles to the west of this main line of shock lay a 
subsidiary line, where, beyond the Blue Ridge, the Shen- 
andoah River flowed northwards through a broad and fer- 
tile valley to Harper's Ferry, there to join the Potomac. 



14 BULL RUN 

Harper's Ferry, on the Virginia side of the Potomac, 
was an arsenal of the United States, valuable for its stock 
of arms and for its factory and repair shops. Its im- 
portance was heightened by the fact that the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad, the great link between Washington 
and the West, here passed to the south of the river. As 
a military position, however, it was weak, for it was 
dominated from the north bank by Maryland Heights, 
and from the south by Loudoun Heights, each within less 
than a mile and rising five hundred feet above the town. 
To hold both the town and heights would require a 
very large garrison, perhaps 15,000 to 20,000 men ; and, 
apart from immobilizing these troops, the step was of 
doubtful value. Harper's Ferry, however, was supposed 
to have political importance ; for Maryland, north of 
the Potomac, sympathized with the South. At the mo- 
ment when the first volunteers were enrolled, it seemed 
as though Maryland would join the Southern States, 
prevent the passage of the newly raised troops, cut 
ofl Washington, and thereby throw the national cap- 
ital into Southern hands. The troops coming down 
from Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, had pre- 
vented this, had got Baltimore under control, and had 
begun to mass into an army at Washington, closing in- 
tercourse between Maryland and Virginia at that point. 
This left Harper's Ferry as the next point of contact to 
the west between disaffected Maryland and seceding 



MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS 15 

Virginia ; if the South held it, communication between 
the two states would be protected. 

There were other directions besides the two just noted 
in which North and South were to come into conflict : 
the sea, the southern coast-line. Western Virginia, the 
Ohio and Mississippi Valleys ; but to consider the strate- 
gical issues involved at all and each of these points 
would only confuse the narrower one involved in a 
study of the Bull Run campaign. For that, the general 
outlook on the Northern side may be summed up as 
follows. An offensive move from Washington into Vir- 
ginia towards Richmond was from the first moment 
clearly indicated, flanked by a subsidiary movement to 
seize Harper's Ferry, and thence possibly to operate 
south along the valley of the Shenandoah, or southeast 
across the Blue Ridge to the valley of the Rappahan- 
nock, in direct support of the main advance. We shall 
see later, in closer detail, how these movements might be 
efTected. 

South. The Southern outlook was defensive, for the 
Southern States claimed merely to remain outside the 
Union ; they had no policy of repression, that is of in- 
vasion or the offensive. The general view of the situation 
was thereby simplified, but in a strategic sense fun- 
damentally weakened. The threatened advance of the 
North must be resisted. The banks of the Potomac op- 
posite Washington must be guarded. Harper's Ferry 






i6 BULL RUN 

must be protected. But no attack was to be planned 
against the enemy. 

At a very early stage the pressure of the armed force 
at Washington became too great to be withstood by 
the scattered detachments of Virginia troops along the 
Potomac, and they were withdrawn some twenty miles 
within the border to positions protecting Manassas Junc- 
tion, a point of considerable strategic importance, the 
situation of which will be described presently. Southern 
strategy during the early weeks of the war concentrated 
its efforts on forwarding enough troops to Manassas and 
Harper's Ferry, to render these two points secure from 
attack. 



II 

EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 

THE FEDERALS CROSS THE POTOMAC 

In Washington, Abraham Lincoln was President, and 
Simon Cameron, Secretary of War ; neither of them had 
any competence in military matters. Under the Presi- 
dent, Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott ranked as com- 
mander-in-chief. The Adjutant-General, Colonel Samuel 
Cooper, and the Quartermaster-General, Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Joseph E. Johnston, had both resigned and thrown 
in their lot with the Confederate States. Colonel Lorenzo 
Thomas, a capable officer, had succeeded the former, and 
Major Sibley, and later General Meigs, an excellent 
quartermaster, had taken Johnston's place. Colonel Rip- 
ley was an efficient Chief of Ordnance. Colonel E. D. 
Townsend, Colonel Baird, Major McDowell all held the 
rank of A.A.G. ^ 

Scott was afflicted with years. His eyesight had be- 
come defective ; he could not get into the saddle ; and 
even in walking he was glad of the assistance of an 
aide on either side. His determination of character had 
suffered, and at times his judgment failed. Yet with all 

1 For a full list of officers on the staff see O. R. Ser. m, vol. i, 964. 



i8 BULL RUN 

these drawbacks, obvious to any person of military 
training who came into contact with him, Scott was the 
only man at Washington competent to give sound ad- 
vice on the larger military questions. He had proved 
himself a great soldier in the Mexican war, and he re- 
mained undoubtedly a master of the craft He could read 
large geographical, political, and military problems in 
technical terms of the soldier's art, — a rare accomplish- 
ment. It was through his competent channel that the 
incompetent policy of the Government was to find ex- 
pression. 

The call for volunteers was clearly a political step ; 
the merest tyro in the art of war could not have described 
it as a military measure in any serious sense. It was a 
plank in a popular platform, and unfortunately entailed 
a second plank to follow. Having got the three months' 
volunteers, they must be made to complete the announced 
programme of putting down the Confederacy. But how ? 
Scott, replying in military terms, declared there was no 
answer, that the thing could not be done at all, that it 
required 300,000 men and three years at the minimum. 
The President, retorting in political terms, declared that 
it must be done by the 75,000 or less men, and within 
three months from the 15th of April. Scott bowed his 
head, accepted the impossible, and with great courage 
and some skill, though not without making mistakes, 
attempted to carry the hopeless burden thus thrust on 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 19 

his aged shoulders. Quite apart from this conflict of 
views, almost inevitable in a country so loosely organ- 
ized as the United States, the course of events served to 
bring about the first great conflict of the war. 

Until about the middle of May the situation in Mary- 
land engrossed the attention of the Cabinet and military 
authorities. From that date it was well in hand, Balti- 
more being occupied in strength. Troops then began to 
accumulate in Washington, and, on the 24th of May, 
Scott decided to transfer a considerable body to Arling- 
ton Heights and to Alexandria, on the farther bank of 
the Potomac. 

The troops in Washington were under the immediate 
command of Brigadier-General Mansfield, , and it was 
his inspector-general. Colonel Heintzelman, who took 
charge of the movement. General Sandford, New York 
militia, commanded the force, which consisted of nine 
volunteer regiments and some details, about 8000 men 
in all. There was no opposition ; but a shot fired from a 
window in Alexandria killed Colonel Ellsworth of the 
nth New York (zouaves). Three days later Major 
McDowell, who was promoted to the rank of brigadier- 
general, was appointed to command the department of 
Northeastern Virginia. 

McDowell was forty-three, a man of remarkably robust 
physique, square and heavy, with a strong, round head, a 
short beard, blue eyes, short nose, large cheeks and jaw. 



20 BULL RUN 

His manner was simple, frank, agreeable.^ As a boy he 
had the advantage of some schooUng in France, and re- 
turning home, entered West Point in 1830, the same year 
as Beauregard. He graduated much lower, twenty-third, 
than his future opponent of Bull Run. His first oppor- 
tunity in the army came with the Mexican War, in which 
he won the brevet rank of captain at Buena Vista, and 
proved himself a good staff officer. In 1856 he received 
the brevet of major, and was continued on staff duty. 
Although army opinion placed him little, if any, higher 
than his West Point instructors had, he was selected for 
the thankless task of leading the three months' volunteers 
to the fray. As a general he proved faithful to his duty, 
courageous, painstaking ; but it cannot be said that his 
abilities extended further. 

McDowell's appointment came in the wrong way, for 
it did not have the approval of the commander-in-chief. 
Scott was requested, notwithstanding his reluctance, to 
choose between Mansfield and McDowell, and selected 
the latter. But he suggested to McDowell that he should 
find some way of declining the responsibility, which sug- 
gestion the latter met with a refusal. A marked coolness 
resulted, which did not tend to promote cooperation 
between the two generals.^ The action of McDowell was 
purely patriotic ; he did not see his way to declining a 

1 Russell, Diary, i, 137. 

* Rep. Cond. War, 11, 37; Fry, McDowell and Tyler, 9. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 21 

duty, which he appeared as well qualified to bear as any- 
one. A favorable view of his course is strengthened by 
the fact that at about the same time he appears to have 
declined the proposal of Cameron to promote him to 
the rank of major-general.^ Mansfield, who outranked 
McDowell, was apparently nettled at not getting the ap- 
pointment, with the result that friction ensued, and that 
when the time came for the advance McDowell had much 
difficulty in getting troops and transport moved over the 
river to him.^ 

The troops already across the Potomac were distrib- 
uted along the line of hills immediately overlooking the 
river opposite the capital at Arlington, and at the little 
city of Alexandria, four miles downstream, the starting 
point of the only line of rail that ran southwards from 
Washington. This was the Orange and Alexandria Rail- 
road that led westerly twenty-five miles to Manassas Junc- 
tion, and thence another sixty-five miles southwest across 
the Rappahannock to Gordonsville, from which Rich- 
mond could be reached by rail. This was the only con- 
nection between the Federal and the Confederate capitals. 
From Manassas another line, the Manassas Gap Railroad, 
ran fifty miles to Front Royal in the Shenandoah Valley, 
a point about forty miles south of Harper's Ferry. A third 
line, the Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad, ran from 

^ Fry, McDowell and Tyler, 9. 
* Fry, McDowell and Tyler, lOi, 



22 BULL RUN 

Alexandria parallel to the Potomac westwards to just be- 
yond Leesburg, about forty miles. 

Fortification was the order of the day ; ^ although 
McDowell stated later that in his view an immediate 
advance against Manassas should have been attempted.^ 
Alexandria, the rail-head, Arlington Heights, dominating 
the capital, and the Long Bridge, connecting Washing- 
ton with Virginia, must be protected. McDowell at once 
turned his attention to this and related problems. Find- 
ing a great lack of organization among the regiments 
in his command, even in the matter of obtaining their 
daily rations, he formed them into brigades, to the num- 
ber of three. As the Virginia troops had dismantled 
the railway, removing rolling stock and breaking down 
bridges, he directed an engineer officer, Colonel Stone, - 
to report on means for placing the Manassas line in 
working order. He further made an urgent request for 
staff officers, of whom he was much in need for super- 
vising the manifold details of organization that faced 
him ; several competent engineer officers were promptly 
sent to him. 

Arlington belonged to Robert E. Lee ; and it is not 
without interest to quote the letter which General Mc- 
Dowell wrote to Mrs. Lee on placing his headquarters 
at her house. 

* For the detail of the fortifications of Washington constructed in i86l 
and 1862 see the general map at end of volume. 
2 Rep, Cond. War, i, 134. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 23 

Arlington, May 30, 1861. 
Mrs. R. E. Lee. 

Madam, — Having been ordered by the Government to relieve 
Major-General Sandford in command of this Department, I had the 
honor to receive this morning your letter of to-day, addressed to him 
at this place. 

With respect to the occupation of Arlington by the United States 
troops, I beg to say it has been done by my predecessor with every 
regard to the preservation of the place. I am here temporarily in 
camp on the grounds, preferring this to sleeping in the house under 
the circumstances in which the painful state of the country places 
me with respect to its proprietors. 

I assure you it has been and will be my earnest endeavor to have all 
things so ordered that on your return you will find things as little dis- 
turbed as possible. In this I have the hearty concurrence of the cour- 
teous, kind-hearted gentleman in the immediate command of the troops 
quartered here and who lives in the lower part of the house to insure 
its being respected. 

Everything has been done as you desired with respect to your serv- 
ants, and your wishes, as far as they are known or could be antici- 
pated, have been complied with. When you desire to return, every 
facility will be given you for so doing. 

I trust, madam, you will not consider it an intrusion if I say I have 
the most sincere sympathy for your distress, and that, as far as it is 
compatible with my duty, I shall always be ready to do whatever may 
alleviate it. 

I have the honor to be. 

Very respectfully. 

Your most obedient servant, 

Irvin McDowell.! 

Meanwhile the city of Washington was seething with 
excitement. On the 13th of May General Butler had 
taken military possession of Baltimore, thus making 

» O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 655. 



24 BULL RUN 

secure the communications between Washington and 
the North. But this was not enough to allay the anxiety 
of the capital, nor was the presence of ever increas- 
ing numbers of troops. Little was known as to what 
the Southern States were doing, and a constant crop of 
rumors did duty for news. Among these rumors few were 
more thrilling and frequent than those reporting a South- 
ern advance to reoccupy the Virginian soil at Alexandria 
and Arlington, thence doubtless to menace the capital 
itself. 

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS, JUNE 3 TO 1 5 A 

North. Within a week of McDowell's taking com- 
mand of the troops beyond the Potomac, he received 

the following letter : — 

Headquarters, June 3, 1861. 
General McDowell, 

Commanding, etc., Arlington: 
General Scott desires you to submit an estimate of the number 
and composition of a column to be pushed towards Manassas Junc- 
tion, and perhaps the Gap, say in four or five days, to favor Patterson's 
attack on Harper's Ferry. 

The rumor is that Arlington Heights will be attacked to-night. 

E. D. TowNSEND, A.A.G.^ 

To this communication McDowell replied at some 
length on the following day, in part as follows : — 

In view of the number of the enemy supposed to be at Manassas 
Junction, at Centreville, Fairfax Station, Fairfax CourJi?Mouse, and 

1 O. R. Set. I, vol. II, 662. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 25 

at places beyond Manassas . . . and of the possibility of troops coming 
from the Valley ... I think the actual entire force at the head of the 
column should, for the purpose of carrying the position at Manassas 
. . . be as much as 12,000 infantry, two batteries of regular artillery, 
and from six to eight companies of cavalry, with an available reserve 
ready to move forward from Alexandria by rail of 5000 infantry and 
one heavy field battery, rifled if possible, these numbers to be in- 
creased or diminished as events may indicate. ... I do not propose to 
have a supply train of wagons for the main body, but to use the rail- 
road. ... In relation to the number of troops to be used, I have only to 
say . . . that in proportion to the numbers used will be the lives 
saved. . . . Might it not be well to overwhelm and conquer as much by 
the show of force as by the use of it? ^ 

From this exchange of dispatches it is a simple matter 
to reconstruct the views held at this moment, June the 3d 
and 4th, at the War Department and at General McDow- 
ell's headquarters. First, then, it is clear that General 
Scott was not for the moment contemplating a real 
offensive against the Confederacy. The main operation 
was to be an attack on Harper's Ferry by an army mov- 
ing to the west of Washington, and the capture of that 
point itself, the importance of which has already been 
indicated. "To favor Patterson's attack on Harper's 
Ferry," it was intended to make what was viewed as 
a subordinate attack at Manassas Junction, which, even 
if not successful, would at all events engage the enemy's 
attention and prevent the sending of reinforcements to 
Harper's Ferry. It was a perfectly clear strategic idea, 
and of closely restricted scope. 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol, 11, 664. 



26 BULL RUN 

We turn now to McDowell's part in it, and note in his 
dispatch of the 4th the following points : — 

1. His calculation of numbers was reasonable and by 
no means exaggerated as is apt to be the case under 
such circumstances ; and it may be inferred that he had 
fairly accurate information of what lay in his immediate 
front, as will further appear when we turn to the South- 
ern side. He did not, however, overlook the obvious fact 
that the position of the Confederates at the junction of 
two railroads gave them opportunity for rapidly increas- 
ing their numbers. This should have, and perhaps 
did, suggest to him that rapidity was of the essence 
of the contemplated movement ; but this is not brought out. 

2. The proposal to leave behind 5000 men, nearly one 
third of the troops, as a reserve advancing in the rear, 
but apparently not within immediate supporting distance 
of the first column, is noticeable. Assuming great cau- 
tion to be warranted, and the protection of Alexandria 
to be a paramount consideration, there was no need to 
hold back so large a body of troops at that point during 
the few decisive hours of the advance and battle; for 
Alexandria might be defended from hills rising some 
two hundred feet that lay two miles back of it, and 
where a comparatively narrow intrenched front was 
rapidly being developed. However vulnerable the Long 
bridge and railroad might be, it seems hard to justify 
the holding back of a really large force which, as the 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 27 

event showed, could not be expected to reach the field 
in time to play an effective part if used as a reserve. 

The fact appears to be, judging his conduct as a whole 
through June and July, either that in his scheme of a 
reserve at Alexandria advancing along the railroad he 
was merely echoing a more or less definite instruction of 
Winfield Scott, or that he had evolved the idea himself 
though an exaggerated sense of the difficulty presented 
in supplying his army. Even allowing for the fact that 
he had as yet little transport, the march before him was 
of less than thirty miles, and through a good farming 
country that would offer some resources in case of an 
emergency. There is no direct evidence to tell us 
whether this was Scott's or McDowell's idea ; it appears 
more probable that it was the latter' s. 

McDowell apparently viewed a reserve at Alexandria 
as a force placed on a railroad junction that might rap- 
idly be thrown to his left should his movements require 
support on the direct line of rail to Manassas, or to his 
right by the Hampshire and Loudoun Railroad to Vienna, 
should the Confederates, operating from the Shenandoah 
through Leesburg, — a remote and unlikely contingency, 
— threaten his right flank and rear.^ In any case, as Mc- 
Dowell expected to be short of transport and intended to 
get on to the Manassas Railroad at the earliest possible 

^ The moving of the 1st and 2d New Jersey Regiments by rail from 
Alexandria to Vienna on the 20th of July serves to support this view. 



28 BULL RUN 

moment, he attached importance to having a consider- 
able body of troops operating along that railroad and 
guarding all its vulnerable points. Prudent, cautious, and 
disinclined for the offensive, McDowell felt all the diffi- 
culties of the task set him, and tried to parry every one 
of them instead of concentrating his efforts on the fun- 
damental difficulty, that of destroying the enemy's army. 
His plan, such as it was, could not be described as sat- 
isfying the conditions of the successful offensive : the 
throwing of every available man to the decisive point, 
and rapidity of action. 

At Washington, attention was chiefly fixed on Har- 
per's Ferry, and this was the natural outcome of a sit- 
uation in which Maryland appeared the most pressing 
problem. Scott was making great efforts to supply 
General Patterson, who was slowly pushing down from 
Pennsylvania towards the Potomac with a considerable 
mass of infantry and a few guns. On the 8th, writing to 
that general, he said : " I do not distinctly foresee that 
we shall be able to make any diversion in your behalf on 
the other side of the Potomac beyond repairing the lower 
part of the railroad leading from Alexandria towards the 
Manassas Gap." ^ By which Scott meant that for the pres- 
ent he did not see his way to furnishing McDowell with 
the 1 7,000 men that general required to operate against 

^ O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 671. — It was at this same date that Scott took 
over control of the telegraph lines. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 29 

Manassas Junction, or if he did, he judged the risk of 
an attack at that point too great to be run. For the 
moment, therefore, the advance of McDowell's army- 
remained a mere possibility, depending largely on what 
might happen farther to the west. 

Patterson's Advance. Meanwhile Patterson had 
been steadily, but very slowly, moving down across west- 
ern Maryland towards the valley of the Shenandoah with 
8000 or 10,000 volunteers, mostly from Pennsylvania. 
As he neared the Potomac his progress became less 
rapid and his assurances of success less emphatic. He 
proposed following the easiest route, that which crossed 
the Potomac at Williamsport, some distance above Har- 
per's Ferry, thence leading to Winchester, the great 
junction of roads, twenty-five miles south of Harper's 
Ferry and sixty miles west of Manassas. To protect the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and to connect with Pat- 
terson, Scott sent a small detached column under Colo- 
nel Stone direct from Washington along the Potomac 
to Point of Rocks, thence to link up with Patterson's left 
when he should get possession of Harper's Ferry, and, 
as that general continued his advance into Virginia, to 
march on Leesburg. The occupation of Leesburg might 
eventually facilitate the shifting of Patterson's army to- 
wards McDowell's by means of the Loudoun and Hamp- 
shire Railroad should that operation become advisable. 



30 BULL RUN 

These plans probably assumed for their basis a mobil- 
ity which Patterson's raw army never attained, and a bold, 
fighting spirit which its commander, a veteran of the war 
of 1812, prudently sealed up within the four corners of his 
dispatches. At the end of May, Scott appears to have 
been confident that in a few days a strong offensive would 
be developed by Patterson. But it was not until the 14th 
of June that Patterson got his troops actually to the line 
of the Potomac, on which day General Joseph E. John- 
ston, commanding the Confederate forces, withdrew from 
Harper's Ferry towards Winchester. Patterson had the 
news in the afternoon of the 15th, but so great was his pru- 
dence, so cumbersome his army, that it was not till forty- 
eight hours later that he actually crossed the Potomac. 

On the 13th of June, Patterson had received the follow- 
ing dispatch from headquarters : — 

The General-in-Chief directs me to say that on the supposition you 
will cross the river Monday or Tuesday next (17th or i8th), Briga- 
dier-General McDowell will be instructed to make a demonstration 
from Alexandria in the direction of Manassas Junction one or two days 
before. The general does not wish you to hasten, but keep him in- 
formed, so that General McDowell may properly time his move- 
ment ... 

E. D. Tow^sEND, A.A.G.' 

Patterson, who was receiving many exaggerated and 
alarming reports about the enemy, some of these from 
the commander-in-chief himself, replied that he could 
» O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 680. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 31 

not cross at the time indicated. On this McDowell was 
informed, on the 15th of June, that Patterson would not 
cross until the 19th, and that the expediency of any 
movement on his part must be determined by events. 
" General Scott says, whether Harper's Ferry is evacu- 
ated or not, General Patterson cannot cross the river 
before Wednesday next. This in reference to a proposed 
movement of yours, on the expediency of which events 
must now decide." ^ This indicates, clearly enough, that 
a movement against Manassas still occupied a subordi- 
nate place as late as the moment when the Confederates 
evacuated Harper's Ferry. 

South. The first and natural move, when the State 
of Virginia seceded and placed armed forces in the field, 
had been to occupy those parts of her soil that lay in 
immediate proximity to Washington. Alexandria was 
held by a small body of local volunteers, and pickets 
were established along Arlington Heights and at the 
bridges leading to Washington. It did not, however, at 
any time enter into the views of the State or of the Con- 
federate Government to establish a real line of resistance 
at that point, much less to take the offensive thence 
upon Washington ; for there were no adequate means to 
such ends. So early as the 6th of May this is shown by 
the following dispatch : — 

^ O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 690. 



32 BULL RUN 

Headquarters, Virginia Forces, 
Richmond, Va., May 6, 1861. 

Colonel St. George Cocke, 

Commanding Virginia Forces, Culpeper Court House, Va. : 
Colonel: — You are desired to post at Manassas Gap Junction 
a force sufficient to defend that point against an attack likely to be 
made against it by troops from Washington. . . . 

R. E. Lee 
Major-General, Commanding.^ 

Thus from an early moment the Confederate position 
was well defined : it was defensive, and it recognized the 
strategic importance of Manassas Junction. 

The headquarters organization at this moment was in 
a state of marked inferiority. At Richmond everything 
had to be improvised. On the 23d of April, Colonel R. E. 
Lee was appointed commander-in-chief of the forces of 
Virginia, and later to the command of the Confederate 
forces in Virginia, with the rank of major-general. He 
was virtually commander-in-chief. His adjutant-general 
was Colonel Cooper, who had resigned from the same 
post at Washington. Lee is too great a figure in Ameri- 
can history to require biographical notice here ; sufTice it 
to say that even all his ability and energy were not equal 
to creating an army rapidly enough to place the Con- 
federate States in anything like a secure position against 
attack. 

By the 15th of May Cocke had assembled at Culpeper 

» O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 806. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 33 

about a thousand men with two field pieces ; and on 
that day he wrote to Lee : — 

With a strong corps d'armie at Manassas and at least a division at 
Winchester, these two bodies being connected by a continuous railway 
through Manassas Gap, there should be kept at all times upon that 
road ample means of transportation. These two columns — one at 
Manassas and one at Winchester — could readily cooperate and con- 
centrate upon the one point or the other. . . .^ 

This was the strategic idea, fully fledged, that was suc- 
cessfully carried out, ten weeks later, against McDowell 
by Johnston and Beauregard on the field of Bull Run. 

Cocke was moved up to Manassas a few days later, 
and a gradual concentration of reinforcements at that 
point took place, of which the detail is unimportant 
and the general result will be summarized presently. On 
the 24th of May, as we have seen, the Federals occupied 
the southern bank of the Potomac for nearly twelve 
miles above and below Washington, this move meeting 
with no resistance. On the same day Lee, foreseeing the 
possible movement on Leesburg which Scott had actu- 
ally ordered, gave instructions for destroying the Lou- 
doun and Hampshire Railroad. On the 28th, Lee left Rich- 
mond for Manassas where he made a rapid inspection 
on the following day. 

^ O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 847. No one, whether at Richmond or at John- 
ston's or Beauregard 's headquarters, assumed the responsibility of car- 
rying out Cocke's sound suggestion; so that when the critical moment 
came there was a shortage not only of cars, but, worse still, of engineers. 



34 BULL RUN 

As a result of Lee's visit a defensive position was 
selected along the stream of Bull Run, and a cordon 
of Confederate pickets vi^as formed in front of this 
line stretching from Wolf Trap Shoal Run through 
Fairfax Station, Fairfax Court House, and Hunter's 
Station, towards Draneville, where Colonel Hunton, 
commanding the small force at Leesburg, continued 
the line to the latter point. E well's brigade, later rein- 
forced by Bonham's, was entrusted with this outpost duty, 
with headquarters at Fairfax Court House. Lee returned 
to Richmond, where President Davis installed the Con- 
federate Government on the 31st of May. On the same 
day they held a conference with General Beauregard 
who had been selected to command what the Confeder- 
ates then called the Army of the Potomac. On the ist of 
June, at 2 P.M., P. G. T. Beauregard, brigadier-general in 
the army of the Confederate States, arrived at Manassas 
Junction and assumed command. 

Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard was born in Lou- 
isiana on the 28th of May, 1818, of Catholic and planter's 
stock. He entered West Point at sixteen, graduating 
second of his class in 1838 ; among his classmates was 
McDowell. He entered the army as an engineer officer 
and distinguished himself in the Mexican War ; he earned 
the brevet rank of captain at Contreras and Churubusco, 
and that of major at Chapultepec ; at Garita de Belen he 
was twice wounded; in i860 he was appointed Superin- 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 35 

tendent of West Point, but only held the position a few 
days. 

When the Civil War broke out, Beauregard followed 
his State, and with his brilliant reputation was at once 
given high command. He was then a man of attractive 
personality, and was described by "An English Com- 
batant," who saw him at Manassas, as: — 

A small man with a sallow complexion, a heavy black moustache, 
and closely cut hair. With the left hand in his trowser's pocket, a cigar 
in his mouth, a buttoned-up coat and small cap, he is the exact type of 
a French engineer and could not anywhere be mistaken for a civilian. 
He is jaunty in his gait, dashing in manner, and evidently takes delight 
in the circumstance of war. It must be confessed his modesty is equal 
to his merit, he is not imperious or overbearing . . . and is never seen 
to such advantage as when standing on an earthwork and giving 
orders, or conversing with animated gesture.^ 

As a general, Beauregard was strong in fortification, 
and of unquenchable courage, but weak in strategy and 
wanting in coolness, insight, and method on the battle- 
field. His dispatches lack clearness, and at times candor ; 
while rhetoric is a pitfall he rarely resists. From his 
wordy and inaccurate report of the battle of Bull Run, 
the following lines may well be quoted : — 

Oh my country ! I would readily have sacrificed my life and those of 
all the brave men around me to save your honor and to maintain your 
independence from the degrading yoke which those ruthless invaders 
had come to impose and render perpetual, and the day's issue has 
assured me that such emotions must also have animated all under my 
command.^ 

* "An English Combatant," Battlefields, 24. ^ O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 493. 



36 BULL RUN 

An even more characteristic effusion was his much- 
quoted proclamation to the people of Virginia on taking 
command, from which the following paragraph may be 
culled : — 

A reckless and unprincipled tyrant has invaded your soil. Abra- 
ham Lincoln, regardless of all moral, legal, and constitutional re- 
straints, has thrown his abolition hosts among you . . . murdering 
and imprisoning your citizens. . . . They proclaim by their acts, if 
not on their banners, that their war-cry is — Beauty and Booty. ^ 

The real question that confronted Beauregard at Man- 
assas, and Lee before him, was not so much to find a 
strong defensive position as to find the best possible 
defensive position ; for the Confederates were bound to 
hold the Junction if they could. The line through Fairfax 
Court House on which Ewell's pickets had been estab- 
lished was too extensive and too easily and variously 
approachable to serve. But between it and Manassas 
ran the small stream of Bull Run ; it presented certain 
advantages which the Confederate leaders decided to 
utilize. 

Manassas Junction itself lay on an open plateau, water- 
less and exposed, with roads running in all directions, 
facilitating military movements. By fortifying the Junc- 
tion an enemy's operations might be retarded, though 
probably not for long. While it might therefore be ad- 
visable to throw up works to protect it, it was necessary 
1 Russell, Diary, i, 135. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 37 

to place the main line of defence forward, that is, on 
Bull Run itself. How to dispose troops to hold Bull Run 
depended on a consideration of the lines of advance 
open to an army coming from Washington. 

Viewing the possible lines of advance of a Federal 
army towards Manassas, it was obvious that Alexandria 
played a very important part, and must almost inevi- 
tably be the real base. Supplies and troops might be 
conveniently moved to that point by steamer, and thence 
could be readily sent into the interior by means of the 
Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The prevailing lack 
of means of transportation emphasized these considera- 
tions. 

Yet it was possible that an attack might be delivered 
from further to the southeast, taking Manassas Junction 
in right flank and rear by an advance along the valley 
of the Occoquan. The Federals controlled the sea, and 
could therefore move troops to Accotink or any conven- 
ient point whence the valley of the Occoquan might be 
reached. But this movement had obvious disadvantages. 
It would of necessity be cumbersome and slow and pos- 
sess none of the advantages of surprise, while it would 
uncover Washington. For these and other reasons it was 
never seriously considered, nor did the Confederates do 
more than keep a close lookout along the valley of the 
Occoquan. 

Again, to the north of Alexandria lay another possible 



38 BULL RUN 

line of advance from the Chain Bridge above Washing- 
ton, through Falls Church and Vienna, towards Fairfax 
Court House and Centreville. These two lines then, 
Alexandria-Manassas, and Chain Bridge-Centreville, re- 
presented the widest angle within which a Federal ad- 
vance was likely. As a glance at the map will show, 
these lines converged on a comparatively short stretch of 
Bull Run, lying for the most part about three to four 
miles east and north of Manassas. 

Bull Run is a winding stream, in many places quite 
narrow, nothing more than a glorified ditch. But the 
banks are cased in, partly precipitous, generally wooded 
and difficult of access, while its bottom is mud save for 
an occasional ford. It is a mean, yellow-looking stream, 
yet it forms a considerable obstacle. From its junction 
with the Occoquan to Sudley Spring is a distance of 
about fourteen miles as the crow flies, with Manassas 
lying midway and a few miles to the southwest. This 
fourteen miles rather more than covered any probable 
crossing of an army advancing from Washington along 
the routes just indicated. 

Beauregard wrote of the position to President Davis 
in the following terms : — 

I have reconnoitred closely several of the fords on Bull Run, and 
one on Occoquan Run (about three miles from here) which offer 
strong natural features of defence; but they are so numerous and far 
apart that only a much larger force than I have here at my command 
(say not less than from ten to fifteen thousand men) could hope to 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 39 

defend them all against a well-organized enemy of about twenty 
thousand men, who could select his point of attack. ^ 

This was a somewhat rough estimate of the situation ; and 
it will be worth while to examine the line of Bull Run a 
little more closely. 

The trend of the roads from Washington and Alex- 
andria, as we have seen, was towards Centreville, whence 
the direct road to Manassas ran south about six miles, 
crossing Bull Run at Mitchell's Ford where there was 
good bottom. For the first two miles from Centreville the 
road followed a high ridge, then dipped down into low 
land, and ran for some distance parallel with the river 
where it was flanked and commanded by the southern 
bank, which here formed a really strong defence. The 
line Centreville-Mitchell's Ford-Manassas, may be taken 
as central ; we will now consider what lay downstream, 
and then upstream from this point. 

The next crossing, half a mile downstream, Black- 
burn's Ford, appeared on the map, or might seem to a 
wayfarer approaching from Centreville, the obvious route 
to Manassas. For the road running through that ford, 
diverging slightly to the east of the Mitchell's Ford road, 
made a straighter line between the two points. The run 
was here encased between wooded banks, the northern 
higher than the southern ; but the ford itself was diffi- 
cult and boggy, and had almost fallen into disuse. Black- 

* 0. R. Ser. i, vol. n, 902; Beauregard to Davis, June i. 



40 BULL RUN 

burn's Ford and the edge of the Manassas plateau just 
beyond, were dominated by the Centreville ridge, but 
partly screened by timber and underbrush. 

Farther downstream, at distances of about a mile 
apart, were McLean's, Union Mills', Gates', and Wood- 
yard's fords. It was here that the line of Bull Run was 
strongest, because least easy of access. The roads run- 
ning to these points from the east and northeast were 
only rough tracks ; the ground was hilly and covered 
with trees and underbrush through which troops, guns, 
and transport could be moved only with the greatest 
difficulty. There were few, if any, positions where bat- 
teries could be conveniently planted to command the 
river and farther bank. The most important point was 
Union Mills, on the northern side, for here was a 
convergence of roads from Sangster's crossroads and 
Centreville, together with the bridge, left standing, by 
which the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crossed the 
run. Gates' Ford and Woodyard's Ford were some- 
what remote, and hence did not come within the scope 
of operations. 

Upstream from Mitchell's Ford the topography be- 
comes more important. But first it should be noted that 
the ridge which ran from Blackburn's Ford to Centreville 
and beyond, aflorded an admirable defensive position 
for the Confederates. Difficult of approach south of Cen- 
treville, it must almost inevitably have been attacked 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 41 

directly at the village or by a flanking movement farther 
north for which an attacking army would have found 
the roads of little service. Even had the position been 
outflanked, retirement was not difficult owing to the 
lines of road running from Centreville west and south to 
Mitchell's Ford, Ball's Ford, Stone Bridge, and several 
other crossings. The Confederates, however, did not as 
yet dispose of sufficient numbers for this purpose, and 
decided not to hold the ridge, but to come back as far 
as the stream itself. ^ 

From Centreville, the Warrenton turnpike ran four 
miles almost due west to Stone Bridge, crossing Cub Run 
about midway. Cub Run ran into Bull Run a little above 
Mitchell's Ford and below Island Ford, forming a 
swampy bottom through which no advance was practi- 
cable. From the Warrenton turnpike just beyond Cub 
Run, farm roads diverged to the southwest to Ball's Ford 
where the crossing was good, and to Lewis' Ford where 
it was moderate ; the south bank at these points was 
high and dominated the north bank. 

Stone Bridge was an important crossing, but, so it 
appeared, was the extreme point that a Federal advance 

^ The Federal plans were not kept secret and were well known to the 
Confederates. From an early date the idea was to turn the Confederate 
right at Union Mills or lower down. The Confederates therefore placed 
very few troops indeed to the left of Mitchell's Ford. They in fact refused 
a left which they thought would not be menaced, to concentrate on their 
centre and right. This they could not have done had they attempted to 
hold the ridge. 



42 BULL RUN 

might reach to the northwest. As it turned out, Mc- 
Dowell eventually crossed above it, but a consideration 
of this part of the field, with the crossings upstream at 
Poplar Ford,^ and at Sudley Spring Ford, will be best 
left until later. 

The Bull Run position covered the lines of rail that 
came together at Manassas. The Orange and Alexan- 
dria Railroad ran directly from Manassas Junction to the 
southwest, crossing Broad Run at Bristoe, four miles 
distant ; it was therefore fairly secure. The Manassas 
Gap Railroad, however, was more open to attack. For it 
ran west and a little north, that is roughly parallel with 
Bull Run as far upstream as Stone Bridge, where it be- 
gan to diverge. 

To sum up, then, it might be said that to the right the 
Confederate position was strong. At Blackburn's Ford, 
owing to the way in which the Centreville ridge domi- 
nated the south bank, it was weak ; and this weakness 
extended to McLean's Ford on one side and Mitchell's 
on the other, for a successful move through Blackburn's 
Ford would outflank those positions. Frontally, Mitch- 
ell's Ford was strong, and there was not much fear for 
the fords just south of Stone Bridge. Beyond that point 
the Confederates had not considered defensive measures, 
and, as will be seen, they were vulnerable. 

Let us add here one of the combatants' impressions of 

1 Also called Red House Ford or Locke's Ford. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 43 

Manassas and the Bull Run valley at night as viewed 
from the plateau, not far from the little house in which 
Beauregard had placed his headquarters : — 

Yonder black streak you see rising from the south-south-west, 
running north and turning off due east, is the timber around Bull Run; 
'tis about three or four miles distant from here to any point, and 
the high grounds you observe rising abruptly beyond the stream — 
the tableland I mean, northward, and shelving to the east across the 
track — is Centreville. A small detachment and military telegraph 
post is stationed there watching the roads from the Upper Potomac 
and Leesburgh . . . and keeping open communication with General 
Bonham who holds Fairfax Court House and the railroad station mid- 
way between Washington and this place. "See yonder! " said my 
companion, pointing towards Centreville, " they are working the 
telegraph! See them repeating the signals on yonder hill ! "... In a few 
minutes one of the men sitting around the large fire in front of the 
general's quarters, seized a long red fagot from the flames, and going 
to the north end of the house, began swaying it to the right and left, 
according to directions, now horizontally, again perpendicularly, and 
seemed to be cutting an imaginary circle at different angles. The signs 
were instantly repeated from post to post and thus traversed fifteen 
miles within a very few minutes.* 

Up to the 15th of June, the Confederate Government 
had no well-settled plans that looked very much beyond 
the defence of Manassas Junction and the maintenance 
of a force in the front of General Patterson as he ad- 
vanced towards Harper's Ferry. On the 13th of the 
month. President Davis wrote as follows to General 
Beauregard : — 

If the enemy commences operations by an attack upon Harper's 
* "English Combatant," Battlefields, 21. 



44 BULL RUN 

Ferry, I do not perceive why General Johnston should be unable, even 
before overwhelming numbers, to retire behind the positions where the 
enemy would approach him in reverse. It would seem to me not unrea- 
sonable to expect that ... he could ... by retiring to the passes on the 
Manassas Railroad and its adjacent mountains, probably check the 
progress of the enemy, and prevent him from either taking possession 
of the Valley or passing to the rear of your position. We hope soon 
to re-enforce you to an extent equal to the strength you require by the 
junction of General Johnston, and I cannot doubt but that . . . you 
would then be better circumstanced to advance upon Alexandria than 
if General Johnston, by withdrawing from the Valley, had left the 
enemy the power to pass to our rear, to cut your line of communica- 
tion, and advance to attack you in reverse while you were engaged 
with the enemy in front. ... To your request that a concerted plan of 
operations should be adopted, I can only reply that the present posi- 
tion and unknown purpose of the enemy require that our plan should 
have many alterations.^ 

But the generals themselves, as soon as Beauregard as- 
sumed command, exchanged letters pledging themselves 
to mutual support at whichever point the Federal attack 
should develop.* 

The Shenandoah Valley, Let us now turn to the 
valley of the Shenandoah. As early as the 27th of April, 
Colonel T. J. Jackson ^ was assigned to the command of 
a force of Virginia militia assembling at Harper's Ferry ; 

* O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 922, 

* Johnston, Narrative, 21. 

' Thomas Jonathan, better known as "Stonewall," Jackson, born Jan- 
uary 2ist, 1824, at Clarksburg, Virginia; graduated West Point, 1846; lieu- 
tenant, 1st Artillery, at Vera Cruz, Cerro Gordo, Churubusco, Molino del 
Rey, Mexico, 1847, for which he received two brevets; professor of artillery 
tactics and natural philosophy, Virginia Military Institution, 1851-61. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 45 

the numbers of this command gradually rose in the 
course of a month to about 7000 effectives. Jackson was 
warned that a movement of Federal troops against that 
point might be expected, and his attention was called to 
the possible means of delaying their movements by the 
breaking down of bridges, railroads, and canals. The 
details of operations in the Shenandoah Valley do not 
belong to our subject, however ; it is merely the outline 
of those events that can be given. 

For three weeks or so Jackson worked hard raising 
and arming troops and developing a defensive scheme 
for Harper's Ferry which he was determined to hold at 
all costs. The appearance of his camp at this time, as 
described by Colonel Deas, inspector-general of the 
Confederate army, is not without interest : — 

The troops here are all raw and inexperienced — wanting even in the 
first elements of the school of the soldier — and there is a great scarcity 
of proper instructors. Many of the captains are singularly ignorant 
of their duties. Guard duty is very loosely done; and, indeed, there is 
apparent on every side the mere elements of men and arms, without 
the discipline and organization of an army. There is a sad deficiency 
in clothing and in camp and garrison equipage. ... To make up, how- 
ever, for this loose state of things so striking to the professional eye, it 
must not be forgotten that a fierce spirit animates those rough looking 
men. , . . This spirit is invincible.^ 

On the 15th of May, General Johnston was appointed 
to command the troops at Harper's Ferry, and arrived 
there on the 24th of the month. Joseph Eggleston Johns- 

* 0. R. Sen l, vol. 11, 862; Deas to Garnett. 



46 BULL RUN 

ton was born on the 3d of February, 1807, at Cherry 
Grove, Prince Edward County, Virginia. His father 
was a planter and had served in the war of Independ- 
ence under " Lighthorse" Harry, father of Robert E. Lee. 
He entered West Point in 1825, in the same class as Lee, 
with whom he formed a steadfast and lifelong friendship. 
He graduated high in his class, displayed strength of 
character and military aptitude, and formed a marked 
habit of reading historical and professional literature. 
He had a distinguished career in the army, winning two 
brevets in the Mexican War, and receiving three wounds 
at the head of his battalion of light infantry on the field 
of Chapultepec. Scott said of him: "Johnston is a great 
soldier, but he has an unfortunate knack of getting him- 
self shot in nearly every engagement." That knack was 
to cling to him throughout the Civil War. 

In 1855, Johnston was sent to the 2d Cavalry as lieuten- 
ant-colonel under Sumner ; and in i860 Scott placed him 
in a list of four, with C. F. Smith, A. S. Johnston, and 
R. E. Lee, for the selection of a quartermaster-general for 
the army ; and it was he received the appointment. 

Johnston had character, courage, judgment, and pru- 
dence, — a useful equipment. He was at times inclined 
to be disputatious and over-methodical; but although 
not easy to please, his troops always believed in him. 
Longstreet wrote, perhaps more enthusiastically than 
others might have : — 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 47 

Johnston was skilled in the art and science of war, gifted in his quick, 
penetrating mind and soldierly bearing, genial and affectionate in 
nature, honorable and winning in person, and confiding in his love. 
He drew the hearts of those about him so close that his comrades felt 
that they could die for him.^ 

He had, in fact, some qualifications for command, though 
he entirely lacked the subtlety of Lee, and the hard, 
brilliant daring of Jackson. Unfortunately for the cause 
he served, his personal relations with Jefferson Davis 
were so bad that military operations were more than 
once seriously aflfected by them ; and he suffered from a 
chronic inability to make his intentions clear to his sub- 
ordinates, both in the writing and in the transmitting of 
his orders. 

Up to the moment of Johnston's arrival at Harper's 
Ferry the prevailing idea had been that that point could 
and should be held. Jackson had devoted much time 
and energy to fortifying the heights on both sides of the 
Potomac with this object in view. But Johnston, imme- 
diately on his arrival and much to the chagrin of the 
Confederate authorities at Richmond, formed an adverse 
opinion. He found that with little over 5000 men to dis- 
pose of he had to watch the Potomac from Williamsport 
down to Point of Rocks, say thirty miles. The troops 
had no more than twelve to fifteen rounds of ammuni- 
tion with as much again in reserve. There was little 
transport. The soldiers were so undisciplined as to be 
* Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 100. 



48 BULL RUN 

unfit for action. But the case will be best stated in 

Johnston's own words : — 

Harper's Ferry is untenable against an army by any force not strong 
enough to hold the neighboring heights north of the Potomac and east 
of the Shenandoah, as well as the place itself. It is a triangle formed 
by the Potomac, Shenandoah, and Furnace Ridge, the latter extending 
from river to river, a mile and a half above their junction. Artillery 
on the heights above mentioned . . . could sweep every part of this 
space. . . . Two main routes lead from Maryland and Pennsylvania 
into the Valley of Virginia, meeting at Winchester: one passing through 
Frederick and crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry; the other 
leading through Chambersburg, Williamsport (where it crosses the 
Potomac), and Martinsburg. These roads are met at Winchester by 
the principal one from northwestern Virginia into the Valley, and also 
by a good and direct one from Manassas Junction. . . . Our scouts 
and friends in Maryland . . . reported that the armies of General Pat- 
terson and McClellan were to unite at Winchester. ... It was neces- 
sary of course that the Confederate troops in the Valley should always 
be ready to meet this in\'asion as well as to unite quickly with the 
army at Manassas Junction whenever it might be threatened. ... At 
Harper's Ferry they were manifestly out of position for either object. 
. . . Winchester . . . fulfilled the conditions desired better than any 
other point. ^ 

It is difficult to say to what extent Lee agreed or dis- 

* Johnston, Narrative, 17. His official reports are all consistent with this 
statement. See further his Memorandum, May 26th, and his dispatch to 
Garnett, O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 880, 881 , and Deas' report of inspection, May 
23d, ibid. 867. I believe Johnston's view was correct, and that his proper 
position, all factors considered, was a little in front of Winchester. Jack- 
son, a greater soldier, disagreed with his commander. A stand at Har- 
per's Ferry placed Patterson in the possible dilemma either of a direct 
attack on that place, or of an advance towards Winchester from Wil- 
liamsport at least as far as Martinsburg, offering his flank to the Confed- 
erates. I understand that my friend Captain Conger, who views John- 
ston's strategy as timid rather than prudent, thinks Jackson was right. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 49 

agreed with these views. He knew the ground, and it 
may well be that Johnston's conclusion appealed to 
him as sound. But Jefferson Davis fought hard against 
accepting it. Jackson whole-heartedly believed that Har- 
per's Ferry should be held at all costs ; and in his official 
correspondence with Johnston, Lee more than once 
urged upon him the great importance of holding the 
place, if in Johnston's judgment it possibly could be 
held. At the same time he acquiesced in that judg- 
ment when given adversely; and it may be surmised 
that he really accepted it as correct, having before this 
merely echoed the wishes and hopes of his Government. 
On the 30th of May, two weeks before Johnston actually 
abandoned Harper's Ferry, we already find Lee outlining 
a movement that closely fitted in with Johnston's views 
and that contained in embryo the decisive operation 
that carried him to Bull Run two months later. Lee 
pointed out the possibility that a Federal force might 
move through Point of Rocks towards Leesburg, the 
very move Scott had already thought of for Colonel 
Stone's small column. " In the event of such a move- 
ment," he wrote, "should you deem it advisable and 
should you be unable to hold your position, I would sug- 
gest a joint attack by you and General Bonham, com- 
manding at Manassas, for the purpose of cutting them 
off." 1 

* Lee to Johnston, May 30, 1861. O. R. Sen i, vol. 11, 894. 



50 BULL RUN 

On the 13th of June we find a long dispatch of Gen- 
eral Cooper to Johnston. Through it there runs a very 
perceptible vein of irony provoked by the fact that John- 
ston had constantly requested the Government to accept 
his view of the strategic position in express terms. This 
President Davis had as constantly refused to do, con- 
tinuing to emphasize the importance of holding Harper's 
Ferry, without, however, limiting Johnston's discretion. 
Finally, in the Adjutant-General's dispatch, Johnston ob- 
tained what he wanted : — 

As you seem to desire . . . that the responsibility of your retirement 
should be assumed here, and as no reluctance is felt to bear any burden 
which the public interests require, you will consider yourself author- 
ized, whenever the position of the enemy shall convince you that he is 
about to turn your position and thus deprive the country of the use of 
yourself and the troops under your command, to destroy everything 
at Harper's'Ferry . . . and retire upon . . . Winchester, destroying 
the road behind you. . . . Whatever . . . would impede your operations 
in the field it would be well to send without delay to the Manassas 
road . . . upon some of the passes on which it is hoped you will be able 
to make an effective stand. . . . Should you move so far as to make a 
junction with General Beauregard, the enemy would be free immedi- 
ately to occupy the Valley of Virginia,^ and to pass to the rear of Man- 
assas Junction. ... It has been with reluctance that any attempt was 
made to give you specific instructions, and you will accept assurances 
of the readiness with which the freest exercise of discretion on your 
part will be sustained.^ 

* The Shenandoah Valley. 

* O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 925. When Davis, many years later, wrote his Rise 
and Fall of the Confederate Government, he had apparently modified his 
judgment and accepted Johnston's position as correct. See pp. 340, 341. 



EARLY MOVEMENTS AND PLANS 51 

That very day, probably before General Cooper's dis- 
patch reached him, Johnston began his retirement. The 
immediate cause was the receipt of information that the 
Federals had reached Romney in western Virginia, 
whence, even if remotely, they threatened Winchester, the 
great knot of roads in the Valley. He promptly ordered 
Colonel A. P. Hill with a couple of regiments to that 
point, and this merely began a movement that was car- 
ried out through the 14th, and completed when his rear 
guard evacuated Harper's Ferry on the 15th. As John- 
ston fell back up the Valley towards Winchester, he 
wrote as follows from Long Meadow to the War De- 
partment at Richmond : — 

General Cooper, 

Adj. and Inspector-General, Richmond. 

General, — I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 13th. 
I know myself to be a careless writer, and will not, therefore, pretend to 
have expressed clearly the opinions I wished to have put before the 
Government. I am confident, however, that nothing in my correspond- 
ence with my military superiors makes me obnoxious to the charge of 
desiring that the responsibility of my official acts should be borne by 
any other person than myself. 

I had the honor yesterday to report to the President the removal of 
the troops from Harper's Ferry. . . . ^ 

* O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 930. 



Ill 

OPERATIONS AND PLANS, JUNE i6 TO JULY i6 

NORTH 

On the 27th of April, Major-General Robert Patterson/ 
of the Pennsylvania Militia, a veteran of the War of 
181 2, had been assigned to the command of the Depart- 
ment of Pennsylvania. For some weeks he devoted his 
time to organizing his new troops, after which he began 
to push them down into Maryland and towards the Vir- 
ginia border, A few detachments of regulars, infantry, 
cavalry, and guns, were sent to him, which, however slight 
in numbers, he looked to as the stiffening of his army. 
By the ist of June the greater part of Patterson's four 
brigades was concentrating about Chambersburg, Ha- 
gerstown, and Williamsport, practically ready to cross 
the Potomac at the latter point. He had about 12,000 
men and his numbers slowly increased to 14,000 by the 
28th of June. On the 15th of that month, the day on 
which Johnston's rear-guard left Harper's Ferry, Patter- 
son was still at Chambersburg, and had not yet crossed 
the Potomac. 

* Captain, lieutenant-colonel, and colonel, 2d Pennsylvania Militia, 
1812-13; major-general of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1846-47. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 53 

June 16, 1861 — II A.M. 

Major-General Patterson . . . 

What movement, if any, in pursuit of the enemy, do you propose 
to make consequent on the evacuation of Harper's Ferry? If no pur- 
suit, and I recommend none specially, send to me at once all the regular 
troops, horse and foot, with you, and also the Rhode Island regiment. 

Winfield Scott. 

To this Patterson replied : ** Design no pursuit ; cannot 
make it." 1 

The impatient dispatch of the commander-in-chief, 
together with its answer, will serve better than anything 
else to mark the turn which the Federal operations took 
at this date. Patterson's slowness had discouraged the 
Government, and Scott was now apparently becoming 
convinced that a vigorous and effective offensive was 
hardly to be looked for in that quarter. More important 
than that, the fact was now being realized by the politi- 
cians at Washington that however popular three months' 
volunteering might be among their electors, it did not 
seem a very promising method of dealing with the Civil 
War. Most of the regiments were nearly two months old 
and still lacking in tactical skill and mobility ; while ope- 
rations were manifestly in nothing more than a prepar- 
atory stage. In Patterson's army every regiment but 
one was on a three months' basis, and he reported that 
all except the ist Wisconsin would claim their dis- 
charge.2 It was natural, therefore, that the politicians 

* O. R. Sen i, vol. ii, 691. 

^ In fourteen regiments, selected at random, the term of service.ended 



54 BULL RUN 

and journalists should begin to abuse somebody for the 
fiasco that was now threatening. The army was muzzled 
by discipline and was therefore the natural and inevit- 
able scapegoat for civilian ineptitude ; and in a frenzied 
effort to make good foolish declarations made to politi- 
cal followers or newspaper subscribers, a fatal cry was 
raised : " On to Richmond 1 " From that moment Scott 
and his devoted staff were to be spurred unmercifully to 
the finish. Something must be accomplished, whatever 
the cost, before the three months' army went home 
again ; that something must be an advance to Manassas, 
and thence to Richmond. 

Scott reluctantly accepted the situation and tried to 
make the best of it. After all, Manassas was only twenty- 
five miles from the Potomac, and even a raw army of 
little mobility might be moved thus far. If the enemy 
should be outnumbered, a success was within the bounds 
of possibility. So Scott, while disapproving, and while 
not committing himself to anything more than the move 
to Manassas, settled down to reinforcing McDowell and 
getting him fit to take the field before the end of the 
three months' army should supervene. 

Patterson, meanwhile, clung desperately to his regu- 
lars, and Scott sent him several pressing dispatches 

as follows: one regiment on July the 19th, one on the 20th; one on the 
22d; two on the 23d; one each on the 24th, 25th, 27th, and 30th. The bat- 
tle of Bull Run, it should be remembered, was fought on the 21st of that 
month. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 55 

before he could obtain them. One of these, on the i6th, 
is interesting, as it shows how Scott viewed the possible 
effect on the strategic situation of an advance by Patter- 
son up the Valley : — 

Why a detachment upon Winchester? If strong enough the detach- 
ment would drive the enemy from Winchester to Strasburg and the 
Manassas Junction. . . . What would be gained? . . . And if your 
detachment be not strong it would be lost. Hence the detachment, if 
not bad, would be useless.^ 

From this and other evidence,* it is possible to state 
Scott's general view : There is no hurry now for Patter- 
son to press forward, because McDowell is not yet ready 
for the advance against Manassas. On the contrary, 
Patterson's delay near the Potomac will most probably 
induce the Confederates to keep Johnston's army well 
to the north, which will delay their concentration at Ma- 
nassas Junction. If and when, however, Patterson does 
operate against Johnston, it must be not with detach- 
ments but with his whole force, that is, vigorously and 
in such a way as either to defeat him, or to grip him 
so closely as to prevent his moving to Manassas in good 
order as an effective reinforcement for Beauregard. 

Things now became more active on the lower Poto- 
mac. Reconnaissances were pushed out towards the 
enemy. On the i6th of June, 400 men under Tyler, start- 
ing from the extreme right of the Federals near Chain 
Bridge, went as far as Vienna, finding no sign of the 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 694. 



56 BULL RUN 

enemy. On the 17th, Scott instructed McDowell to send 
a strong reconnaissance from Alexandria along the 
Loudoun and Hampshire Railroad to the same point. 

The I St Ohio Volunteers, Colonel McCodk, 697 rank 
and file, was detailed for this service ; General Schenck, 
the brigade commander, was in charge. The troops left 
Alexandria by train in the afternoon of the 17th of June. 
At six miles, Schenck passed the advanced posts and dis- 
entrained two companies to guard the line ; at ten miles, 
Falls Church, he disentrained two more companies. He 
then proceeded at slow speed towards Vienna and, 
taking no other precaution, was rounding a curve little 
more than a mile from that place, when two field pieces 
unexpectedly opened fire on him. Schenck had run into 
Colonel Gregg's command, the ist South Carolina In- 
fantry, with a troop of cavalry, and a section of six- 
pounders under Kemper.^ 

Gregg, too, was on a reconnaissance. From Fairfax 
Court House he had pushed as far as the Potomac with- 
out difficulty. He was now, at 6 P.M., passing through 
Vienna on his return, when he observed the slow ap- 
proach of Schenck's locomotive, just in time to take posi- 
tion. The effect of his field pieces on Schenck's train 
was instantaneous. The men jumped, scattered to the 
right and left, and promptly took to the woods. The en- 

1 The Confederate reconnaissance was properly constituted of the three 
arms; the contrast with the Federals is striking. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 57 

gfineer, who was at the rear, detached the now empty 
platform cars and promptly ran back to Alexandria. 
Gregg made no attempt at pursuit. Schenck and his 
men, finding their way back to the railroad, eventually 
made good their retreat ; they had lost 8 killed, 4 
wounded, and i prisoner. Thus closed an incident trifling 
in itself, yet which, as far as it went, seemed to indicate 
better leadership and organization on the Southern side. 

Patterson, who had crossed the Potomac at Williams- 
port on the 17th, became alarmed because of Scott's 
calling his regulars to Washington, and because of highly 
exaggerated reports of Johnston's numbers and move- 
ments. Although that general was many miles to the 
south, Patterson promptly decided to retire to the north 
side of the Potomac, and began a ludicrously cautious 
approach of the abandoned Confederate position at 
Harper's Ferry. 

On the 20th of June, Scott outlined a plan for bringing 
in Patterson to cooperate with McDowell against Ma- 
nassas. Harper's Ferry might be controlled by a sin- 
gle powerful battery placed on Maryland Heights, there 
being no particular object in occupying the town itself. 
The bulk of Patterson's forces might then be brought 
eastwards through Leesburg to cooperate with Mc- 
Dowell.i 

» O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 709. 



58 BULL RUN 

There were several valid objections to such a plan. It 
had been well ascertained by this time that Patterson 
was not an enterprising general, and that his army was 
not very mobile. Yet such a move demanded that he 
should first cross the Blue Ridge and then the Potomac, 
presumably at Point of Rocks, after which he would have 
to make a flank march of quite thirty miles with the 
Potomac on one side of him and the enemy on the other. 
Johnston, with the Manassas Gap Railroad to help him, 
would presumably always be able to reach Manassas 
before Patterson could get to Vienna, and might pos- 
sibly find a favorable occasion for attacking Patterson 
in flank before he could effect his junction with Mc- 
Dowell. 

On the 2 1 St, McDowell was requested from Head- 
quarters to frame a scheme of operations for joining 
hands with Patterson towards Leesburg, " a column co- 
operating from this end " ; and on the 24th, he presented 
the following plan : — 

There is at Manassas Junction, and the places in its front or imme- 
diate vicinity, a force of from 23,000 to 25,000 infantry and about 2000 
cavalry and a supply of well-provided artillery. . . . How much of a 
force is beyond Manassas Gap, in the Valley, and could be brought 
within the operations here contemplated, I have no means of judging. 
There is nothing to hinder their coming, and unless they are kept 
engaged by our troops around Harper's Ferry, reinforcements, in 
case of serious operations from that section, would have to be guarded 
against, as would also those from places to the south of Manassas on 
the line of the railroad to Richmond. . . . 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 59 

We have in this Department good, bad, and indifferent, twenty 
regiments of infantry, giving an aggregate of less than 14,000; four 
companies of cavalry giving about 250; one battery of regular artillery 
of six rifled guns. ... It seems to me the distance between General 
Patterson's force and this one is so great and the line of march each 
has to take is such (a flank exposed), that, in my view, the force to 
move from each position should be constituted without reference to 
material support from the other. . . . 

What would be our position if a movement is made to the right . . . 
towards Leesburg? In the first place as we are for any such purpose 
without means of wagon transportation, we should be obliged to 
repair and use the railroad; but whether this was done or not, we 
should march with the left flank of the column exposed to attack from 
their advanced positions. . . . 

Any reverse happening to this raw force . . . with the enemy on 
the flank and rear and an impassable river on the right would be fatal. 
I do not think, therefore, it safe to risk anything from this position 
in the direction of Leesburg farther than Vienna . . . and even to go 
there the force should be large. . . .^ 

On the whole, it must be concluded that McDowell's 
views were sounder than Scott's. When one considers 
the extraordinarily low degree of mobility displayed by 
the Federals during the whole campaign, it is difficult 
to view the proposed concentration on Leesburg as any- 
thing more than a map problem. It was an important 
point, it is true, but held only by a weak detachment of 
a few hundred men ; while the operation exposed both 
Federal armies to flank attacks for no object likely to 
result in the immediate disadvantage of the enemy. 
McDowell, however much he may have exaggerated 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 718. 



6o BULL RUN 

the numbers in his front, was surely right in virtually 
declining to carry out such a plan. 

Scott promptly gave up his Leesburg scheme, on any 
large scale, and came back to the old idea of the direct 
advance on Manassas. He probably requested Mc- 
Dowell to draw up a new statement based on that idea, 
for an undated memorandum, which presumably belongs 
to the 24th or 25th, was prepared by the latter. From 
this document again we must take some long ex- 
tracts : — 

They have . . . been expecting us to attack their position and have 
been preparing for it. When it becomes known positively we are about 
to march, and they learn in what strength, they will be obliged to call 
in their disposable forces from all quarters, for they will not be able, 
if closely pressed, to get away by railroad before we can reach them. 
If General J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Major General 
Patterson ... I think they will not be able to bring up more than 
10,000 men. So we must calculate on having to do with 35,000 men. 

The objective point in our plan is Manassas Junction. . . . The 
country lying between the two armies is mostly thickly wooded and 
the roads . . . are narrow. . . . This makes it necessary to have the 
fewest possible number of carriages of any kind, and our forces, there- 
fore, though the distance is short, will have to move over several lines 
of approach in order to get forward in time a sufficient body to operate 
with success. . . . The Orange and Alexandria road, which I propose 
to look to as the main channel of supply, is now in working order some 
seven miles out of Alexandria, and from Manassas Junction to within 
fifteen miles of Alexandria. In the intermediate space the road has 
been destroyed as effectively as possible, and a long deep cut filled in 
with trees and earth. . . . 

Leaving small garrisons in the defensive works, I propose to move 
against Manassas with a force of 30,000 of all arms, organized into 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 6i 

three columns, with a reserve of 10,000. One column to move from 
Falls Church or Vienna ... to go between Fairfax Court House and 
Centreville, and, in connection with another column moving by the 
Little River turnpike, cut off or drive in . . . the enemy's advanced 
posts. The third column to move by the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad, and leaving as large a force as may be necessary to aid in 
rebuilding it, to push on with the remainder to join the first and second 
columns. 

The enemy is said to have batteries in position at several places 
in his front, and defensive works on Bull Run and Manassas Junction. 
I do not propose that these batteries be attacked for I think they may 
all be turned. Bull Run, I am told, is fordable at almost any place. 
After uniting the columns this side of it, I propose to attack the main 
position by turning it, if possible, so as to cut off communications by 
rail with the South, or threaten to do so sufficiently to force the 
enemy to leave his entrenchments to guard them. . . . Believing the 
chances are greatly in favor of the enemy's accepting battle between 
this and the Junction, and that the consequences of that battle will be 
of the greatest importance to the country as establishing the prestige 
in this contest on the one side or on the other — the more so as the 
two sections will be fairly represented by regiments from almost 
every State — I think it of great consequence that, as for the most 
part our regiments are exceedingly raw and the best of them, with few 
exceptions, not over steady in line, they be organized into as many 
small fixed brigades as the number of regular colonels will admit. . . .* 

At the moment that McDowell prepared this statement 
he reported present for duty 13,666 men and 764 officers.^ 
This plan of operations was substantially the one 
which McDowell attempted to carry out four weeks 
later, and therefore needs close examination. Let us 
take it point by point, noting first of all the omissions. 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 720, 721. 

* O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 726; June 26, 1861. 



62 BULL RUN 

To begin with, then, it is important to see that Mc- 
Dowell, although dealing with a problem that involved 
the handling of 30,000 or 40,000 men, still maintains 
a certain tone that he had assumed from the start, that of 
a subordinate commander and not that of the general- 
in-chief of an army. At the moment when he had been 
detached from Scott's staff to assume command of the 
troops beyond the Potomac, that attitude might in a 
way have been justified. He had suddenly been pro- 
moted to the rank of a general from that of a major ; 
General Scott had from the beginning treated him as a 
direct subordinate ; his orders being often of the most 
precise and detailed character, indicating that McDow- 
ell was not entrusted with much, if any, initiative. 

It had thus unfortunately come about, quite naturally 
from the existing circumstances, that, although Mc- 
Dowell realized well enough some of the elements of the 
strategic problem, he did not always consider it his busi- 
ness to deal with them. For, in fact, the problem before 
him was only stated by Scott in part, and he therefore 
offered only a part solution. That problem was not 
merely how to reach Manassas Junction and how to de- 
feat the Confederate army there, but it was how to deal 
with the aggregate of the Confederate forces in the field 
that might be brought into action at Manassas. John- 
ston's army was within sixty miles, and controlled an un- 
damaged line of rail for about half of that distance. The 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 63 

real problem confronting a general marching on Man- 
assas comprised, therefore, both Johnston's and Beaure- 
gard's armies. McDowell, while really conscious of the 
fact, assumed that his function was limited to carrying out 
part only of a larger and quite undetermined operation, 
of which the conduct and responsibility rested with Scott. 
It is therefore impossible to absolve the commander-in- 
chief from some part of the blame due to his failing to 
give sufficient scope to the operations and function of 
McDowell's army. There was a maladjustment of com- 
mand, and a failure to seize the essential features of the 
situation clearly and logically. McDowell shifted the re- 
sponsibility for anything that might happen a few miles 
to the west of him on Scott ; and Scott, while alive to the 
danger, did not deal with it completely, in fact drifted, in 
a way that will presently be described. McDowell's own 
chief of staff declared later that he "was dominated by the 
feeling of subordination and deference to General Scott." ^ 
On the basis then of McDowell's false assumption 
as to Scott's covering his movement against Manas- 
sas, the salient features of his scheme may now be 
dealt with. And first it may be noted that he was fully 
conscious that information passed rapidly from Washing- 
ton to the Confederate headquarters ; that the prepara- 
tions for such a move as he contemplated could not be 
concealed and would give the enemy ample warning; 

1 Fry, Battles and Leaders, i, i8i. 



64 BULL RUN 

and that his advance must be relatively slow. In other 
words, all the conditions would inevitably give the enemy 
time to effect a heavier concentration in his front unless 
otherwise prevented. Rapidity of march was therefore 
essential to his success. The case might even be put on 
more general grounds, for rapidity is one of the greatest 
of military virtues ; and judging from the whole record of 
McDowell, one gets a clear impression that that virtue 
was not in him. 

As against this it might be argued in his favor that 
his army could not show mobility in its then condition of 
faulty organization, which he fully realized. He doubt- 
less felt keenly the danger of overmarching such a large 
body of men, lacking fitness and cohesion. It might be 
harsh to blame him for leaning towards prudence rather 
than towards boldness. Yet the offensive has always im- 
plied boldness rather than prudence ; and it was an of- 
fensive operation he was asked to undertake. 

The statement that " we must have the fewest possible 
number of carriages" requires comment. A sufficient 
transport train, if it could have been properly managed, 
would have gone a long way towards making the army 
mobile, freeing it from the Orange and Alexandria Rail- 
road, and making available the large reserve McDowell 
contemplated moving along that railroad to establish a 
line of communications.^ But this was clearly not what 

* A railway makes a more efficient line of communications than a road; 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 65 

McDowell had in mind. His fundamental transport 
difficulty was one of organization and experience, — the 
being able to handle transportation ; while in one sense he 
lacked transport, in another he had too much, as appears 
from Sherman's description of the camps of the volunteer 
regiments: "They were so loaded down with over- 
coats, haversacks, knapsacks, tents, and baggage, that 
it took from twenty-five to fifty wagons to move the 
camp of a regiment from one place to another, and some 
of the camps had bakeries and cooking establishments 
that would have done credit to Delmonico." ^ 

The Orange and Alexandria Railroad was broken up 
at Accotink Creek, about ten miles from Alexandria, and 
it might be presumed that on retiring the Confederates 
would destroy the line from that point westward. Under 
these circumstances the problem of the army's line of 
communications was not clearly grasped. The Orange 
and Alexandria could under no imaginable circumstances 
be the army's line of communication during the period 
of the actual operation against Manassas Junction, for the 
reason that it could not be made fit for use within 
the brief space within which a Confederate concentration 
could be forestalled. Up to the time when the army 
should have defeated the enemy and occupied Manassas 

but it is more delicate owing to its liability to destruction, and therefore 
consumes more troops for guarding purposes. 
^ Sherman, Mems., i, 178. 



66 BULL RUN 

Junction it would have to be supplied by road transpor- 
tation, and that being the case the railroad line became 
a subordinate issue until after the moment when Mc- 
Dowell's army should be established at Manassas. After 
that, the re-establishing, and perhaps the guarding, of 
the railroad would doubtless become a prime issue. The 
decision to place a heavy reserve on that railroad, partly 
to guard and partly to rebuild it, was therefore a grave 
error. The correct policy was to leave a few posts to 
cover the line from raiding parties ; to move to the front 
every available man to reinforce the main army ; to 
strike rapidly ; and to supply the army by road.^ 

As to the plan for the advance it is less subject to 
criticism, save in so far as the preceding remarks apply 
to it. The move towards a front, Centreville-Sangs- 
ter's Crossroads (the latter point is about a mile south of 
Fairfax Station), was clearly indicated, and it was fair, 
in view of defective local knowledge and the uncertainty 
attending military operations, to leave further move- 
ments to be determined later. The general preference 
for a flanking movement over a frontal attack was nat- 
ural ; but this point wall receive further consideration 
later, as well as the question of the use of artillery. The 
turning of the Confederate flank was dealt with on the 

1 McDowell's paragraph about the use of his 3d division and reserve 
on the railroad, when read with his earlier plan, is illogical and contra- 
dictory, 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 67 

basis that Johnston's army need not be considered, and 
McDowell merely decided to operate on the enemy's 
line of communications by the flank that left his own 
line, that is the railroad, as well guarded as possible. He 
did not consider the effect of this move in possibly com- 
pelling Beauregard's retreat towards Johnston, and the 
resulting accumulation of force against Patterson. 

Keenly conscious of the lack of cohesion of his army, 
McDowell merely repeated a request already made in 
asking for a brigade organization. It will be more con- 
venient to leave this and similar points to be discussed 
when we consider the composition and organization of 
his army at the time the campaign opened. 

To sum up : one of the chief criticisms levelled at Mc- 
Dowell's scheme — it might be fairer to treat it as both 
McDowell's and Scott's — was that it left a loose end of 
the greatest importance in the matter of Johnston's army. 
A dispatch of Scott to Patterson of this same date, June 
the 25th, will reinforce the argument, and show that this 
problem was not being adequately dealt with. In this, 
Scott says : — 

Remain in front of the enemy while he continues in force between 
Winchester and the Potomac. If you are in superior or equal force, 
you may cross and oflfer him battle. If the enemy should retire upon 
his resources at Winchester, it is not enjoined that you should pursue 
him to that distance from your base of operations without a well- 
grounded confidence in your continued superiority.* 

* O. R. Sen i, vol. ii, 725. 



68 BULL RUN 

An instruction of this sort to an officer whose caution, 
not to say timidity, should have been realized, might 
easily result in giving Johnston a large liberty of action. 

The fact appears to have been that Scott was physi- 
cally unequal to the conduct of the war. It is true that at 
the outbreak he was the one person at Washington com- 
petent to give a sound technical opinion to the Adminis- 
tration. When we contrast his reasoned views with the 
prevailing ignorance, Scott at once commands our con- 
fidence, our admiration, and our sympathy. He could 
judge what war on such a theatre of operations and 
with armies of militia meant: Three hundred thous- 
and men might in two or three years destroy the eco- 
nomic resources of the South and bring about a restora- 
tion of order, — that was his minimum. It was actually 
to take nearly ten times that number of men and nearly 
twice that time ; while the Administration had informed 
the country that one quarter of the men and one tenth of 
the time would suffice. 

But however competent Scott might have been in his 
general views at the outset, he assumed far too readily 
that his subordinates were as fit to play the game of 
war as he was. He was aged and infirm, no longer able 
to deal with desk work continuously. Headquarters were 
not sufficiently organized to cope with the heavy and 
confusing work that the emergency called for ; and the 
politicians made that work even more difficult. Sen- 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 69 

ator Wilson, chairman of tiie Committee on Military 
Affairs, for which his qualification was his success in life 
as a manufacturer of shoes and a manipulator of votes, 
habitually reviled West Pointers for no better reason than 
that they were West Pointers. His attitude was typical of 
that of many other men of the same type who directed 
the government of the country, for its misfortune. 

Scott probably felt little confidence in the abilities of 
his two army commanders. He limited McDowell's view 
of his operations so that when that commander knew 
Johnston had come within them, he declined to act on 
the information, leaving the responsibility to others. And 
Scott poured out an unceasing stream of orders and 
recommendations on Patterson that were not consistent 
in spirit and that did not tend to stimulate that ineffec- 
tive commander into efficiency. Thus we find him, two 
days after the last quoted dispatch, telegraphing to Pat- 
terson, as follows : " No acknowledgment of mine of the 
25th ; and letter of the same date. Under the latter I had 
expected your crossing the river to-day in pursuit of the 
enemy." ^ Such an expectation was clearly not justified, 
and the natural effect of Scott's dispatch of the 25th on 
an officer such as Patterson is that shown in the latter's 
dispatch to one of his subordinates on the 26th, in which 
he writes : " If I can get permission to go over into Vir- 
ginia, I intend to cross the river and offer battle to the 
* O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 727; Scott to Patterson, June 27, 1861. 



70 BULL RUN 

insurgents." ^ The road from Williamsport to Win- 
chester was paved quite solid with Patterson's good 
intentions 1 

On the 29th of June a conference was held at the 
White House to which the President summoned Generals 
Scott, McDowell, Mansfield, Meigs, Sandford, and Tyler. 
McDowell read his plan for the attack on Manassas, and 
after some desultory comment, this was apparently ap- 
proved by those present.^ On the following day a meet- 
ing of the Cabinet was held at which the retention of 
Patterson in command was debated; it was decided not 
to make a change. A week later the same question arose 
again, but with the same result.^ 

Meanwhile the President had decided that McDowell 
should march on Manassas in accordance with his plan, 
and at the earliest possible date, in view of the fact that 
before another month most of his men would become 
entitled to be discharged from service. At the moment 
Scott hoped that the advance might take place in about 
a week's time, as he informed General Patterson on the 
following day.4 

On the 4th of July, Congress assembled. Political 
questions do not come strictly within our scope, yet it is 
impossible to pass by some of the demands and state- 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 726. 

2 Rep. Cond. War, 11, 36, 62. 
' Rep. Cond. War, 11, 62, 55. 

* O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 157; Townsend to Patterson. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 71 

merits made by the Administration on that occasion, for 
they illustrate in a striking degree the grave misfortunes 
that attend a country that neglects to conduct its mili- 
tary affairs as a matter of business and under competent 
technical advice. President Lincoln's Message to Con- 
gress virtually admitted the uselessness of his previous 
measures, for he now asked for an army of 400,000 men. 
But that was almost a confession that McDowell's army 
was not fit for its purpose, and that the lives of his offi- 
cers and men were to be deliberately offered up on the 
sacred altar of political bluff. And the message added in- 
sult to injury. Seizing on the fact that so many officers 
had followed their States and renounced their allegiance, 
from mistaken loyalty to a cause more than one of them 
believed hopeless, Lincoln made an odious comparison 
by declaring : " Not one common soldier or common sailor 
is known to have deserted his flag." That might be the 
way to win necessary popular and newspaper approval ; 
it was not the way of facilitating the cruel task he had 
already loaded on the shoulders of that group of brave 
and self-denying men at the head of which stood Scott 
and McDowell. The weightiest historian of the epoch 
has well characterized Lincoln's message when he says : 
" No demagogue ever made a more crafty appeal." ^ 

Meanwhile Patterson had received some artillery, an 
arm in which he had been deficient, and finally ven- 
* Rhodes, History, iir, 440. 



72 BULL RUN 

tured across the Potomac. He occupied Martinsburg on 
the 3d of July, Confederate detachments retiring before 
him. He now informed Scott that he would advance 
on the enemy at Winchester, and thence open up com- 
munications with McDowell through Charlestown and 
Leesburg. This was all fairly satisfactory as seen from 
headquarters. It appeared to indicate that energetic 
action might be expected from Patterson and that he 
would begin pressing in on Johnston a few days before 
the moment fixed for McDowell's advance. But in these 
same dispatches Patterson announced that he was short 
of supplies and must wait to get them up, that Johnston 
was in his immediate front, and that he was embarrassed 
by the fact that the term of enlistment of his volunteer 
regiments had nearly expired. Scott, however, took the 
case at its best, and signified his satisfaction to Patterson. 
"Having defeated the enemy," he wrote, "if you can 
continue the pursuit without too great hazard, advance 
via Leesburg . . . towards Alexandria ; but . . . move 
with great caution." ^ As usual with Patterson, it was the 
expression "caution" that fixed his attention and "de- 
feat the enemy " that escaped him. Already on the 5th, 
he was giving credit to fantastic reports that Johnston 
had been heavily reinforced from Manassas ; he showed 
the greatest disinclination to advance. He was still at 
Martinsburg hurrying all possible reinforcements to that 

» O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 157, 159; dispatches of July 3, 4, and 5. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 73 

point and clamoring for more troops. His offensive ten- 
dencies were not reawakened by a dispatch of the 7th 
from Washington announcing that owing to the dearth 
of horses the advance on Manassas could not take place 
before the 14th. ^ 

A long dispatch from Patterson to Colonel Townsend, 
A.A.G., dated from Martinsburg the 9th of July, reveals 
that general's state of mind. The last paragraph alone 
was sufficient to show how little he could be relied on to 
keep Johnston away from Manassas : — 

As I have already stated, I cannot advance far, and if I could I 
think the movement very imprudent. When you make your attack 
I expect to advance and offer battle. If the enemy retires I shall not 
pursue. I am very desirous to know when the general-in-chief wishes 
me to approach Leesburg. ..." 

On the nth, Scott sent Patterson a report indicating 
that the Confederates were attempting to lure him as far 
as Winchester where, by reinforcing Johnston from Ma- 
nassas, they could strike him at a disadvantage some 
way from his base. Patterson entirely fell in with this 
view; on the 12th, — and McDowell was now almost 
ready to move, — he asked permission to change his 
line of operations from Hagerstown-Martinsburg-Win- 
chester, to Harper's Ferry-Charlestown-Winchester, in- 
volving a change of base certain, with him, to occupy 
some days. And yet at that very moment Patterson's in- 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, i6i ; Townsend to Patterson, July 7. 
* O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 163. 



74 BULL RUN 

formation, erroneous as it proved, was that Johnston had 
just fallen back beyond Winchester towards the Manas- 
sas Gap Railroad.^ 

On the 13th, news reached Patterson that General 
McClellan had had a considerable success in western 
Virginia. He thereupon seized his pen and thus vented 
his emotions on the general-in-chief : — 

Martinsburg, July 13, 1861. 
Colonel E. D. Townsend, A.A.G. 

McClellan's victory received here with great joy. . . . My column 
must be preserved to insure to the country the fruits of this and other 
victories, which we hope will follow. My determination is not changed 
by this news. I would rather lose the chance of accomplishing some- 
thing brilliant than, by hazarding this column, to destroy the fruits of 
the campaign to the country by defeat. If wrong let me be instructed. 

R. Patterson. 2 

Comment appears to be superfluous. A critique of Pat- 
terson's generalship belongs less to the domain of mili- 
tary art than to that of musical comedy. 

It is difficult to exonerate Scott from the responsibility 
of entrusting to such a subordinate so vital and so deli- 
cate an operation as the one contemplated ; and it is 
difficult to exonerate him from continuously alternating 
in his orders recommendations to vigor and to pru- 
dence. On the 13th, Scott, for once, is explicit, though it 
may be questioned whether the following order was 
closely reasoned out on the facts and capable of execu- 
tion : — 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 165. ^ q. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 165. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 



75 



... If not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week,' 
make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester; 
but if he retreats in force towards Manassas, and if it be too hazardous 
to follow him, then consider the route via Leesburg.* 

The consistency of this with the general scheme is as 
evident as its inconsistency with several other dispatches 
from Scott to Patterson. It may further be noted that it 
was a pure assumption to suppose that Patterson could 
get news of a movement by Johnston on the Manassas 
Gap Railroad in time to act. The contrary assumption 
would have been nearer the actual fact. 

On the 14th Patterson wrote, still from Martinsburg: — 

To-morrow I advance. ... If an opportunity offers I shall attack; 
but unless I can rout, shall be careful not to set him in full retreat 
upon Strassburg. . . . Many of the three months' volunteers are rest- 
less at the prospect of being retained over their time. . . .^ 



•V; 



I / 



Two days later, after skirmishing so vigorously with 
the enemy that he claimed to have killed one man, Pat- 
terson reached Bunker Hill, twelve miles from Win- 
chester, and announced his movement for the following 
day, not towards Johnston and the Manassas Gap Rail- 
road, but to his left, towards Charlestown. 

The next day, the 17th of July, Patterson moved to his 
left, to Springfield, midway to Charlestown, and thence J' 
reported that eighteen of his regiments would be entitled 

* That is, about the i6th, the day McDowell actually moved. 
« O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 166. 
' O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 166. 






si 



76 BULL RUN 

to their discharge within a week and that he could not 
rely on any of them staying with him. " Shall I reoccupy 
. . . Harper's Ferry or withdraw entirely ? " he asks.^ 
At 9.30 P.M., with the news just in that McDowell was 
within five miles of Bull Run, Scott telegraphed as fol- 
lows: — 

I have nothing official from you since Sunday [14th], but am glad 
to learn, through Philadelphia papers, that you have advanced. Do 
not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front 
whilst he re-enforces his main body at the Junction. McDowell's first 
day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court House. The 
Junction will probably be carried to-morrow.^ 

To this Patterson replied at 1.30 A.M. on the morning of 
the 1 8th that to attack was hazardous, but should he 
do so ? A few hours later Scott answered : — 

I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to 
hear that you had felt him strongly. . . . You have been at least his 
equal, and, I suppose, superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march 
and sent re-enforcements toward Manassas Junction ? . . . You must 
not retreat. ... If necessary, when abandoned by the short term 
volunteers, intrench somewhere and wait for re-enforcements.' 

This reproach apparently nettled Patterson, for later on 
the same day, we find him retorting in highly imagina- 
tive if not positively untrue terms, as follows : — 

The enemy has stolen no march on me. I have kept him actively 
employed and by threats and reconnaissances in force caused him to 

» O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 167; Rep. Cond. War, 11, 57. 
* O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 168. 
" O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 168. 



'S?5W??'-'^-'~3 Williamsport 




Martinsburg'Ssss, C-iv,^^ Frederick 




Banker Hill o ci,°rie.Xoy^jR»fVjri FcTV* 


^*'**^*u^ 


J^ / Leesburg'St ^~^-'^_ 


■J\ 


JULy 18 *.M. jf /^ %i ^\^ 


f 


Winchesters ) \ ^*S 


f 


JUHE 18 -O \ 


7 ^ 


/Ashby'g Gap Ti 


s. / 


/ ^''^"'''is5i*H*s. x^ 


iJVashifigton 




■*"+'**n+<55f^AI\iTflndria 



Johnston's positions at various dates 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 77 

be re-enforced. I have accomplished in this respect more than the 
General-in-Chief asked, or could well be expected. ^ 

At the time when Patterson wrote those lines Johnston's 

troops were marching hard for Ashby's Gap, while forty 

miles further east Longstreet had just flung back Tyler 

from Blackburn's Ford on Bull Run. 

On the 20th, the day before the battle of Bull Run, 
Patterson telegraphed from Charlestown the far from 
valuable information that Johnston had moved from 
Winchester to Millwood on the i8th, with a force of 
35,000 men ; the fact being that his total was less than 
one third of that figure. This information was sent on 
by Scott to McDowell, and reached him on the field of 
battle where Johnston's troops were already facing him. 

We need not follow the unfortunate Patterson farther, 
merely adding that an order appointing General Banks 
to supersede him was dated the 19th of July. A review 
of his operations will be attempted after first tracing 
those of his opponent. General Joseph E. Johnston. 

THE CONFEDERATES IN THE SHENANDOAH 

Following his withdrawal from Harper's Ferry, John- 
ston took position at Bunker Hill, twelve miles north 
of Winchester, on the i6th of June. He expected that 
Patterson would cross the Potomac that day and ad- 
vance southward. He believed that the Federals out- 
» O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 168. 



78 BULL RUN 

numbered him by about three to one, though in fact the 
proportion was only about three to two, and his sole 
expectation for the moment was to retard their advance. 
He had increased his supply of ammunition to about 
thirty rounds. 

On the following day, Johnston decided to move back 
eight miles nearer to Winchester. There he found a 
position at Aittler's Run which he decided to fortify, to 
arm with a few heavy guns, and to hold. Strategically 
the move was sound, for he could now more easily repel 
any advance from western Virginia, or else reach Beaure- 
gard at Manassas, while he was almost as well placed for 
stopping Patterson, and in a stronger position. Colonel 
Stuart with the cavalry, about 300 sabres, was pushed 
out towards Patterson beyond Martinsburg, and Jack- 
son's brigade was moved to the latter place, in support, 
a few days later. These advanced troops found no enemy 
in their front, as Patterson had now recrossed the Po- 
tomac. 

This was the moment of McDowell's reconnaissances 
towards Vienna, and the interpretation of these move- 
ments at Confederate headquarters appears from a dis- 
patch of Jefferson Davis to Johnston on the 226. : — 

... If the enemy has withdrawn from your front ... it may be 
that an attempt will be made to advance from Leesburg to seize the 
Manassas road and to turn Beauregard's position. The recent eflfort 
to repair the railroad from Alexandria to Leesburg may have been 
with such intent. In that event, if your scouts give you accurate and 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 79 

timely information, an opportunity will be offered you by the roads 
through the mountain passes to make a flank attack. . . .^ 

On the 2d of July, as we have already seen, Patterson 
for the second time crossed the Potomac, and moved 
on Martinsburg, fighting a heavy skirmish with Jackson 
and Stuart on the way. On the news coming in, and 
with a view to imposing on the enemy and stopping his 
advance, Johnston moved at once towards Martinsburg, 
taking up his position on the 3d at Darkesville, six 
miles from Martinsburg, where he was joined by Jackson 
and Stuart. For four days Johnston remained at Darkes- 
ville, prepared to fight if necessary ; and then, as Patter- 
son would not advance and as he was not willing to risk 
the offensive against superior numbers, he fell back to- 
wards Winchester again, leaving his cavalry to observe 
the enemy's movements. 

Johnston's advance had had its moral effect, and Pat- 
terson showed extreme reluctance to push on beyond 
Martinsburg. On the 15th, however, he advanced as far 
as Bunker Hill where he remained on the i6th, and on 
the next day began to move away towards his left and 
rear in the direction of Charlestown. This, according to 
Johnston's report, "created the impression that he . . . 
was merely holding us in check while General Beaure- 
gard should be attacked at Manassas by General Scott." 2 
At one o'clock in the morning of the i8th, at the very 

* O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 945. ^ 0. R. Sen i, vol. 11, 473. 



8o BULL RUN 

moment when Patterson was relaxing such slight pres- 
sure as he had been exerting, Johnston received from 
Richmond the following telegram : — 

General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive 
blow a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, 
make the movement, sending your sick and wounded to Culpeper 
Court House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrange- 
ments exercise your discretion. 

S. Cooper, 
Adjutant and Inspector-General.* 

To this Johnston replied: — 

. . . General Patterson . . . seems to have moved yesterday to 
Charlestown. . . . Unless he prevents it we shall move toward 
General Beauregard to-day. . . . There are wagons enough to carry 
but four days' provisions, but the urgency of the case seems to me to 
justify a risk of hunger. I am delayed by provision for the care of the 
sick. ... 2 

A few hours later Johnston's columns were headed for 

Ashby's Gap en route for Piedmont on the Manassas 

Gap Railroad, 

CRITIQUE OF THE VALLEY OPERATIONS 
The operations of the Confederates in the Valley were 
much better managed than those of the Federals. John- 
ston received few instructions, and of the widest scope ; 
with Patterson it was the opposite. The former did not 
hesitate, by abandoning Harper's Ferry, to follow his 
judgment against the wishes of his Government, while 
his opponent was always visibly leaning on his superiors 
» O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 478. « O. R. Ser, i, vol. 11, 982. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 8i 

and attempting to evade responsibility. Johnston gen- 
erally formed an approximately accurate estimate of his 
opponent's forces; Patterson did the reverse. Making 
allowance for the deficiencies in ammunition and num- 
bers that imposed caution on Johnston, his movements 
and orders were clean-cut and well adapted to the imme- 
diate object in view ; Patterson's were uncertain and 
timid. Johnston made good use of his cavalry, and of 
Jackson's brigade thrown out in advance ; and, although 
he did not altogether size up his opponent's weakness, 
he succeeded in imposing on him by a well-timed feint. 

Patterson was undoubtedly an incompetent general. 
And yet, before dismissing his case, it is only fair to sum 
up such facts as may be pointed to in his favor. Two 
of these have already been referred to, Scott's excessive 
control and the expiration of the volunteers' term of 
service. As to the former there was occasional incon- 
sistency in the spirit of Scott's instructions and a failure 
to estimate what might be expected from his subordinate. 
Yet with a more capable lieutenant it is possible that 
Scott would have given a greater latitude of action and 
that the situation would have been better met. As to the 
volunteers and the expiration of their term of service, it 
is true to say that in this Patterson had a problem that 
might well have baffled the most resolute commander.^ 

' Patterson's evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War (ii, 6) tells heavily against him. Fitz John Porter, his A. A.G., testified 



82 BULL RUN 

THE CONFEDERATES AT MANASSAS 

Beauregard was busy fortifying, and concentrated his 
attention on Manassas itself rather than on the Hne of 
Bull Run. With the help of slave labor supplied by the 
neighboring planters, he erected several considerable 
earthworks in front of the junction ; later he placed these 
under the command of Colonel Terrett, who was given 
about a thousand local militia to man the works, and 
some naval officers to see to the serving of the guns. At 
Blackburn's Ford, at Stone Bridge, nothing was done 
to prevent the enemy's crossing Bull Run ; only at Mitch- 
ell's Ford was there any preparation made by digging 
trenches. The fact was that at the beginning of the war 
far too high an opinion was held of regular fortifications, 
while the art of field intrenchment, which played so 
great a part later, was little understood. No one failed 
more than Beauregard in this particular, and his neglect 
to improve the defensive qualities of the line on which 
he had made up his mind to fight was one of the grav- 
est errors committed in this far from faultless campaign. 

Ontheaoth of June, we have the first record of a brigade 
organization in Beauregard's army; it was as follows: — 

before the same committee that Patterson's staff believed from the first 
that Johnston would slip away whenever he wanted to (ll, 155). Clearly 
the best way to cripple him was to engage him and at all events to make 
him fire away his ammunition. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 83 

First Corps, Army of the Potomac 

First Brigade, Brigadier-General M. L, Bonham.^ 
1st South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Gregg. 
7th South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Bacon. 
2d South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Kershaw. 
8th South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Cash. 

Second Brigade, Brigadier-General R. S. Ewell.^ 
6th Alabama Volunteers, Colonel Seibel. 
5th Alabama Volunteers, Colonel Rodes. 
6th Louisiana Volunteers, Colonel Seymour. 

Third Brigade, Brigadier-General D. R. Jones.' 

5th South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Jenkins. 
17th Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel Featherston. 
1 8th Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel Burt. 

Fourth Brigade, Colonel S. H. Terrett. 

1st Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Moore, 
nth Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Garland. 
17th Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Corse. 

Fifth Brigade, Colonel P. St. G. Cocke.'* 

19th Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Cocke. 
28th Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Preston. 
1 8th Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Withers. 

^ Milledge Luke Bonham; captain of volunteers in Florida, 1836; brevet 
colonel of volunteers, 1847-48. 

2 Richard Stoddart Ewell: grad. West Point, 1836; brevet captain for 
Contreras and Churubusco, 1847. 

' David Rumple Jones; grad. West Point, 1842; brevet first lieutenant 
for Contreras, 1847; brevet captain, 1853. 

* Philip St. George Cocke; grad. West Point, 1828; resigned commission, 
1834; colonel of Virginia Volunteers, 1861. 






84 BULL RUN 

Sixth Brigade, Colonel J. A. Early. 

24th Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Early. ^ 
7th Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Kemper. 
4th South Carolina Volunteers, Colonel Sloan. 

This statement, derived from the official reports, covers 
merely the brigading of the infantry at the date given. 
A complete statement of the organization and numbers 
of Beauregard, Johnston, and McDowell, will presently 
be made for the i6th of July, the date at which the opera- 
tions of the Bull Run campaign really began. 

Beauregard was now strengthening his advanced line 
especially at Fairfax Court House, Fairfax Station, and 
Sangster's Crossroads ; Bonham's headquarters were at 
Fairfax Court House ; Ewell was at Sangster's and Cocke 
had established himself at Centreville. The cavalry 
scouted towards Vienna, Falls Church, and Alexandria, 
and a post of one battalion of infantry and two troops 
of cavalry was thrown out as far as the Loudon and 
Hampshire Railroad to the west of Vienna, whence it 
could keep in touch through Dranesville with a small 
Confederate force at Leesburg. Sloan's South Carolina 
regiment was detached from Early's brigade to reinforce 
Colonel Hunton at the latter point. It may further be 
noted that at this moment, the end of June, Beauregard, 
like Johnston, was short of ammunition. He had about 

^ Jubal Anderson Early; grad. West Point, 1833; resigned commission, 
1838. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 85 

twenty rounds per man, and was asking for forty, with 
sixty more in immediate reserve. 

There is nothing of special note to mention on the 
Confederate side until McDowell's movement began to 
take shape. Washington was largely in sympathy with 
the Confederates and important news leaked through 
with surprising rapidity. Scott's first expectation to ad- 
vance early in the second week of July, and the obvious 
preparations for such a move, were quickly known at 
Manassas. On the 9th, Beauregard telegraphed to Rich- 
mond that the enemy "will soon attack with very supe- 
rior numbers. No time should be lost in reinforcing me 
here with at least ten thousand men. . . ." ^ On the 
I ith, he informed Jefferson Davis that he hoped McDow- 
ell would attack him at Mitchell's Ford, but feared 
he might attempt a flanking movement beyond Stone 
Bridge.2 And on the 13th, he followed this up by send- 
ing to Richmond Colonel Chesnut of his staff to submit 
a plan of operations to the Government. 

Beauregard's idea was this : — 

I proposed that General Johnston should unite as soon as possible 
the bulk of the Army of the Shenandoah with that of the Potomac . . . 
leaving only sufficient forces to garrison his strong works at Win- 
chester and to guard the five defensive passes of the Blue Ridge and 
thus hold General Patterson in check . . . General Holmes ... to 

* O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 969.' 

' Roman, Beauregard, 83. If the move was really foreseen, then the 
lack of preparation to meet it deserves the greater blame. 



86 BULL RUN 

march hither with all of his command not essential for the defence of 
. . . Aquia Creek. These junctions having been effected at Manassas, 
an immediate impetuous attack of our combined armies upon General 
McDowell was to follow as soon as he approached . . . Fairfax Court 
House, with the inevitable result, as I submitted, of his complete 
defeat and the destruction or capture of his army. This accomplished 
the Army of the Shenandoah . . . increased with a part of my forces 
. . . was to march back rapidly into the Valley, fall upon and crush 
Patterson with a superior force wheresoever he might be found. . . . 
Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston 
would reinforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him superior to 
his opponent, General McClellan, and able to defeat that officer. . . .^ 

This plan of Beauregard's confirms the not very high 
estimate formed of him ; he was a competent engineer, a 
good fighter, but no strategist. His plan was worse than 
sketchy ; it was almost down to the level of newspaper 
strategy. Its fundamental weaknesses were that it as- 
sumed a degree of mobility for the Confederate armies 
which they did not possess, and, even more important, 
that it gave to Johnston's long contemplated march from 
the valley westwards an offensive instead of a defensive 
character. Beauregard and Johnston together could not 
have any marked numerical advantage, while from Fair- 
fax Court House to the line of Federal forts and intrench- 
ments that covered Arlington Heights was only a few 
miles. The offensive move of the Confederates proposed 
by Beauregard, unless it happened to coincide precisely 
with an offensive movement on the part of McDowell, 

* O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 485; Beauregard's report. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 87 

was in fact bound to resolve itself into an effort to carry 
the Federal works, against superior artillery, an unthink- 
able proposition that requires no serious consideration. 
There is no evidence that President Davis ever received 
Beauregard's plan in a written form,i although there was 
a conference attended by Colonel Chesnut, President 
Davis, General Lee, General Cooper, and Colonel Pres- 
ton. Whatever Chesnut may have said, the precise shape 
of Beauregard's idea was probably lost in course of con- 
versation, Chesnut' s strategic notions being of the crud- 
est.2 The authorities at Richmond, and this means chiefly 
President Davis and General Lee, remained throughout 
apparently of one mind. They hoped, though with no 
confidence, that Johnston could keep himself sufificiently 
disengaged from Patterson in the Valley to secure free- 
dom of action, and therefore to reach Beauregard at 
short notice of his urgent need. When the latter was 
attacked they proposed in any case to rush every avail- 
able man to his support. This meant a small brigade 
under General Holmes from Fredericksburg, several new 
regiments from Richmond, and, if possible, Johnston 
from the Valley. Should Johnston be able to reach the 
field, they hoped to do more than merely repel McDowell, 
by dealing him an effective counterstroke. Above all, 

1 See Davis' statement, O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 504, and Chesnut to 
Beauregard, ibid., 506. 

2 O, R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 506; Chesnut to Beauregard. 



88 BULL RUN 

Lee certainly realized/ and it is probable that Davis did, 
the immense difficulty of timing Johnston's movement 
accurately, not moving him till it was certain Beauregard 
would be attacked, yet moving him in time to play his 
part. 

It was in the afternoon of the i6th of July that the Fed- 
eral columns left their camps and began their long ex- 
pected movement towards Manassas. Early on the i yth, 
Beauregard had the information and telegraphed it on 
to Richmond. Within a few hours he was informed that 
considerable reinforcements would join him from the 
Confederate capital ; he was instructed to detain the 6th 
North Carolina Regiment, on its way by rail to the Val- 
ley, and to repeat the instruction already sent to John- 
ston to move to Manassas if practicable; Holmes, at 
Fredericksburg, was directed to march on Manassas with 
three battalions and one battery. Later on the 17th, as 
news came in that McDowell was pressing on, Beaure- 
gard telegraphed : " I believe this proposed movement 
of General Johnston is too late. Enemy will attack me 
in force to-morrow morning." ^ 

And yet the Confederate general, who had neglected 
to fortify the line of Bull Run while the opportunity was 
his, who depended for success on the ordered reinforce- 
ments reaching him in time, made no effort of any sort 

^ O. R. Ser. I, vol. 11, 515; Lee to Davis. 
2 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 980. 



OPERATIONS AND PLANS 89 

to delay the march of the enemy, but ordered his brigades 
at Fairfax and Centreville to abandon the intrenchments 
they had dug there, and to retire to Bull Run. This 
course was not without reason ; it was probably a 
big risk to fight a rear-guard action against a superior 
force and take the chances of a brigade or two becom- 
ing stampeded and the whole army demoralized. Yet it 
is difficult to resist the conclusion that in a general sense 
Beauregard had not a very close grasp of the facts of 
the situation. 



IV 

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES » 

NORTH 

Before going further we must now take up the organ- 
ization of the armies that met at Bull Run, and we will 
begin with that of McDowell. 

Army of Northeastern Virginia 

Commander-in-Chief, Irvin McDowell, Brigadier-General, 
Aides-de-camp, Lieutenant H. W. Kingsbury, Lieutenant G. V. 

Henry, Major C. S. Brown, New York Volunteers; Major J, S. 

Wadsworth, New York Volunteers. 
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain J. B. Fry. 
Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Captain O. H. Tillinghast. 
Chief Commissary, Captain H. F. Clarke. 
Signal Officers, Major Myer, Major M. McDowell. 
Chief Engineer, Major Barnard. 

Assistants, Captain Whipple, Lieutenants Abbot and Putnam. 
Chief of Artillery, Major Barry. 
Ordnance, Lieutenant Strong. 
Inspector-General, Major Wood. 
Medical officers, W. S. King and Magruder. 

1 The statements in the following section have been laboriously com- 
piled from a cross-examination of all available reports and other docu- 
ments, many of them conflicting, not only in the official Records, but else- 
where. Footnotes would have been endlessly complicated and not very 
profitable; they have therefore been omitted save where they seemed 
directly in point. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 91 

First Division, Daniel Tyler/ Brigadier-General. 
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Baird. 
Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Captain Merrill. 
Chief Engineer, Captain Alexander. 

A.D.C. and other duties: Lieutenants Houston, Abbot, Upton, 
O'Rorke and Audenried. 

First Brigade, Colonel E. D. Keyes.^ 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Hascall. 

Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Lieutenant Hodge. 

Commissary, Lieutenant Ely. 

A.D.C. and other duties: Lieutenants Walter, Gordon. 
2d Maine, Colonel Jameson. 
1st Connecticut, Colonel Speidel. 
2d Connecticut, Colonel Terry. 
3d Connecticut, Colonel Chatfield. 

Second Brigade, Brigadier-General R. C. Schenck. 
1st Ohio, Colonel McCook. 
' 2d Ohio, Colonel Mason. 
2d New York, Colonel Tompkins. 
Battery E, 2d U.S. Artiller>% Captain Carlyle. 
I Parrott thirty-pounder gun. Lieutenant Hains (Battery G, 1st 
U.S. Artillery). 

Third Brigade, Colonel W. T. Sherman. ^ 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Piper. 
Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Lieutenant McQuesten. 

* Daniel Tyler; grad. West Point, 1816; resigned as lieutenant, 1834; 
brigadier-General of Connecticut Volunteers, 1861. 

' Erasmus Darwin Keyes; grad. West Point, 1828; captain, 1838; major, 
1858; lieutenant-colonel and military secretary to General Scott, 1861; 
colonel nth Infantry, 1861; brigadier-general of volunteers, 1861. 

^ William Tecumseh Sherman ; grad. West Point, 1840; resigned 
commission, 1853; president Louisiana Military Institute, i860. 



92 BULL RUN 

A.D.C. and other duties: Colonel Coon, Wisconsin, Lieutenant 
Bagley. 
13th New York, Colonel Quinby. 
69th New York (Irish), Colonel Corcoran. 
79th New York (Highlanders), Colonel Cameron.* ^ 
2d Wisconsin, Colonel Peck. 
Battery E, 3d U.S. Artillery, Captain Ayres. 

Fourth Brigade, Colonel I. B. Richardson. ^ 

Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Eastman. 

Assistant Quartermaster, Lieutenant Brightly. 

Chief Engineer, Lieutenant Prime. 

A.D.C, Cadet Meigs. 
Light Infantry Battalion, Captain Brethschneider.' 
3d Michigan, Colonel McConnell. 
1st Massachusetts, Colonel Cowdin. 
I2th New York (Militia), Colonel Walreth. 
2d Michigan (Colonel I. B. Richardson). 

Major Williams. 
Battery G, 2d U.S. Artillery, Lieutenant Edwards. 
Battery M, 2d U.S. Artillery, Major Hunt. 
I Squadron 2d U.S. Cavalry, Captain Brackett. 

Second Division, Colonel David Hunter.* 
Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain W. D. Whipple. 
Chief Engineer, Captain Woodbury. 

A.D.C. and other duties: Lieutenant Cross, Lieutenant Flagler, 
Lieutenant S. W. Stockton, Hon. J. W. Arnold. 

* This regiment wore the kilt as a full-dress uniform, but fought at Bull 
Run in trousers. 

^ Israel Bush Richardson, grad. West Point, 1836; brevet captain, 
Contrerasand Churubusco, 1847; brevet major, Chapultepec, 1847; re- 
signed commission, 1855; colonel 2d Michigan Vols., 1861. 

' One company was detailed from each regiment of the brigade to form 
this light battalion. 

^ David Hunter, grad. West Point, 18 18; captain, 1833; major, 1842; 
colonel 3d Cavalry, 1861. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 93 

First Brigade, Colonel Andrew Porter.' 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant W . W. Averell. 

Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Lieutenant J. B. Howard. 

A.D.C. and other duties: Lieutenants Trowbridge and Bache. 
I Battalion U.S. Marines, Major Reynolds. 
I Battalion U.S. Infantry, Major Sykes. 
I Battalion U.S. Cavalry,^ Major Palmer. 
27th New York, Colonel H. W. Slocum. 
14th (84th) New York (Brooklyn), Colonel Wood. 
8th New York (Militia), Colonel Lyons. 
Battery D, 5th U.S. Artillery, Captain Griffin. 

Second Brigade, Colonel A. E. Burnside.' 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Merriman. 

Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Captain Anson. 

Commissary, Captain Goodhue. 

A.D.C. and other duties: Captain Woodbury, Lieutenant 
Beaumont.^ 
1st Rhode Island, Major Balch. 
2d Rhode Island, Colonel Slocum. 
71st New York (Militia), Colonel Martin. 
2d New Hampshire, Colonel Fiske. 
Rhode Island Battery, Colonel Monroe. 
Two howitzers, 71st New York. 

Third Division, Colonel Heintzelman. ^ 
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain McKeever. 

1 Andrew Porter, West Point, 1836-37; lieutenant and captain of 
Mounted Rifles, 1 846-47 ; brevet major, Contreras, 1847; brevet lieutenant- 
colonel, Churubusco, 1847; brigadier-general of volunteers, 1861. 

2 Two squadrons 2d Dragoons, four squadrons ist Cavalry, eight 
squadrons 2d Cavalry; two squadrons to one company. 

' Ambrose Everett Burnside, grad. West Point, 1843; resigned commis- 
sion, 1853; colonel 1st Rhode Island Vols., 1861. 

* Governor Sprague of Rhode Island was present at Bull Run and 
apparently performed some of Burnside's duties himself. 

* Samuel Peter Heintzelman; grad. West Point, 1822; captain, 1838; 
major, 1855; colonel 14th Infantry, 1861. 



94 BULL RUN 

Chief Engineer, Captain H. Wright. 

A.D.C. and other duties: Lieutenants Snyder, Farquhar, 
Sweet, and Fairbanks. 

First Brigade, Colonel W. B. Franklin.^ 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Jenkins. 

Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Lieutenant Gibson. 

A.D.C. and other duties: Lieutenant Baker, Colonel Hart- 
ranft.2 
5th Massachusetts, Colonel Lawrence, 
nth Massachusetts, Colonel Clark. 
4th Pennsylvania,^ Colonel Hartranft. 
1st Minnesota, Colonel Gorman. 
Battery \, ist U.S. Artillery, Captain Ricketts. 

Second Brigade, Colonel O. B. Willcox. 

Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Woodrufif. 

A.D.C. and other duties: Lieutenants Parker and Edie. 
1st Michigan, Major Bidwell. 
4th Michigan,^ Colonel Willcox. 
nth New York (Zouaves), Colonel Farnham. 
38th New York (Scott Life Guard), Colonel Ward. 
Battery D, 2d U.S. Artillery, Captain Arnold. 

Third Brigade, Colonel O. O. Howard.^ 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Burt. 
Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Lieutenant Burt. 

^ William Buel Franklin; grad. West Point, 1839 (first); captain, 1857; 
colonel I2th Infantry, 1861. 

^ His regiment refused to advance on the 21st, claiming that their time 
was up. Their colonel joined the staff. 

' Turned back from Centreville the morning of the battle on expiration 
of service. 

* Was detached and left behind at Fairfax Court House. 

^ Oliver Otis Howard; grad. West Point, 1850; colonel 3d Maine Volun- 
teers, 1 86 1. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 95 

A.D.C. and other duties: Lieutenants Buel and Mordecai, 
Charles H. Howard. 
2d Vermont, Colonel Whiting. 
3d Maine, Major Staples. 
4th Maine, Colonel Barry. 
5th Maine, Colonel Dunnell. 

Fifth Division, Colonel D. S. Miles. ^ 
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Vincent. 
Assistant Quartermaster, Lieutenant Hawkins. 
Chief Engineer, Lieutenant Prime. 

A.D.C. and other duties: Major Ritchie, Lieutenants M'Millan, 
Mendell, Cushing. 

First Brigade, Colonel L. Blenker. 

8th New York (Volunteers), Colonel Stahel. ■ 

29th New York, Colonel Steinwehr. 

39th New York (Garibaldi Guard), Colonel Utassy. 

27th Pennsylvania, Colonel Einstein. 

Battery A, 2d U.S. Artillery, Captain Tidball. 

Battery, 8th New York Militia ^ (Varian's), Captain Bookwood. 

Second Brigade, Colonel Thomas A. Da vies. ^ 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Cowdrey. 
Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Lieutenant Hopkins. 
Commissary, Lieutenant Bradford. 
A.D.C. and other duties: Lieutenant Howland. 
l6th New York, Colonel Marsh. 

^ Dixon Stanbury Miles; grad. West Point, 1819; captain, 1836; major, 
1847; two brevets for expedition to Mexico, 1847; lieutenant-colonel, 
1851; colonel 2d Infantry, 1855. 

2 Abandoned by its own men at Centreville, it was manned by volun- 
teers commanded by Captain Bookwood. 

' Thomas Alfred Davies; grad. West Point, 1825; resigned commission, 
1 831; colonel 1 6th New York Volunteers, 1861. 



96 



BULL RUN 

1 8th New York, Colonel Jackson. 

31st New York, Colonel Pratt. 

32d New York, Colonel Matheson. 

Battery G, ist U.S. Artillery, Lieutenant Benjamin. 



Register of Volunteer and Militia Regiments 



Div. Brig. 

1st Connecticut I i 

2d Connecticut I ^ 

3d Connecticut I i 

2d Maine I i 

3d Maine HI 3 

4th Maine HI 3 

5th Maine III 3 

1st Massachusetts I 4 

5th Massachusetts III I 

nth Massachusetts III i 

1st Michigan III 2 

2d Michigan I 4 

3d Michigan I 4 

4th Michigan III 2 

1st Minnesota III I 

2d New Hampshire II 2 

2d New York I 2 

8th New York (Militia) II I 

8th New York (Vols.) V I 

nth New York III 2 

1 2th New York I 4 



13th New York 
14th New York 
1 6th New York 
1 8th New York 
27th New York 
29th New York 
31st New York 
32d New York 
38th New York 
39th New York 
69th New York 
71st New York 
79th New York 
1st Ohio 
2d Ohio 

4th Pennsylvania 
27th Pennsylvania 
1st Rhode Island 
2d Rhode Island 
2d Vermont 
2d Wisconsin 



Div. Brig. 
I 

II 
V 
V 
II 
V 
V 
V 

III 

V 

I 
II 

I 

I 

I 
III 

V 

II 

II 

III 

I 



General Runyon's division was left behind at Alex- 
andria, and its only direct participation in the operations 
was a movement of the ist and 2d New Jersey to Vienna 
and thence to Centreville on the 21st ; they did not come 
into contact with the enemy, and played no part. 

The above statement of McDowell's organization is 
subject to the two following corrections: the staff returns 
are in some cases probably incomplete and inaccurate, 
and the numerous civilians who rendered more or less 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 97 

staff service are not wholly listed ; then again there is room 
for variation in the statement of the regiments present ; 
some deserted — that is, claimed their discharge — while on 
the march and before any fighting had occurred ; others, 
less prudent, did not abandon the army until the very 
morning of the battle, like the 4th Pennsylvania ; the for- 
mer have been excluded from the enumeration, the latter 
included. This again shows the difficulty of giving an 
accurate estimate of the numbers involved, which must 
be our next endeavor. First of all we may take McDow- 
ell's own showing for the i6th of July when he opened 
his march. 





Present for duty 




Officers 


Men 


Total 


First (Tyler's) Division 


569 
121 

382 
289 


12,226 

2,364 
8,680 

5,884 


.12,795 
2,485 
9,062 

6,173 


Second (Hunter's) Division 


Third (Heintzelman's) Division 

Fifth (Miles') Division 




Total 


1,361 


29,154 


30,515 





The figures just given represent an estimate more than 
facts, for divisional and brigade commanders exercised 
a more or less wide discretion in selecting regiments 
to go to the front or to stay behind in the Alexan- 
dria-Arlington lines up to the very last minute. Mc- 
Dowell's original document, from which the above 
is largely deduced, is a curious arithmetical puzzle 



98 BULL RUN 

which the reader may attempt to make sense from if he 

chooses.^ 

On the whole, and looking at the matter roughly, 

one may conclude that' McDowell expected to arrive at 

Centreville with not more than 30,000 men, leaving some 

6000 men behind in his works.^ 

The number of guns is easier to ascertain. 

1st U.S. Artillery, Battery G, 2, 20-lb. rifled; i, 30-lb. rifled. 

1st " " " I, 6, lo-lb. rifled. 

2d " " " A, 2, 6-lb. smooth; 2, 12-lb. howitzers. 

2d " " " D, 2, 6-lb. smooth; 2, 13-lb. rifled. 

2d " " " E, 2, 6-lb. smooth; 2, 13-lb. rifled. 



1 " Abstract from the returns of the Department of Northeastern Vir- 
ginia, commanded by Brigadier-General McDowell, U.S.A., for July 16 
and 17, 1861. 





Present 


Commands 


For duty 


Total 


Aggregate 




Officers 


Men 


General Staff 


19 
569 
121 
382 

247 

289 

37 

34 

4 


12,226 
2,364 
8,680 

5,201 

5.884 
684 
519 

56 


9.494 

2,52s 

9.38s 

5.502 

S.917 

707 

534 

63 


21 


First (Tyler's) Division* 

Second (Hunter's) Division 


9.936 

2,648 
9.777 




5.752 


Fifth (Miles') Division 


6,207 




745 




573 




73 






Total 


1702 


35.614 


34.127 


35,732 





* " The total and aggregate present in the Fourth Brigade of this division is not carried 
out on the original return. Hence the anomaly of a smaller total and aggregate ' Present' 
than ' Present for duty ' in the division." O. R. Ser. I, vol. ii, 309. 

2 We shall later give a more precise estimate of the numbers he actually 
had in the battle, and also of those seriously engaged. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 99 

2d U.S. Artillery, Battery G, 4, lO-lb. rifled. 

2d " " " M, 4, I2-Ib. smooth. 

3d " " " E, 2, lo-lb. rifled ; 2, 6-lb. smooth ; 2, ' 

I2-Ib. howitzers. 
5th " " " D, 4, lo-lb. rifled; 2, 12-lb. howitzers. 

2d Rhode Island Volunteers, 6, 13-lb. rifled. 
71st New York Militia, 2 small howitzers. 

8th New York Militia Battery, 6, 6-lb. smooth.^ 

The total was therefore fifty-five guns, mostly of the 
regular army, and divisible as follows : — 





Rifled 


Smoothbore 


30-pounders, 


I 




20-pounders, 


2 




13-pounders, 


10 




1 2 -pounders, 




10 


lo-pounders. 


16 




6-pounders, 




14 


Small howitzers, 




2 



This gave McDowell a strength in artillery of almost 
two guns per thousand men and it will be observed that 
more than half of his pieces were rifled ten-pounders or 
better. 

The cavalry of the army was insignificant in numbers, 2 
which was a source of weakness as will be seen later. 

^ The 8th New York went home on the morning of the battle, but left 
their guns to be served by volunteers. If a few had been drumhead court- 
martialled and shot for cowardice in presence of the enemy the effect would 
doubtless have been healthy; unfortunately they were voters, and there- 
fore sacred. 

^ The country about Bull Run was not well suited to this arm. 



lOo BULL RUN 

The transport and artillery swallowed up all available 

horses. 

Staff and Command. McDowell's infantry was 
properly distributed into brigades and divisions; but 
his organization was so hasty, and those entrusted 
with its working were so inexperienced, that it broke 
down in many ways when brought to the test. The 
strength of the army lay in the number and [quality 
of its guns, and in the training and discipline of the ar- 
tillery corps, which was almost wholly of the regular 
army. But the organization of this arm was faulty, un- 
suited to the problem in hand, and unlikely to produce 
good results. The batteries were merely distributed 
more or less haphazard among the different brigades, 
changes being made while actually on the march and on 
the field. Some brigades were without guns, others had 
two batteries. Now it is clear that such raw infantry as 
McDowell's required artillery support at every point 
where the enemy's fire would have to be faced. On the 
other hand it was essential to concentrate the fire of as 
many guns as possible at the decisive point, and not to 
take the chance that a battery would fail to get there 
merely because the brigade to which it was attached was 
not engaged. It would seem therefore as though a divi- 
sional grouping would have been best, each division 
commander controlling his batteries through a chief of 
artillery. But there were no such officers in theory or 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES loi 

in fact. Major Barry did not join McDowell until the 
17th, and his functions as chief of artillery were largely 
nominal. When it came down to practice, the organiza- 
tion was so bad that some battery commanders received 
orders from brigade and division commanders, the chief 
of artillery, and the commander-in-chief in person. 

The higher command and staff organization were too 
hastily improvised to be effective. Turning to the divi- 
sional and brigade commanders first of all, it may be 
said that at this point there was least ground for criti- 
cism under the circumstances. They were mostly regular 
officers of considerable rank : Keyes was colonel of the 
nth Infantry, Sherman of the 13th, Hunter of the 3d 
Cavalry, Porter of the i6th Infantry, Heintzelman of the 
17th, Franklin of the i8th, and Miles of the 2d; Tyler, 
though long in civil life, was a West-Pointer, as were 
one or two of the others. On the whole, it might be said 
that all that was possible had been done in the way of 
selection. 

The staffs of these generals and of the commander-in- 
chief were small, and made up of young and inexperi- 
enced officers ; they were, however, almost wholly regu- 
lars, except for a considerable number of civilian aides- 
de-camp, and showed courage, ability, and driving 
power when put to the test. Though of the generals 
only Sherman was destined to rise beyond mediocrity, 
there were among the staff officers mere boys, almost 



I02 BULL RUN 

straight from West Point, like Upton, who had the 
makings of first-rate soldiers in them. 

Neither these staff officers nor their commanders had 
experience or instruction enough to control any army, 
leave alone a raw one, in field operations. There was no 
well-defined system of command. Some of the brigades 
were constituted within a few hours only of the ad- 
vance. Practically none of the brigadiers had ever held, 
or even seen, a brigade drill. When they reached the 
field, the capable and energetic, from McDowell down, 
gave such orders as seemed best, without much regard 
for the methods of systematized command. They ener- 
gized in one direction while they added to the confusion 
in another. 

The transport service was in the charge of Captain 
H. F. Clarke, chief commissary, and worked better than 
was anticipated. The teams and teamsters were green, 
wagons and horses were few, notwithstanding which 
160,000 rations were conveyed to Centreville by the i8th 
and there distributed, though in disorderly and wasteful 
fashion. Had McDowell taken, say, another 3000 men 
of Runyon's division from Alexandria for active opera- 
tions, there seems little doubt but that the victualling 
problem could have been solved. Some account of the 
work of the transport service will be given in its proper 
place. 

The officering of the volunteer regiments was very de- 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 103 

fective. Political considerations outweighed military, and 
instead of making a large draft of junior officers of the 
regular army for the command and organization of the 
volunteers, the regiments were mostly given to prom- 
inent politicians. Very few, indeed, of these officers were 
fit for their post, and some were hopelessly unfit. In one 
case Sherman found a way out of the difficulty by pro- 
moting the colonel to his staff, leaving the regiment to 
be led by a junior but more efficient officer. 

If the colonels were poor, the regimental officers were on 
the whole poorer, usually elected by their men, currying 
their favor by winking at slackness and insubordination, 
and ignorant of all that pertained to military affairs. 
The results of all this will presently appear ; but we must 
first turn to the Confederate army. 

SOUTH 

Army of the Potomac 

First Corps, Brigadier-General G. T. Beauregard. 
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel T. Jordan, Capt. 

Clifton H. Smith. 
Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Major Cabell. 
Chief Commissary, Colonel R. B. Lee. 
Chief of Artillery, Colonel S. Jones. 
Chief Engineer, Colonel Williamson. 
Chief Signal Oiificer, Captain E. P. Alexander. 
Chief Surgeon, R. L. Brodie. 
A.D.C., Colonels Preston, Manning, Chesnut, Miles, Rice, 

Hayward, and Chisolm, Captains D. B. Harris and W. H. 

Stevens, Lieutenants W. Ferguson, H. E. Peyton. 



I04 BULL RUN 

First Brigade, Brigadier-General M. L. Bonham. 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel Lay. ^ 

Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Colonel Kemper, Lieutenant 

Washington. 
Chief Commissary, Major Kennedy. 
Military Secretary, Major Walton. 
A.D.C. and other duties: Generals Hagood and McGowan, 
Colonels Aldrich, Simpson and Lipscomb, Majors Davies, 
Tompkins, Butler, and M. B. Lipscomb, Captains Stevens, 
Venable, Nyles, Alfred Moss, 
nth North Carolina, Colonel Kirkland. 
2d South Carolina (Palmettos), Colonel Kershaw. 
3d South Carolina, Colonel Williams. 
7th South Carolina, Colonel Bacon. 
8th South Carolina, Colonel Cash. 
30th Virginia Cavalry, Colonel Radford. 
Alexandria Light Artillery, Captain Kemper. 

Second Brigade, Brigadier-General R. S. Ewell. 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Fitzhugh Lee. 
5th Alabama, Colonel Rodes. 
6th Alabama, Colonel Seibel. 
6th Louisiana, Colonel Seymour. 
I Battery Washington Artillery, Captain Rosser. 
A half battalion of cavalry. Colonel Jenifer. 

Third Brigade, Brigadier-General D. R. Jones. 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Latham. 
Acting Assistant Quartermaster and other duties: Captains 
Coward, Ford, Taylor, Curfell, Lieutenant McLemore. 
17th Mississippi, Colonel Featherston. 
1 8th Mississippi, Colonel Burt. 
5th South Carolina, Colonel Jenkins. 
A troop of cavalry. Captain Flood. 
I section Washington Artillery, Captain Miller. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 105 

Fourth Brigade, Brigadier-General J. Longstreet.^ 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Armistead. 
Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Lieutenant Manning. 
A.D.C. and other duties: Colonels Terry, Lubbock, and Rid- 
dick, Captains Sorrel, Goree, Chichester, Thompson, and 
Walton. 
1st Virginia, Colonel Moore, 
nth Virginia, Colonel Garland. 
17th Virginia, Colonel Corse. 
24th Virginia, Colonel Hairston. 
5th North Carolina, Colonel McCrae. 
I section Washington Artillery, Captain Garnett. 
I troop cavalry, Captain Whitehead. 

[ Fifth Brigade, Colonel P. St. George Cocke. 
Chief Engineer, Captain Harris. 
8th Virginia, Colonel Hunton. 
1 8th Virginia, Colonel Withers. 
19th Virginia, Colonel P. St. G. Cocke. 
28th Virginia, Colonel Preston. 
49th Virginia, Colonel W. Smith. 
I Battery, Loudoun Artillery, Captain Latham. 
I company cavalry. Captain Langhorne. 

Sixth Brigade, Colonel Jubal A. Early. 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Gardner. 

A.D.C, Lieutenant Willis. 
7th Virginia, Colonel Kemper. 
7th Louisiana, Colonel Hays. 
13th Mississippi, Colonel Barksdale. 
I Battery Washington Artillery, Lieutenant Squires. 

1 James Longstreet; grad. West Point, 1842; brevet captain for Con- 
treras and Churubusco; brevet major for Molino del Rey. 



io6 BULL RUN 

Seventh Brigade, Brigadier-General Nathan G. Evans. i 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain A. L. Evans. 
A.D.C., Captains McCausland and Rogers. 

4th South Carolina, Colonel Sloan. 

1st Louisiana (New Orleans Tigers), Major Wheat. 

I Squadron Cavalry, Captain Terry. 

I Section Latham's Artillery, Captain Davidson. 

I Squadron Campbell Rangers (mounted). Captain Alexander. 

Holmes' Brigade, Gen. F. H. Holmes. 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Walker. 
1st Arkansas, Colonel Fagan. 
2d Tennessee, Colonel Bate. 
I Battery, Captain Walker. 

Unhrigaded. 
8th Louisiana, Colonel Kelly. 

Harrison's Battalion of Cavalry (4 companies), Major Julian 
Harrison. 

Artillery Reserve, Major Walton. 

A battalion of Virginia militia, Colonel Wilcox (within the de- 
fences at Manassas). 

Artillery. 

Washington Artillery, Major Walton. 
4 twelve-pounder howitzers. 

3 six-pounders rifled. 

6 six-pounders smoothbore. 
Alexandria Light Artillery, Captain Kemper. 

4 six-pounders smoothbore. 
Loudoun Artillery, Captain Rogers. 

4 six-pounders smoothbore. 
Walker's Battery, Captain Walker. 

* Nathan George Evans; grad. West Point, 1844; captain, 1856. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 107 

4 six-pounders rifled. 
Latham's Battery, Captain Latham. 

4 six-pounders smoothbore. 
A total of 29 guns, of which i8 were smoothbore six-pounders, 9 

were six-pounders rifled, and 4 were twelve-pounder howitzers. 

Second Corps, General Joseph E. Johnston.^ 
Acting Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General Kirby Smith, '^ 

Major Rhett. 
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain T. C. Preston. 
Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Major McLean. 
Chief Engineer, Major Whiting. 
Chief of Artillery, Colonel Pendleton. 
Chief Commissary, Major Kearsley. 
Chief Ordnance Ofhcer, Colonel Thomas. 
A.D.C., Captain Fauntleroy, Lieutenant J. B. Washington, 

Colonels Cole and Duncan, Major Dees, Captain Mason. 

First Brigade, Brigadier-General T. J. Jackson. 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel F. B. Jones. 

Ordnance Ofificer, Lieutenant A. S. Pendleton. 

A.D.C. and other duties: Captain Marshall, Lieutenant T. G. 
Lee, Cadets Thompson and N. W. Lee. 
2d Virginia, Colonel Allen. 
4th Virginia, Colonel J. F. Preston. 
5th Virginia, Colonel Harper. 
27th Virginia, Colonel Echols. 
33d Virginia, Colonel Cummings. 
I Battery, Captain Stanard. 

^ Promoted to the rank of general, July 4th; notified July 20th; con- 
firmed August 31st. 

2 At the very moment when Johnston was starting for the Valley, Smith 
was placed in command of the 4th Brigade. Captain Preston filled his 
place until Johnston's arrival at Manassas, when Major Rhett took over 
Kirby Smith's functions. 



io8 BULL RUN 

Second Brigade, Colonel F. S. Bartow. 

Stafif Officers, General Gist, Colonel ^Shingler, and Major 
Stevens. 
7th Georgia, Colonel Gartrell. 
8th Georgia, Colonel Gardner. 
9th Georgia, Colonel Elzey. 
1st Kentucky, Colonel Duncan. 
2d Kentucky, Colonel Pope. 
I Battery, Captain Alburtis. 

Third Brigade, Brigadier-General Bee.* 

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain T. L. Preston. 
1st Tennessee, Colonel Turney. 
2d Mississippi, Colonel Falkner. 
nth Mississippi, Colonel Liddell. 
4th Alabama, Colonel Jones. 
I Batter>', Captain Imboden. 

Fourth Brigade, Brigadier-General Kirby Smith, ^ Colonel Elzey.' 
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Chentney. 
Acting Assistant Quartermaster, Lieutenant McDonald. 
A.D.C., Lieutenant Contee, Colonel Buist, Captains Tupper, 
Hill and Cunningham on General Kirby Smith's staff. 

1st Mar>'land, Colonel F. J. Stewart. 

3d Tennessee, Colonel Vaughan. 

loth Virginia, Colonel Gibbons. 

13th Virginia, Colonel A. P. Hill. 

I Batter>', Captain Grove. 

* Barnard Elliot Bee; grad. West Point, 1841; brevet first lieutenant, 
Cerro Gordo, 1847; brevet captain, Chapultepec, 1 847. 

^ Edmund Kirby Smith, grad. West Point, 1841 ; 2 brevets for campaign 
of Mexico, 1847; major, 1861; assumed command at Piedmont, but was, 
badly wounded at the beginning of the action when Elzey took over the 
command. 

3 Arnold Elzey; grad. West Point, 1833; brevet captain for Contreras 
and Churubusco. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 109 

Unbrigaded. 
6th North Carolina, Colonel Fisher.^ 



Reserve. 

I Battery, Captain Beckham. 

Ariillery. 
5 Batteries of 4 six-pounder smoothbores, Colonel Pendleton. 
Total, 20 guns. 

Cavalry. 

1st Virginia, Colonel J. E. B. Stuart.^ 

The strength of the two Confederate Corps at the date 
of the battle according to the official returns may be 
stated as follows : — 

First Corps, Brigadier-General Beauregard 

Officers 
Infantry — and men 

First Brigade 4,961 

Second Brigade 2,444 

Third Brigade 2,121 

Fourth Brigade 3,528 

Fifth Brigade 3,276 

Sixth Brigade 2,620^ 

Seventh Brigade 1,100 

Holmes' Brigade i,355 

8 th Louisiana 846 

Hampton's Legion 654 

^ This regiment was intended for Bee's brigade; it joined Johnston on 
the battlefield of Bull Run. 
2 Grad. West Point, 1850. 
^ In this total the 4th South Carolina is reckoned. 



no 



BULL RUN 



Cavalry ^ — 

Harrison's Battalion 209 

Ten troops 583 

Artillery 543 

Total 24,240 



Officers 
and men 



Second Corps,- General J. E. Johnston 

Infantry — 

First Brigade 2,151 

Second Brigade 2,546 

Third Brigade 2,790 

Fourth Brigade 2,262 

6th North Carolina 600 

Cavalry — 

1st Virginia 334 

Artillery 278 

Total 10,961 ' 

Register of Confederate Regiments 





Brigade Corps 


Brigade 


Corps 


4th Alabama 


Bee I 


[ 2d Mississippi 


Bee 


II 


Sth .^abama 


EweU 


[ 13th Mississippi 


Early 




6ih .Alabama 


Ewell 


[ 17th Mississippi 


Jones 




1st Arkansas 


Holmes 1 


I Sth Mississippi 


Jones 




7th Georgia 


Barton I 


5th Xorth Carolina 


Longstreet 




Sth Georgia 


Barton I 


[ nth Xorth Carolina 


Bonham 




pth Georgia 


Barton I 


2d South Carolina 


Bonham 




1st Kentucky 


Barton I 


[ 3d South Carolina 


Bonham 




2d Kentucky 


Barton I 


[ 4th South CaroUna 


Evans 




6th Louisiana 


EweU ] 


[ 5th South Carolina 


Jones 




7th Louisiana 


Evans 


7th South CaroUna 


Bonham 




Sth Louisiana 


unbrigaded 


Sth South Carolina 


Bonham 




1st Mar>-land 


Ewell 


[ I St Tennessee 


Bee 


II 



* The 30th\lrginia, attached to Bonham's brigade, is counted with it. 

• The figures given are for the 30th of June. At Bull Run Jackson 
numbered 261 1; the composite brigade under Bee, 2732; Kirby Smith, 
2250, of whom he took 1700 into acrion, lea\"ing 550 men under A. P. Hill 
at Manassas. 

' There is a return in the Report on the Conduct of the War (n, 249) 
which contains many inaccuracies, and inspires no confidence. Its total is 
29,949 for the two corps. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES in 

Brigade Corps Brigade Corps 



2d Tennessee 


Hohnes 


I 


13th Virginia 


Smith 


II 


3d Tennessee 


Smith 


II 


17th Virginia 


Longstreet 




ist Virginia 


Longstreet 


I 


1 8th Virginia 


Cocke 




2d Virginia 


Jackson 


II 


19th Virginia 


Cocke 




4th \'irginia 


Jackson 


II 


24th Virginia 


Early- 




5th Virginia 


Jackson 


II 


27th Virginia 


Jackson 


II 


7th Virginia 


Early 


I 


28th Virginia 


Cocke 




8th Virginia 


Cocke 


I 


30th Virginia (Cavalry) 


Bonham 




loth Virginia 


Smith 


II 


33d Virginia 


Jackson 


II 


nth Virginia 


Longstreet 


I 


49th Virginia 


Cocke 





Staff and Command. In the Confederate army it is 
noticeable that Johnston's corps was far better organized 
than Beauregard's. His 10,000 or 1 1,000 men might well 
be taken as constituting a division, and it was broken 
up into four brigades of almost equal size. His artillery 
command was centralized in Pendleton's hands; and 
although four of his batteries were distributed among 
the infantry brigades, the fifth was in reserve under 
Pendleton's control. The cavalry, small as it was, was 
not split up into detachments, but kept together under 
Stuart's able leadership. And when Johnston moved his 
army from the Shenandoah to Bull Run, Stuart and Pen- 
dleton moved together by road, and accentuated, by that 
march of the combined cavalry and artiller}^, a degree 
of organization in Johnston's army higher than in those 
of McDowell and Beauregard. 

In Beauregard's corps, conditions were very different. 
The creation of two or three divisions was urgently needed, 
as events were soon to demonstrate. His seven brigades 
(not counting Holmes') were very uneven in number 
and quality, and the smaller ones lacked cohesion. The 



112 BULL RUN 

artillery was badly organized, almost one half of it — with 
three types of guns — belonging to one command, the 
Washington Artillery (Louisiana). This was broken up 
irregularly and distributed, with the other three batteries 
of the corps (four if we include Walker's battery of 
Holmes' brigade), among the various brigades. In prac- 
tice, however, Beauregard apparently tended to create 
an artillery reserve out of some part of the Washington 
Artillery. The few troops of horse were scattered, save 
for the 30th Virginia (cavalry), which was attached to 
Bonham's brigade for patrol and outpost duty. 

In the Confederate army the higher command was 
better in quality, or better selected, than in that of the 
North. Among the corps and brigade commanders, John- 
ston, Kirby Smith, Jackson, Longstreet, Ewell, and Early, 
and among the colonels, A. P. Hill, Wade Hampton, and 
J. E. B. Stuart, were eventually to prove themselves 
competent, and one or two of them, brilliant, soldiers. 
t In the matter of the staff it might be said that there 
was no great superiority on one side or the other. While 
the North had more young regular officers, the South 
had, except in some of Beauregard's smaller brigades, 
slightly better organization. At Bonham's headquarters 
might be seen, in an extreme form, the amateur soldier- 
ing of politicians and Southern colonels, turned aides- 
de-camp for the occasion. On the whole, the staff service 
of McDowell's army was probably rather better performed 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES 113 

than that of Beauregard's army and possibly better than 
that of Johnston's. 

The command of regiments was marked by the same 
features in the Southern as in the Northern army, but on 
the whole the level of military training seems to have 
been higher, while the planter politician was perhaps 
more adaptable to military command than the city poli- 
tician. 

When it came to the control and command of troops 
in battle, it will be seen presently that, whatever the dif- 
ferences of the two armies, they both broke down badly 
from lack of organization. And this, after all, is only what 
might have been expected under the circumstances. 



V 

MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 

THE ADVANCE 

Under the spur of the political and military necessities 
already discussed, McDowell decided that his advance 
must begin on the i6th of July. Accordingly the follow- 
ing general order was issued that morning: — 

General Orders Hdqrs. Dept. N.E. Virginia, 

No. 17. Arlington, July 16, 1861. 

The troops will march to the front this afternoon in the following 
order: — 

1. The brigades of the First Division (Tyler's) will leave their 
camps in light marching order, and go as far as V'ienna, the Fourth 
Brigade taking the road across the Chain Bridge . . . the others by the 
Georgetown turnpike and Leesburg stone roads. . . . 

2. The Second Division (Hunter's) will leave their camps in light 
marching order, and go on the Columbia turnpike as far as the Little 
River turnpike, but not to cross it. . . . 

3. The Third Division (Heintzelman's) will leave their camps in 
light marching order, and go on the old Fairfax Court House road . . . 
as far as the Accotink, or the Pohick, if he finds it convenient. . . . 

4. The Fifth Division (Miles') will proceed in light marching order 
by the Little River turnpike as far as Annandale or to the point where 
the road leads to the left to go into the old Braddock road. . . . 

5. The brigades of the several divisions will be put in march in time 
to reach their respective destinations by dark. 

6. The reserve will be held in readiness to march at the shortest 
notice. . . . 

11. On the morning of the 17th, the troops will resume their march 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 115 

after daylight in time to reach Fairfax Court House (the Third Divi- 
sion, Sangster's) by 8 a.m. 

1. Brigadier-General Tyler will direct his march so as to intercept 
the enemy's communication between Fairfax Court House and Centre- 
ville 

2. The Second Division (Hunter's) will (after the road shall be 
cleared of the Fifth Division) move on the direct road to Fairfax Court 
House by the Little River turnpike. 

3. The Fifth Division (Miles') will turn off from the Little River 
turnpike and gain the old Braddock road, which it will follow to its 
intersection with the road from Fairfax Court House to Fairfax 
Station, where it will turn to the right and move on the Court House. 

4. The Third Division (Heintzelman's) will move by the best and 
shortest of the roads to the south of the railroad till he reaches the 
railroad at Sangster's. He will, according to the indications he may 
find, turn his Second and Third Brigades to the right, to go to Fairfax 
Station, or to the front to support his First Brigade. He may find it 
necessary to guard the road coming up from Wolf Run Shoals and the 
one leading to Yates' ford. 

HL The enemy is represented to be in force at Centreville, German- 
town, Fairfax Court House, and Fairfax Station, . . . and on the road 
towards Wolf Run Shoals. He ... is believed ... to have thrown up 
breastworks and planted cannon. It is therefore probable the move- 
ments above ordered may lead to an engagement, and everything must 
be done with a view to this result. 

The three following things will not be pardonable in any com- 
mander: I, to come upon a battery or breastwork without a knowledge 
of its position ; 2, to be surprised ; 3, to fall back. Advance guards with 
vedettes well in front and flankers and vigilance, will guard against the 
first and second. 

The columns are so strong and well provided that, though they may 
be for a time checked, they should not be overthrown. Each is pro- 
vided with intrenching tools and axes, and if the country afTords facili- 
ties for obstructing our march, it also gives equal facilities for sustaining 
ourselves in any position we obtain. A brigade should sustain itself 



ii6 BULL RUN 

as long as possible before asking for help from another. It can hardly 
be necessary to attack a battery in front; in most cases it may be 
turned. Commanders are enjoined to so conduct their march as to 
keep their men well closed up. This is of great importance. . . . 
Wagons will only be taken ... for ammunition, the medical depart- 
ment, and for intrenching tools. A small baggage train for each 
brigade . . . will consist of from twelve to fifteen wagons. . . . Depart- 
ment headquarters will be with the Second Division, on the Little 
River turnpike. Division commanders will communicate with them 
by every opportunity. . . . 

James B. Fry, A.A.G.^ 

McDowell's objective, the Confederate advanced line 
at Fairfax Court House, was clearly defined; and the 
march of the four columns was well calculated to give 
an initial success to the Federals if the Confederates 
should linger in their advanced positions. It was evi- 
dently McDowell's hope that they would, and he un- 
doubtedly expected much from his flanking columns, 
especially that under Tyler. If, however, the Confeder- 
ates retired, then an awkward accumulation of troops on 
the Warrenton pike near Centreville was entailed for no 
sufficient object. It may further be noted that the short 
march for the first day tended to reduce the total dis- 
tance to be traversed by the army before the enemy 
should be warned of its approach, but on the other hand 
involved making camp at night, an undesirable thing 
with green troops. 

The order has a peculiarity, which is only the natural 

^ O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 303. 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 117 

outcome of the circumstances: its laying down of certain 
precepts for the guidance of the division commanders. 
It was not a very practical way of teaching them their 
business ; yet what was McDowell to do ? These pre- 
cepts are not unsound, as far as they go, but it may be 
pointed out that in one of these elementary lessons in 
the military art McDowell failed to develop his subject 
sufficiently. His problem was how to move, with no un- 
due delay, an untrained army under a broiling July 
sun for a limited distance. It was essential to keep the 
men as short a time as possible on the road. The way 
to do this was to avoid delay by pushing out advanced 
guards, as McDowell in fact indicated. But in practice 
what happened was that the generals turned their whole 
divisions into advanced guards, kept deploying and 
scouting and deploying again, while the main column 
painfully waited, getting fatigued, demoralized, and un- 
disciplined to no useful purpose. Had McDowell seen to 
it that each of his divisional generals had a properly con- 
stituted advanced guard clearing the way at a sufficient 
distance from his column until the Confederate position 
at Fairfax Court House was reached, the advance towards 
Bull Run would have gained very much in effectiveness. 
The sentence, " A brigade should sustain itself as long 
as possible before asking help from another," suggests 
that McDowell for the moment forgot that his army was 
organized into divisions, and that the question of whether 



ii8 BULL RUN 

one brigade should reinforce another was one for his di- 
visional generals. Still, as matters went in that semi- 
organized army, this proved of no great consequence. On 
the whole, it might be said that the general order was 
as good a one as might reasonably be expected from a 
general officer wholly untrained for war ; it showed on 
McDowell's part those qualities of painstaking attention 
to detail which, with his undoubted courage and sense 
of duty, made up most of his equipment for command.' 

1 A military correspondent says of McDowell's order, that it "displays 
all the crudities to be expected in a march order by an officer devoid of 
experience or training in the handling of a force of 30,000 men. 

" Two contingencies were to be looked for : either the Confederates would 
fight at Fairfax Court House, or they would retreat. This might have 
been guessed had McDowell stopped to consider the enemy's point of 
view and to inquire what course of action the enemy's best interests de- 
manded; but Lee, Sherman and Grant were to be the first to solve, in 
the Civil War, this most interesting and essential personal-psychological 
factor of success. 

"At any rate, had cavalry been sent ahead on the i6th, reports must 
have been received which would have given an intelligent basis for the 
issuance of orders for the 17th. But McDowell not only did not wait for 
information, he did not even seem to desire it. His order providing for 
two days' marches in advance was ill-suited to either case. 

" Had the enemy been found in force at Fairfax Court House, the 1st 
division (Tyler) had a six-mile march and could march at 5 a.m. The 5th 
division (Miles) had a nine-mile march over a rough country road, part 
of which must be passed over before daylight. To ensure the division 
reaching Fairfax Court House at 8 A.M., it must march at 2 A.M., and even 
then the column (with the lack of discipline) would have straggled beyond 
all conception; only half the men would have reached Fairfax Court 
House that day, and those that did reach there would have been useless 
for fighting. The 3d division (Heintzelman) was not ordered to Fairfax 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 119 

The army was still in considerable confusion. Some of 
the brigades that were marked off for the advance were 
not completed until the very day when the march opened, 
several regiments, on that very day, crossing the Poto- 
mac to join the army. The staff service was inadequate, 
and to such an extraordinary degree that the commander- 
in-chief himself had to drive back from Arlington to the 
railroad station at Washington, just as his army was 
opening its march, to attend to a comparatively slight 
detail : we quote from W. H. Russell's " Diary " for the 
i6th of July : — 

On arriving at the Washington platform the first person I saw was 
General McDowell alone, looking anxiously into the carriages. He . . . 
inquired eagerly if I had seen two batteries of artillery — Barry's and 
another — which he had ordered up and was waiting for, but which 
had gone astray. . . . The general could hear nothing of his guns; 
his carriage was waiting and I accepted his offer of a seat to my 

Court House and the roads for him to march there would have been 
blocked by the 5th division. 

" Thus in case of a fight, only two of the five divisions could reach Fairfax 
Court House in any sort of condition for fighting. The lines of march con- 
verged from three directions and the routes of the ist and 5th divisions 
over narrow, wooded, and hilly country roads made it possible for a small 
Confederate force to have delayed almost indefinitely either of these 
columns. 

"On the other hand, if the enemy did not hold Fairfax Court House, 
then the unnecessary night-rising and night-marching is inexcusable. All 
three divisions are concentrated on the Little-river-Warrenton turnpike, 
whence they must march in single column to Centreville, by the only 
practicable wagon supply route, and thus, with the friction due to lack of 
organization and discipline, complications are bound to arise and all the 
delays actually experienced become thereafter unavoidable." _ 



120 BULL RUN 

lodgings. Although he spoke confidently, he did not seem in good 
spirits.^ 

Notwithstanding such difficulties as these, McDowell 
got his army started on its disastrous journey early that 
afternoon. The day was warm, but clear and not oppres- 
sive. The distance to be marched was not too great. 
Danger was as yet comparatively remote. And so the 
men went forward in good spirits, and, for the most part, 
reached the designated points in good time.^ 

Early on the 17th, McDowell's four divisions resumed 
their march. Hunter's, in the centre, at 5 A.M. He had 
only seven miles to go, but it took him five hours to 
make the distance. The long column blocked the road, 
making little and at times no progress. As the sun rose 
and the air became very warm, straggling began for 
water, for blackberries. The leading troops and the cav- 
alry continuously deployed in front of imaginary and un- 
tenanted Confederate positions. An onlooker described 
the artillery as "badly horsed, miserably equipped and 
. . . the worst set of gunners and drivers which I, who 
have seen the Turkish field-guns, ever beheld. . . . Their 
transport is tolerably good, but inadequate ; they have 
no carriage for reserve ammunition ; the commissariat 
drivers are civilians, under little or no control. . . . " ^ 

1 Russell, Diary, i, 157. 

2 Tyler's division was very slow, and could not keep closed up. Richard- 
son's brigade, marching from Chain Bridge, did not reach Vienna till 1 1 
P.M. Cudworth, Hist, isi Mass. » Russell, Diary, 1, 157. 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 121 

At about ten o'clock, just before reaching Fairfax 
Court House, Tyler's column was caught sight of, about 
two miles away to the northwest, his wagons showing 
against the skyline as they crossed the top of Flint Hill, 
on the road from Vienna to Germantown. No opposition 
was met with at the barricades which the Confederates 
had placed across the approaches to the village. A few 
shots were fired by the last pickets ; one or two men were 
wounded, and at that modest price Hunter was in occu- 
pation of Fairfax Court House ; at i P.M., Tyler reached 
Germantown less than two miles beyond on the War- 
renton turnpike ; while Miles and Heintzelman, farther to 
the south, were reaching their respective positions. At 
every point no greater resistance was met with than at 
Fairfax Court House. The enemy had evidently fallen 
back towards Manassas. 

A halt was made at Fairfax Court House, of which the 
first object was to rest the troops and to enable the 
commanding general to fix the position of his columns. 
He was soon satisfied as to the whereabouts of Tyler, 
just west of him, and of Miles who had marched about 
parallel with Hunter two or three miles to the south. 
But no word came from beyond the Alexandria and 
Orange Railroad, where Heintzelman was advancing. 
Finally, at about 3 P.M., McDowell decided to proceed in 
that direction in person. Two miles south, at the crossing 
of the old Braddock road, he found Miles' division at 



\ 



122 BULL RUN 

rest, and ascertained that Wilcox's brigade of Heintzel- 
man's corps was at Fairfax Station, another two miles 
south. 

It appears probable that McDowell pushed on farther 
and saw Willcox at the station, though this is only mat- 
ter for inference. Whether he did or not, the precise po- 
sition of Heintzelman's other two brigades does not seem 
to have been cleared up until later in the afternoon when 
Willcox wrote to McDowell, now back at Fairfax Court 
House, that he had just had word from Heintzelman 
that he was at Sangster's waiting orders.^ 

Summing up, it may be said that, even if clumsy and 
somewhat slow, McDowell's move on the Confederate 
advanced positions had turned out well, though he had 
failed to engage the enemy and win a preliminary suc- 
cess. But no sooner had he occupied Fairfax Court 
House than the machine showed signs of falling to pieces : 
the columns did not reach their respective positions as 
early as was expected ; one, at least, of the divisional 
commanders failed to inform headquarters of his where- 
abouts ; and so great was the lassitude, disorder, and 
straggling that it appeared hopeless to whip the men up 
for a further movement that day. It was for these reasons 

1 O. R. Sen i, vol. ii, 310; Willcox to Fry, July 18. It is difficult to say at 
what hour this dispatch was written, but it does not seem probable that 
McDowell received it before four o'clock. Sangster's probably meant the 
crossroads where Heintzelman held one brigade while he pushed another 
on to Sangster's Station. 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 123 

that McDowell, whose early intention had been to push 
on another four or five miles to Centreville, finally gave 
this up as hopeless and decided to start fresh on the i8th. 
His most advanced body was Richardson's brigade of 
Tyler's corps which camped along the Warrenton turn- 
pike about three miles east of Centreville. 

An account of this day's march would not be complete 
unless it mentioned the fact that both at Fairfax Court 
House and at Germantown there was a good deal of 
pillaging and some burning of houses. This resulted in 
the indignation both of the generals and of the public, but 
not in the punishment of the offenders. This disorder was 
not surprising, however, if the composition of the army 
and the conditions of its day's march, are considered. 

It cannot be doubted that McDowell left Washington 
with a fixed plan. He intended to risk no frontal attack, 
but to outflank the enemy ; and the flanking movement 
was to be made towards the south, his left. In this may 
be discerned a sound idea, but an unsound state of mind. 
There is no more advantageous position than on an 
enemy's flank, and with raw troops the idea has double 
force ; yet military operations are in their nature full of the 
unforeseen, while opportunities for flanking are not easy 
to create, so that few things are more dangerous than to 
prejudge a situation, or to have rigid ideas ; few things 
are more fatal than not to seize any opportunity, what- 



124 BULL RUN 

ever it may be, that presents itself. But McDowell's 
mind did not work in the higher plane of strategy ; he 
had little information as to the topography of the coun- 
try or the positions of the Confederates ; he had predeter- 
mined that his attack should be a flank attack ; while for 
the moment, that is up to the evening of the 17th of July, 
this flank movement was to be by his left. His orders 
for the 1 8th were framed accordingly : — 

General Orders Hdqrs. Dept. N.E. Virginia, 

No. 19. Fairfax Court House, July 18, 1861. 

The troops will move to-day as follows : — 

Heintzelman's division will go to Little Rocky Run, on the road 
hence to Centreville. Tyler's division will go beyond Centreville, on 
the road to Gainesville. Hunter's division will go as near Centreville as 
he can get water. 

The above movements will be made after supplies shall have been 
received. If the supply trains do not come up in time, division com- 
manders will procure beef from the inhabitants. . . . 

The troops should be at the places indicated to-night and they 
must have two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. . . . 

James B. Fry, A.A.G.^ 

There was apparently a separate order to Miles, per- 
haps verbal, to move directly to Centreville. 

These orders are curious. Their effect was to allot one 
whole day to a movement in which the maximum dis- 
tance which any body of the troops had to march was 
no more than six miles. It further provided for an exces- 
sive concentration, as all four divisions were to be brought 
to Centreville or as near there as possible. Whether the 
1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11. 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 125 

eventual attack was to be frontal or by a flank, this ac- 
cumulation of troops would in any case have to be re- 
duced before such a movement could be carried out. 
The question of supplies did not in fact materially affect 
the situation and will be dealt with later. ^ 

McDowell apparently left Fairfax Court House early 
on the morning of the i8th and found the road thence to 
Centreville full of the moving troops of Hunter and Tyler. 
At a quarter past eight he was with the advance, Rich- 
ardson's brigade of Tyler's corps, nearing Centreville, 
and he wrote as follows to General Tyler, who was close 
behind with the other three brigades of his division: — 

1 have information which leads me to believe you will find no force 
at Centreville, and will meet with no resistance in getting there. 
Observe well the roads to Bull Run and to Warrenton. Do not bring 
on an engagement, but keep up the impression that we are moving 
on Manassas. I go to Heintzelman's to arrange about the plan we 
have talked over.- 

This done, the general turned ofl^ from the direct road 
to Centreville and made his way to the road leading 
from Centreville southeasterly to Sangster's, on which 
he continued until he reached Sangster's Crossroads 
about noon, where he had a conversation with Heintzel- 
man. The latter moved on Centreville in the course of 
the afternoon.^ 

It was just as McDowell turned south that an incident 

* McDowell tries hard to explain his slowness as due to the failure of his 
transport, but this is little better than an excuse. 

2 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 312. ^ ^^p^ Cond. War, 11, 28, 29. 



126 BULL RUN 

occurred, slight, yet illustrating the haphazard and loose 
organization of his army. Major Barnard was Mc- 
Dowell's chief engineer officer ; he was with McDowell 
in the early morning and relates that his chief "was 
then about going to Sangster's and invited me to attend 
him. Not understanding his journey to have the char- 
acter of a reconnaissance, but as simpl}^ to communicate 
with the division of Colonel Heintzelman, I preferred ac- 
companying the division of General Tyler to Centreville." ^ 
Captain Fry similarly abandoned his general. And, ap- 
parently for no better reason, McDowell's reconnaissance 
had to be conducted without his adjutant-general and his 
chief engineer. 

Accompanied by a small escort, McDowell proceeded 
for several hours to explore the country to the south, along 
the line by which he hoped to effect his outflanking 
movement. It was while thus occupied, and at an hour 
that may be conjectured as about 3 P.M., that news 
reached him that an engagement was in progress be- 
tween Tyler and the enemy along Bull Run. Having 
already pretty well come to a decision as a result of his 
reconnaissance, he started at once for Centreville, only 
to find on his arrival there that an unsuccessful skirmish 
had been fought at Blackburn's Ford. Before dealing 
with this, however, it will be better to trace the Confeder- 
ate movements up to that point. 

^ Major Barnard's report, O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 329. 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 127 

THE CONFEDERATE RETIREMENT FROM FAIRFAX 
COURT HOUSE 

On the Confederate side there is less to be narrated. 
As early as the 8th of July, doubtless informed from Wash- 
ington that McDowell's advance was hourly expected, 
Beauregard issued his orders for the eventual retirement 
from the advanced lines to that of Bull Run.i The Sec- 
ond Brigade, Ewell's, was to fall back from the railroad 
about Fairfax Station and Sangster's Crossroads to Union 
Mills Ford, burning bridges behind them ; the First Bri- 
gade, Bonham's, was to retire from Fairfax Court House 
through Centreville to Mitchell's Ford ; and the Fifth 
Brigade, Cocke's, was to follow the Warrenton turnpike 
to Stone Bridge, leaving behind a detachment to make 
a stand, if practicable, at Cub Run. Beauregard's chief 
object was undoubtedly to avoid a conflict on the ad- 
vanced line where McDowell stood a chance of concen- 
trating superior numbers and winning a partial success. 

Beauregard's plans and views at this moment are not 
easy to unravel ; the only constant factor in them being 
his pugnacious temperament. We have already seen 
that Bull Run as a line of defence had weak as well as 
strong points. Taking Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords 
as the centre, it might be said that the Confederate right 
was a good deal stronger than the left. The river was 

^ Special Order loo, 0. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 447. 



128 BULL RUN 

deeper at this point ; ^ the farther bank was densely 
wooded and rugged ; while on the Confederate side the 
roads and terrain generally facilitated the concentration 
of troops at any threatened point. Yet here, as at Black- 
burn's Ford and farther upstream towards Stone Bridge, 
the river was not a real obstacle. It ran mostly through 
a deep wooded gully that might serve the purposes of 
an ambuscade excellently and yet be untenable by in- 
fantry against a well-directed artillery fire, if a suitable 
place for guns could be found. A few trestles, even a sin- 
gle pontoon, would in many places have served to bridge 
the stream in a very short time ; but McDowell's army 
was not organized to solve this simple problem. 

In his order of the 8th of July, Beauregard's not alto- 
gether sound appreciation of the defensive value of Bull 
Run appears in the instructions as to what is to fol- 
low the retirement from Fairfax Court House to that 
stream : — 

These brigades, thus in position, will make a desperate stand at 
the several points hereinbefore designated on the line of Bull Run, 
and will be supported. . . . 

It then goes on : — 

Should the enemy march to the attack of Mitchell's Ford via Centre- 
ville, the following movements will be made with celerity: — 

1. The 4th brigade will march from Blackburn's Ford to attack 
him on the flank and centre. 

2. The 3d brigade will be thrown to the attack of his centre and 
rear towards Centreville. 

^ The stream is tidal up to Union Mills. 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 129 

3. The 2d and 6th brigades united will also push forward and attack 
him in the rear by way of Centreville, protecting their own right 
flanks and rear from the direction of Fairfax Station and Court 
House. . . .^ 

The above-quoted order reveals Beauregard's inten- 
tions clearly enough. He attached no importance to his 
outlying position at Fairfax Court House, and merely 
wished to fight the enemy on his own line. Anticipating 
that he would be attacked at his strongest point, Mitch- 
ell's Ford, simply because that was the best route to 
Manassas, he intended as soon as such a movement took 
place to attempt a counterstroke at the enemy's most 
vulnerable flank. The idea was good. What Beauregard 
overlooked was that the Federals might not attack at 
Mitchell's Ford, but somewhere else. He also neglected 
to take steps by scouting and reconnaissance work to keep 
in touch with the enemy, by that means learning more of 
his movements and intentions, and gaining opportunities 
for action. Thus Bonham, who had with him nearly all 
the available cavalry at Fairfax Court House,^ brought it 
back with him to Mitchell's Ford, where it was of the 
least possible use. Thrown out on the right flank it could 
have kept close contact with Heintzelman, and when 
McDowell had packed his army into Centreville, might 
have raided successfully in the Federal rear ; on the left 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 448. 

2 The 30th Virginia, Colonel Radford, with four independent troops 
under Captains Wickham, Ball, Powell, and Payne. 



I30 BULL RUN 

flank, if supported from Stone Bridge, the cavalry might 
have kept watch along the line of Cub Run and given 
early warning of any Federal movement by their right. 

Bonham, Ewell, and Cocke slipped away from their 
positions on the 17th without any great difficulty and 
with hardly a shot fired. They had precise instructions 
as to what to do, and they had ample warning of the 
Federal approach. Bonham reached Centreville about 
midday, and there lingered to see whether the Federal 
movement would develop further. As it did not, he re- 
mained until midnight unmolested, and then, on receipt 
of a positive order from Beauregard, resumed his march 
and filed into position at Mitchell's Ford in the early 
hours of the morning of the i8th. 

THE SKIRMISH AT BLACKBURN'S FORD, JULY 18 

Richardson's advance reached Centreville at nine 
o'clock on the morning of the i8th. Turning to the left, he 
came out, as it happened, not on the road leading west 
towards Stone Bridge and Warrenton, the direction in- 
dicated in McDowell's order, but on that leading south 
to Manassas, coming to a halt about one mile from the 
village. Tyler soon joined Richardson. The instructions 
which he had just received from McDowell were suffi- 
ciently clear,! but he apparently paid little heed to them. 

^ That is, the letter of 8.15 a.m., quoted above. 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 131 

Instead of directing his main column along the Warren- 
ton turnpike, and not risking an engagement, he pushed 
Richardson along the Manassas road and brought on 
an unfortunate skirmish. The fact was probably that the 
road along the Centreville ridge, from which the sur- 
rounding country could be easily discovered, was a 
tempting line along which to advance, and Tyler could 
not resist the temptation. 

Taking Richardson and an escort with him, Tyler 
pushed along the Centreville ridge about a mile farther 
until he reached the point where it dips down to Bull 
Run. From this point it was clear that the Confederates 
were in position beyond the stream, and probably in 
some force. On the rising ground beyond Blackburn's 
Ford a section of artillery was in plain sight, and in the 
woods and at various points the glint of rifles and bayo- 
nets announced the presence of the enemy. Tyler quickly 
decided to test their strength and sent back orders for 
Ayres' battery of Sherman's brigade, which was close 
behind Richardson's, to come to the front. Richardson's 
brigade was ordered up in support. Tyler was now 
joined by Major Barnard and by Captain Fry, who 
freely supplied him with advice in the name of their 
absent general. ^ 

Ayres' guns were brought up at a gallop and wheeled 
to the right. They were rifled ten-pounders, well served, 

^ Barnard's report, O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 329. 



132 BULL RUN 

and got the range at once. The Confederate guns, a 
mile away to the south, were much weaker ; Longstreet 
almost immediately ordered them to be withdrawn.^ A 
section left by Bonham on the north bank also fired a few 
shots from the right, and then retired across the run at 
Mitchell's Ford. This seemed on the whole encouraging. 
The infantry, meanwhile, some light companies and 
the 1 2th New York,^ had been pushed down in front of 
the guns and into the woods where the bank descended 
sharply towards Blackburn's Ford, a few Confederate 
pickets falling back before them. The enemy did not 
appear to be showing fight to any alarming extent and 
Tyler now decided to push in on the position. The ist 
Massachusetts was ordered to follow the 12th New York, 
while the 2d and 3d Michigan were deployed to the right, 
descending to the lowlands in the direction of Mitchell's 
Ford.^ Benjamin's section of rifled twenty-pounders was 
placed on the ridge, and Ayres was ordered to send his 
section of twelve-pounder howitzers into the gully to sup- 
port the ist Massachusetts and 12th New York. It was 
now nearly two o'clock. 

1 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 38; which confirms his 
official report. 

2 A very poor and insubordinate regiment, of which a part had to be 
disarmed on the afternoon of the 21st. 

* An amusing example of the greenness of the commanding officers was 
afforded by Major Williams, of the 2d Michigan, who immediately on 
entering the woods ordered his regiment to form square to resist cavalry. 
Lyster, "Bull Run," Paps. Loyal Legion Mich. Command, i. 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 133 

On the Confederate side Longstreet was in position, 
with the ist, nth and 17th Virginia; he had Bonham 
on his left at Mitchell's Ford, which was never threatened, 
and Early in reserve behind him. He withdrew his pick- 
ets from the farther bank of Bull Run without firing, at 
some time between twelve and one, and with his infantry 
as well screened as was possible in the underbrush on 
the southern bank, awaited the advance of the enemy. 
The Confederates had no intrenchments. 

Longstreet succeeded fairly well in getting his men to 
reserve their fire. A few straggling shots were exchanged. 
Presently the 12th New York advanced in deployed or- 
der, and was met by a tremendous but ill-aimed volley ; 
the Federals at once broke and fell back.i The ist 
Massachusetts, with a few regular troopers and the light 
infantry, took cover and did rather better. For fifteen 
minutes or more a hot musketry fire was kept up by both 
sides, neither showing much steadiness at a compara- 
tively close range, and part of the Confederate line in 
turn broke away.2 Longstreet called for reinforcements, 
and Early brought up the 7th Virginia and 7th Louisi- 
ana which, formed in a second line, proved almost as 
dangerous to friend as to foe ; at all events, Longstreet 

* Richardson tried to rally the regiment, but could find no officers. Tyler 
came up, but concluded it was hopeless, and told Richardson to let them 
go. Rep. Cond. War, ii, 20. 

^ Longstreet actually sabred his men up to their work. From Manas- 
sas to Appomattox, 38. 



134 BULL RUN 

relates that to escape their fire he had to jump off 
his horse and roll on the ground. Early also brought 
up five more guns of the Washington Artillery which 
were massed with Longstreet's two pieces and placed 
a little to the rear. When the Federals presently with- 
drew, an artillery engagement was continued for an hour 
or so until past four o'clock, the Federals having rather 
the best of it. ^ The casualties were, for the N orth, 1 9 killed, 
38 wounded, 26 missing ; for the South, 15 killed, 53 
wounded, 2 missing.^ 

It is clear that Blackburn's Ford was an ill-managed 
affair. Tyler should not have engaged at all, in view of 

^ In Alexander's excellent account of this affair he gives the following 
details of the artillery practice: The Federals, with eight guns engaged, 
fired 415 rounds; the Confederates, with seven guns, fired 310 rounds. The 
Burton and Archer shell which was used with three of the Confederate 
guns was badly designed and "tumbled " ; another of the Confederate guns 
became useless through an enlarged vent. It was only owing to their being 
masked by timber that the Confederate guns stood any chance at all against 
the heavier metal of their opponents; and they would have been entirely 
withdrawn at the close of the action if the Federals had fired a few more 
rounds than they did. Alexander, Military Memoirs, 24. It may be sus- 
pected, though direct evidence as to the supply of ammunition is scanty, 
that the Federal batteries had little left in hand at the close of the en- 
gagement. 

2 For Blackburn's Ford, see the reports of officers present in O. R., Ser. 
I, vol. II, particularly those of Tyler, Richardson, Barnard, Beauregard, 
Longstreet, and Early. Among other accounts those of E. P. Alexander, 
in his Military Memoirs, of Longstreet in his From Manassas to Appomat- 
tox, and of H. J. Raymond in the New York Times, are specially good. 
The figures for casualties on the Northern side are from Richardson's 
report, but Cudworth {Hist, of the ist Mass.), who gives 13 killed and 20 
wounded for that command, has been read with it. 



MCDOWELL'S MARCH TO CENTREVILLE 135 

his precise instructions from McDowell and of the repre- 
sentations made to him by Major Barnard and Captain 
Fry. Having engaged, he should not have sent the main 
body of his raw infantry into the woods until he had 
searched them thoroughly with his guns, which his 
superiority over the Confederate artillery and dominant 
position should have facilitated. But having once gone 
in, Tyler should not have ordered a general retirement 
to Centreville merely because he had lost a few dozen 
men and because one of his regiments had become demor- 
alized. He could have safely established himself towards 
the end of the ridge in such a way as to impede or delay 
any counterstroke which the Confederates might attempt 
by crossing Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords. He could 
have imposed on the enemy, threatened their centre, 
and, at the least, maintained the morale of his troops. 

The fight should have revealed the weakness of the 
Confederate position at Blackburn's Ford, yet this was 
apparently not perceived by the Federals. Longstreet's 
regiments, as it happened, were nearly dislodged by the 
ill-directed attack made on them. The little plateau back 
of them could easily be covered by the fire of the guns 
from the Centreville ridge, and that plateau gave access 
to the left fiank and rear of Bonham covering Mitchell's 
Ford. Longstreet displayed cool nerve and some judg- 
ment, and his handling of his men had much to do with 
the success they won. 



VI 

FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST OF 

JULY 

MCDOWELL 

McDowell arrived at Centreville late in the afternoon 
of the i8th, just as Tyler was completing his retirement 
from Blackburn's Ford. Richardson's and Sherman's 
brigades were at that moment to the south of the vil- 
lage, Schenck's to the west, Keyes' to the east. There 
was apparently a good deal of recrimination over what 
had occurred, Barnard and Fry making the most of the 
advice they had given Tyler against attacking, Mc- 
Dowell justly annoyed at his divisional commander's dis- 
obedience of orders. The scene was unfortunately public, 
and confirmed the impression of undiscipline already 
produced by many similar scenes which had taken place 
on the march among the junior officers.^ 

There is nothing to show that McDowell himself pro- 
ceeded along the Centreville ridge to view the central 
line of approach to the Confederate position. He was ap- 

1 The rout of the I2th New York and Tyler's retreat undoubtedly had 
a very demoralizing effect. McDowell believed that it led to the defection 
of the 4th Pennsylvania and 8th New York Battery on the 20th. Fry 
says: "After the affair at Blackburn's Ford . . . and Tyler's action in the 
battle of the 2 1 st, a bitterness between Tyler and McDowell grew up which 
lasted till they died." Battles and Leaders, i, 187. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 137 

parently wedded to the idea of outflanking it, and as he 
had earlier in the day decided that to march by his left 
was impracticable, his mind was now fixed on discover- 
ing a means of effecting the same purpose by his right. 
It never entered his head apparently that by means of 
the Centreville ridge and his superior artillery he might 
either force the enemy's centre, or at all events cross 
Bull Run and keep the enemy under such pressure as 
to give a flanking movement the best chance of success. 
The check to Tyler was wrongly accepted at its face 
value. 

For the moment McDowell confined himself to order- 
ing Tyler at once to push a brigade (Richardson's) back 
along the ridge so as to keep in touch with the enemy 
and observe their movements. On finding this order neg- 
lected, he repeated it sharply at 12.30 A.M. on the 19th. 
For the rest he decided to let the troops remain at Centre- 
ville until he could find out by means of reconnaissances 
how to turn Beauregard's left. 

Let us turn for a moment now to the matter of trans- 
portation. In the postscript to his report on Bull Run,^ 
McDowell speaks of a day's delay in his transport, 
" making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we 
should have made on Saturday." It is doubtful whether 
the excuse is a valid one. 

The army had started on Tuesday, the i6th, with three 

^ O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 324. 



138 BULL RUN 

days' rations carried by the troops. It was the case, how- 
ever, that what with the undiscipline of the men and the 
fatigue caused by the great heat which began on the 17th, 
the men wasted or threw away a large proportion of 
this supply. These rations consisted in part of coffee, 
sugar, beans, and rice, but the transport had been so cut 
down that some regiments, if not all, left behind them 
their camp-kettles and mess-pans, so that these articles 
proved useless. ^ Cooked beef and biscuit was the sub- 
stantial part of what they carried. 

By the night of the i8th, the army was starving, for 
the supply trains were not yet up and the rations were 
now consumed. For a few hours there was a difficult situ- 
ation, and it undoubtedly gave McDowell considerable 
anxiety. 

The general-in-chief's apprehensions were not in fact 
well founded, and were soon allayed, for ample supplies 
were within immediate reach. Three wagon trains con- 
veying nearly 200,000 rations and 225 head of cattle, 
equivalent to over 120,000 rations more, had been 
started close behind the columns. The first, under Haw- 
kins, reached Fairfax Court House early on the iSth, 
and, after detaching 14 wagons to Miles' division on 
the old Braddock road, pushed on and reached Centre- 
ville the same evening. At the same time the second, 
under Curtis, had parked on the Warrenton turnpike be- 

* See the statement in Captain Curtis' report; O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 341. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 139 

tween Germantown and Centreville ; it was able to dis- 
tribute rations at the latter place early on the following 
morning. The third, under Bell, reached Fairfax Court 
House at 4.45 P.M. on the i8th, left there at 4 A.M. on the 
19th, and reached the army four hours later.^ 

There was some wastage by the way ; there were un- 
necessary supplies ; there was much confusion and irregu- 
larity in their distribution. Apparently the commissariat 
officers found it hopeless to get proper receipts, and in 
some cases were nearly pillaged by mobs of disorderly 
and famished men. Yet Captain Clarke, chief commissary, 
who probably is optimistic, estimates that after all de- 
ductions 160,000 rations were actually distributed at or 
near Centreville on the night of the i8th and morning 
of the 19th. Add to these the cattle, and it is no exagger- 
ation to say that McDowell's army was largely supplied 
and fit to use within a radius of a few miles by ten or 
twelve o'clock on the morning of the 19th of July ; nor 
was it reasonable to delay an advance on Manassas, six 
miles from Centreville, for the slaughtering and cooking 
of the cattle.^ 

Probably in view of what had happened the day be- 
fore, McDowell decided on the 19th to remain with his 

1 In the dispatch to Tyler, written at 12.30 a.m. on the 19th, McDowell 
says: "The train of subsistence came up long ago." O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 
306. He evidently refers to Hawkins' train. 

" See generally the reports of Clarke, Hawkins, Curtis, and Bell; O. R. 
Ser. I, vol. II, 336-44. 



I40 BULL RUN 

troops at Centreville and to delegate the duty of recon- 
naissance to his subordinates. Major Barnard and Cap- 
tain Woodbury of the Engineers were selected for this 
duty. They conferred with the commanding general, it 
being assumed from the maps ^ and information before 
these officers that a flank movement towards the right 
must pass either by Stone Bridge, or a few miles farther 
north by Sudley Spring. Given the premises, there is 
little reason to quarrel with this general proposition, for 
the Confederate centre might properly be reckoned as 
running to about Island Ford. From this point to Stone 
Bridge, which was supposed to be strongly held, their 
left wing was marked off. Therefore the question, as Mc- 
Dowell and his engineers approached it, really narrowed 
down merely to this: How could the position at Stone 
Bridge be turned? 

Assuming for a moment the soundness of a flanking 
movement beyond Stone Bridge, McDowell's mental 
working can better be followed. The next important 
crossing of Bull Run above the bridge was at Sudley 
Spring, whence a road that would facilitate the move- 
ment of guns and wagons led south a mile and a half, 
where it cut the Warrenton turnpike little more than a 
mile beyond Stone Bridge. From this crossroads it was 
about six miles farther to Manassas. It was presumable 
that the Confederate line did not extend as far as Sudley 

1 See McDowell's map at back. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 141 

Spring. How could McDowell, from Centreville, reach 
the Sudley Spring road ? If he could once get on it with 
a sufficient force, he hoped to be able to roll up the Con- 
federates the whole distance of nearly eight miles that lay 
between Sudley Spring and Manassas. It was possible, 
too, that fords might be found between Sudley Spring 
and Stone Bridge, unguarded by the enemy and short- 
ening the route. There were in fact several such fords, 
of which Poplar or Red House Ford was the best. 

Barnard and Woodbury, accompanied by the ubiquitous 
Governor Sprague of Rhode Island and a troop of U. S. 
cavalry, started on their reconnaissance early on the morn- 
ing of the 19th. The question was largely whether roads 
could be found on the northern side of Bull Run con- 
necting the Warrenton turnpike with Sudley Spring. 

We had information, — says Barnard, — that a road branched from 
the Warrenton turnpike a short distance beyond Cub Run, by which, 
opening gates and passing through private grounds, we might reach 
the fords. . . . I . . . followed up the valley of Cub Run until we 
reached a point west 10° north and about four miles in an air line from 
Centreville, near which we struck a road which we believed to lead to 
the fords. Following it for a short distance we encountered the enemy's 
patrols. As we were most anxious to avoid attracting the enemy's 
attention to our designs in this quarter we did not care to pursue the 
reconnaissance farther. We had seen enough to be convinced of the 
perfect practicability of the route. To make more certain of the fords, 
however, Captain W'oodbury proposed to return at night, and, with a 
few Michig'an woodmen from Colonel Sherman's brigade, to endeavor 
to find them. On returning to camp it was determined to send Captain 
Wright and Lieutenant Snyder, Engineers, with Captain Woodbury. 



142 BULL RUN 

At the same time the commanding general directed Captain Whipple, 
Topographical Engineers, and Lieutenant Prime, Engineers, to make 
a night reconnaissance of the run between Warrenton Bridge and Black- 
burn's Ford. Both these night expeditions failed. It was found the 
enemy occupied the woods too strongly on our side of the run to per- 
mit the reconnaissances to be accomplished.^ 

From this report it may be seen that McDowell was at 
the disadvantage entailed by a surprise attack in that he 
could not show his hand, and could therefore obtain only 
slight information. Barnard saw a very small part of the 
Sudley Spring road, which eventually proved a difficult 
route for artillery, and circuitous. He failed to reach Bull 
Run itself, and got no information as to Poplar Ford. 
McDowell was dissatisfied with the result, and we find 
him on the next day contemplating a reconnaissance in 
force. 2 

On the night of the 19th, General Tyler was struck by 
the sound of locomotives coming from Manassas, as were 
many others in the Federal lines. He was an experi- 
enced railroad man, and was able to draw inferences. 
He was convinced from what he heard that heavy rein- 
forcements, probably parts of Johnston's army, were 

^ O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 330. 

2 McDowell to Townsend ; O. R. Ser. I, vol. 11, 308. If an account in the 
New York World (July 23) may be trusted, orders were drawn up after 
Barnard's return for an advance at 6 A.M. on the 20th ; this was found, how- 
ever, to be much too late an hour at which to start, besides which a short- 
age in artillery ammunition was discovered, so it was decided to postpone 
the advance until the 21st. This order suggests the reconnaissance in 
force which might develop into a real attack. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 143 

reaching the enemy's camp. He went with his news to 
McDowell's headquarters at once, only to be met with a 
very cool reception.^ 

On the 20th nothing was done. In the early morning 
McDowell was still for a reconnaissance in force. " I 
wished yesterday," he wrote to Colonel Townsend, "to 
make a reconnaissance in force, but deferred to the better 
judgment of others — to try and get it by observation 
and stealth. To-day I propose to drive in the enemy and 
get the information required." 2 He was once more, how- 
ever, persuaded to defer to the opinion of others and 
not to resort to such a measure. More reconnoitring 
parties went out, and in the course of the day further 
information came to eke out Barnard's meagre report of 
the day before. A rumor also reached McDowell, and a 
true one as it proved, that Johnston had reached Ma- 
nassas ; it was possibly an echo of what Tyler had said 
the night before. Under these circumstances he decided 
to delay no longer, but to attempt on the next day the 
movement through Sudley Spring. 

To carry out this purpose McDowell's first plan was to 
move his right wing well forward late on the 20th, so as 
to get it through Centreville and shorten the distance it 
would have to march the next day. Once more, how- 
ever, he allowed himself to be persuaded against his 
better judgment. "I deferred," he says, "to those who 

^ Alexander, Military Memoirs, 27. 2 q. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 308. 



144 BULL RUN 

had the greatest distance to go, and who preferred start- 
ing early in the morning and making but one move." ^ 
There are few remarks in McDowell's reports or dis- 
patches that give one a stronger impression of his unfit- 
ness for command. 

The General Order for the movement of the army, 
issued on the evening of the 20th, ran as follows : — 

General Orders Hdqrs. Dept. Northeastern Virginia, 

No. 22. Centreville, July 20, 1861. 

The enemy has planted a battery on the Warrenton turnpike to 
defend the passage of Bull Run. ... It is intended to turn the position, 
force the enemy from the road, that it may be reopened, and, if pos- 
sible, destroy the railroad leading from Manassas to the Valley of Vir- 
ginia, where the enemy has a large force. As this may be resisted by all 
the force of the enemy, the troops will be disposed of as follows: — 

The First Division (General Tyler's), with the exception of Rich- 
ardson's brigade, will move at 2.30 A.M. precisely on the Warrenton 
turnpike to threaten the passage of the bridge, but will not open fire 
until full daybreak. 

The Second Division (Hunter's) will move from its camp at 2 A.M. 
precisely and . . . will after passing Cub Run turn to the right and pass 
the Bull Run stream above the lower ford at Sudley Springs, and then, 
turning down to the left, descend the stream and clear away the enemy 
who may be guarding the lower ford and bridge. It will then bear off 
to the right to make room for the succeeding division. 

The Third Division (Heintzelman's) will march at 2.30 a.m. and 
follow the road taken by the Second Division (Hunter's) but will cross 
at the lower ford, after it has been turned as above, and then, going to 
the left, take place between the stream and Second Division. 

The Fifth Division (Miles') will take position on the Centreville 
Heights. (Richardson's brigade will for the time form part of his divi- 
sion, and will continue in its present position.) One brigade will be in 
* O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 317. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 145 

the village and one near the present station of Richardson's brigade. 
This division will threaten Blackburn's Ford and remain in reserve at 
Centreville. The commander will open fire with artillery only, and 
will bear in mind that it is a demonstration only he is to make. . . .^ 

Such was the order that took the Federal army to the 
field of Bull Run, and before leaving that army on the 
night of the 20th of July, some comment on this order 
should be made.^ 

Probably the worst feature of McDowell's plans and 
operations was the persistent way in which Johnston's 
possible presence at Manassas was left out of account. 
If Johnston was a likely combatant, then every hour of 
time might be decisive of failure or success ; if he had 
arrived at Manassas, then it was certainly a question 
whether it was not better to assume the defensive, or to 
attempt a combined operation with Patterson. Even on 
the assumption that Johnston was in the Valley, and 
making every allowance for McDowell's difficulties, it is 
not possible to acquit him of having wasted invaluable 
time. 

The flanking movement by Sudley Spring was defen- 
sible chiefiy because the fortifications of Manassas stood 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 326. 

^ I have left it largely to the sequel to show the crudity of the time 
lable and other arrangements of McDowell. It was a mistake to at- 
tempt a night march with such troops as he had; his marching arrange- 
ments were absurdly bad; he was scattering his army over an enormous 
front; he was working out a plan whereby his men were nearly sure to 
be physically exhausted at the decisive moment: — all these matters will 
appear at considerable length in the course of the narrative. 



146 BULL RUN 

in the way of the direct advance through Blackburn's 
Ford. But the planning of the march was clearly defect- 
ive, for it involved covering a distance of over ten miles 
along a doubtful line of approach. In hot July weather and 
for troops such as those, this was a very considerable enter- 
prise, and one that was insufficiently worked out, as ap- 
peared when the troops attempted to carry out the order. 
With his right once moved as far as Sudley Spring, 
it became imperative for McDowell to establish a com- 
munication at Stone Bridge, and to resist all possible 
counterstrokes against the Centreville ridge, else he 
might easily see his army broken at either point or 
turned. 1 Even more dangerous than this was the fact 
that his turning movement prolonged his line of opera- 
tions so as to open a wide flank to an enemy's counter- 
stroke ; so extended was his right that his left had 
actually to be thrown back and to face one of its bri- 
gades towards Alexandria, the base. Yet it may be ques- 
tioned whether there was any other move open; and 
some military experts, General Sherman chief among 
them, have considered his plan an admirable one. That 

^ A comparison of the reports of Barnard and McDowell suggests that 
the latter possibly made a mistake. Barnard reported that the ford below 
Stone Bridge, that is Lewis' Ford, was guarded; McDowell may have 
understood the ford above Stone Bridge, and therefore decided to swing 
far around by Sudley Spring. A long and fatiguing march would have been 
avoided had the troops crossed at Poplar Ford, while the army would have 
avoided the dispersal that the advance along the Sudley Spring road even- 
tually caused. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 147 

opinion it is not possible to share. The soundest fea- 
ture of the plan was that from Sudley Spring the advance 
should be by the left ; and it was the opposite that act- 
ually took place. 

McDowell's mental attitude appears to have been that 
of a subordinate carrying out a defective order from his 
superiors to the best of his ability. He deliberately dis- 
missed Johnston from his mind, on the supposition that 
this was a matter that did not concern him. He clung 
closely to the idea that a frontal attack was hopeless with 
such troops as he commanded, and that there was noth- 
ing to do but to outflank the enemy. If this could not be 
done by his left, then it must be done by his right, 
whatever the risk. On the basis of these assumptions, 
all fundamental and to a certain degree false, the march 
through Sudley Spring was ordered. 

The plan of the next day's operations was carefully 
explained to the division and brigade commanders who 
assembled that night at headquarters for the purpose. 
It may be doubted whether this conference was alto- 
gether cheerful. For the army was showing signs of 
grave demoralization, and that very evening two com- 
mands had obtained from the commander-in-chief a re- 
lease from service because of the expiration of their three 
months' term. The 4th Pennsylvania and the 8th New 
York militia battery were making their arrangements to 
march not on Manassas but on Washington the follow- 



148 BULL RUN 

ing morning. The New Yorkers left their guns behind 
them at Centreville, and there they lay unnoticed and 
uncared-for during some hours, until General Blenker 
eventually took them and added them to his brigade. 
Those abandoned guns might have played a big part in 
the struggle for the Henry house plateau. ^ 

BEAUREGARD 

On the 1 8th of July, while Tyler was unskilfully en- 
gaging Richardson's brigade at Blackburn's Ford, word 
reached Beauregard that Johnston's movement had be- 
gun. Whatever his imperfections as a general, Beaure- 
gard did not lack the offensive spirit ; he seems from 
the first to have been anxious to avail himself of any 
opportunit)^ that should present itself of striking back at 
the enemy across Bull Run. The news of Johnston's ap- 
proach led to his working out a new scheme. 

Beauregard sent his aide, Captain Chisolm, on the 
evening of the i8th, to propose that Johnston should de- 
tach part of his forces to operate through Aldie Gap and 

^ The Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, was at McDowell's 
headquarters. He expended some eloquence on the recalcitrant troops, but 
in vain. It is doubtful whether, even with a free hand, McDowell was the 
man to order a few of these deserters to be shot as an example; but with 
his superior present the blame cannot be laid at his door. The undiscipline 
of the volunteers and the political weakness of the Government went as far 
in one direction as the ferocity of the disciplinary code of the regular army 
did in another. In camp at Centreville the volunteers were startled to see 
two deserters from Sykes' battalion of regulars triced up, receive thirty 
lashes, and get branded. Slocum, Hist, of 27th New York. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 149 

take Centreville in reverse. Captain Chisolm reached 
Johnston twenty-four hours later, on the evening of the 
19th, at Piedmont on the Manassas Gap Railroad, and 
placed Beauregard's proposal before him. 

I did not agree to the plan, — says Johnston, — because, ordinarily, it 
is impracticable to direct the movement of troops so distant from each 
other, by roads so far separated, in such a manner as to combine their 
action on a field of battle. It would have been impossible, in my 
opinion,to calculate when our undisciplined volunteers would reach any 
distant point that might be indicated. I preferred the junction of the 
two armies at the earliest time possible, as the first measure to secure 
success.^ 

While he was figuring out this more or less fantastic 
scheme, Beauregard was not neglecting to call other re- 
inforcements to his aid. Colonel Hunton was marching 
fast from Leesburg with the 8th Virginia, while General 
Holmes, under orders from Richmond, with the ist 
Arkansas, 2d Tennessee, and four rifled six-pounders, was 
on the way from Fredericksburg. Hunton arrived on the 
19th and took position near the Lewis house. Holmes 
arrived on the 20th and was placed in reserve between 
Manassas and Union Mills Ford. Meanwhile, as Mc- 
Dowell's offensive did not develop further, clearly the 
best plan for Beauregard was to await the approaching 
reinforcements and to strike the instant they arrived and 
before Patterson should have time to reach the scene of 
operations ; and this was the course he followed. 

1 Johnston, Narrative, 38. The controversy concerning this plan of 
Beauregard's appears to be negligible. 



I50 BULL RUN 

JOHNSTON 

It has already been stated that it was at i A.M. of the 
i8th, while the Federals were camping along the War- 
renton turnpike from Fairfax Court House to German- 
town, that Johnston received the dispatch from Richmond 
stating that Beauregard was attacked.^ He had long 
foreseen this contingency and apparently made up his 
mind at once to move to Beauregard's help. He had 
several important matters to attend to before starting : 
how to dispose of his sick and wounded ; how to provide 
for the defence of Winchester. Even more difficult was the 
problem presented by Patterson. Johnston, not unnatu- 
rally, assumed that his opponent's movements were re- 
lated to those that McDowell was carrying out towards 
Manassas. The day before, July the 1 7th, Patterson had 
marched by his left from Bunker Hill toSmithfield (now 
Midway) closely shadowed by Stuart's cavalry. On the 
whole it seemed probable that this move meant either 
that Patterson was still aiming at Winchester but avoiding 
the obstacles in his direct route, or that he would continue 
twelve miles farther south to Berryville where he would 
be across the direct road from Winchester through 
Snicker's Gap to Manassas, and within six miles of the 

1 For Johnston's movement to Manassas his Narrative strongly corrobo- 
rates the official reports and should be read with them. A comparison of 
the texts, however, leaves little doubt but that Johnston had copies of his 
reports before him when he wrote the Narrative. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 151 

road through Ashby's Gap, farther south. Even if Pat- 
terson were thrown back at that point, the mere necessity 
of fighting an engagement there would be fatal to any 
hope of Johnston's army reaching Beauregard so as 
to be of help. The early hours of the i8th were, there- 
fore, anxious ones for the Confederate general, and, while 
he employed them in making indispensable preparations, 
up till noon he issued no orders for moving his troops. It 
was probably at about this time that he received a report 
from Stuart stating that up till nine o'clock that morning 
there had been no signs of an advance by Patterson to- 
wards Berryville. On this Johnston issued his orders of 
march. 

There were fifty-seven miles to be accomplished by 
Johnston's army before it could reach the point where, at 
the very moment it was filing out of Winchester, Tyler's 
guns were already booming along the banks of Bull Run, 
Fifty-seven miles was a formidable distance to carry even 
veteran troops on a forced march ; and when, after an 
hour or two, his green soldiers began to straggle and 
his green officers to display their incompetence, Johnston 
was seized with something like despair. Could he ever 
reach Manassas in time ? 

Presently he ordered his Chief Engineer, Major 
Whiting, to ride forward to Piedmont, a little station on 
the Manassas Gap Railroad not quite halfway to Ma- 
nassas, and to make ready to entrain the troops. In the 



152 BULL RUN 

late afternoon Jackson, with the leading brigade, reached 
the Shenandoah beyond Millwood, forded the river, and 
climbed up the steep ascent beyond, seven hundred feet, 
into Ashby's Gap, where the troops bivouacked about 8 
P.M. At dawn of the 19th they started again, the advance 
reaching Piedmont Station at 8 A.I\I., — the very hour at 
which Major Barnard was pushing his reconnaissance up 
Cub Run. 

The Manassas Gap Railroad was a poor line, far from 
plentifully equipped with rolling stock; yet at first all 
seemed to promise well. Trains were waiting sufficient to 
convey Jackson's brigade which was rapidly sent on its 
way, reaching Manassas at four o'clock that afternoon. 
The railroad authorities declared that the whole arm)'^ 
would be transported in the course of twenty-four hours. 

Nevertheless Johnston decided that the artillery should 
proceed by road. Stuart had been instructed to keep in 
close contact with Patterson through the i8th, closing all 
roads along which information might pass, and then to 
slip away at nightfall to rejoin the army. This he did, 
and from Piedmont to Manassas acted as escort for the 
artillery. It was not till one o'clock in the morning of the 
2ist that this part of Johnston's army reached Manassas.^ 

Unfortunately for the Confederates the Manassas Gap 
Railroad broke down almost immediately under the 
strain thus suddenly placed on it. The chief trouble ap- 
^ Imboden, Battles and Leaders, i, 230. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 153 

pears to have been that the force of engineers was insuf- 
ficient. The locomotive hands, much overworked, ap- 
parently refused to do any night duty, and the line soon 
got almost completely tied up. While Johnston and his 
men, only thirty-four miles from their objective point, 
grew more and more impatient, hours, almost days, 
passed with little accomplished. 

Bartow's brigade reached Piedmont early in the after- 
noon of the 19th, and the 7th and 8th Georgia were en- 
trained and sent off at 3 P.M. ; but no more troops left 
that day. 

During the night of the I9th-20th, enough cars re- 
turned from Manassas for about 1000 men, but the train 
hands insisted on resting till morning, so that it was not 
until between 7 and 8 A.M. on the 20th — just when Mc- 
Dowell was wondering whether he should not make a 
reconnaissance in force over the ground which Barnard 
had reconnoitred the day before — that the moving of 
the troops could be continued, the 4th Alabama, 2d Mis- 
sissippi, and two companies of the nth Mississippi, all 
from Bee's brigade, being entrained. With about one 
half of his infantry, and all his cavalry and artillery thus 
started, Johnston himself decided to join Beauregard. 
He left Kirby Smith to replace him at Piedmont, and 
arrived at Manassas a little before noon. 

As to the troops left at Piedmont this much may now 
be added. The causes of delay worked in increasing 



154 BULL RUN 

ratio, so that no more troops left on the 20th and it was 
not till the next morning that Kirby Smith with four 
more regiments could move. A collision near Manassas 
early on the 21st added slightly to the delay, but he 
reached the battlefield just in time to play an important 
parto 

Johnston's movement was much criticized at the time, 
and chief among the critics was President Davis. There 
is no need to renew this old controversy here, for there 
was really little in it ; the outline must suffice. Davis and 
Johnston were not on good terms, and the latter was 
punctilious and combative. His trenchant attitude on the 
Harper's Ferry question had nettled the Confederate 
President, who was wedded to the idea that Harper's 
Ferry was a position to be retained at all hazards. But 
Johnston insisted on having his way, and thereby had 
his army ready for the emergency at Manassas when the 
critical moment arrived. 

Now it was evidently a question whether, under the 
most favorable circumstances, a corps of 10,000 men 
could be moved from Winchester to Manassas within a 
sufficiently short space of time to render help against an 
enemy having so short a distance to traverse as Mc- 
Dowell had. It does not appear that the Confederate au- 
thorities at Richmond took much more trouble to work 
out a plan for making the mutual support of their two 
generals effective than did the Federal authorities at 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 155 

Washington to co-ordinate the movements of Patterson 
and McDowell. It was left as a generally understood 
matter under the responsibility of the commanders 
themselves. 

But, in fact, it was most difficult to carry out the pro- 
posed combination against an enemy who realized the 
conditions. For Johnston had to cover more than twice 
the distance that McDowell had ; he was further handi- 
capped by the inevitable loss of time entailed by the 
transmission of the news of McDowell's start and to a 
further possible loss of time from pressure by Patterson. 
A reasonably rapid and resolute advance by the Fed- 
erals, which took account of these conditions, must have 
led to the battle being fought before the Confederate 
forces could effect their junction. 

Lee, Davis, and Johnston were all doubtless more or 
less conscious that the chances might be against them ; 
it was failing a better plan, that they accepted the concen- 
tration at Manassas with all its drawbacks. But when it 
came to carrying out the operation, Davis and Johnston 
were apparently inclined to throw back on each other 
the responsibility for its danger and inherent short- 
comings. They did their best, however. Davis tele- 
graphed to Johnston the instant word reached him from 
Beauregard that McDowell was moving. Johnston started 
from Winchester as quickly as could reasonably be ex- 
pected in view of the indispensable arrangements he had 



156 BULL RUN 

to make and of the necessity for learning whether Patter- 
son was advancing or not towards Berryville and the 
Confederate line of march. But when, after the first com- 
paratively rapid day's march, while every hour through 
the 19th and 20th Beauregard and Davis expected Mc- 
Dowell's attack to be delivered and Johnston's army re- 
mained in large part unable to pass beyond Piedmont, 
impatience, dissatisfaction, and recrimination naturally 
arose. A few hours one way or another, a few thousand 
men more or less, and the fate of the Confederacy might 
be sealed. Johnston knew it as well as Davis, but the 
latter scanned the former's conduct closely to prove that 
he alone was to blame for the situation. 

Davis at the time, and for many years afterwards, main- 
tained the view, with which few agreed, that Johnston's 
march might have been more rapid had he strictly 
obeyed the orders he received. The questions involved 
have no importance for the present purpose. Should 
Johnston have sent his sick and wounded to Culpeper, 
or was he right in leaving them at Winchester and 
thereby saving a certain number of wagons for transport 
purposes? What was the precise meaning of the ex- 
pression "if practicable," applied to Johnston's move- 
ment ? It will suffice to say that in the period following 
the war these matters received undue attention. 

On the whole the conclusion must be that the move of 
Johnston from the Shenandoah Valley to Manassas was 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 157 

a doubtful proposition in terms of space and time. Yet 
it was clearly the best move open to the Confederates. 
It was effected with as much rapidity as was possible 
under adverse circumstances. And its success was due 
mostly to the slowness of McDowell. 

Johnston reached Manassas, as we have seen, about 
noon on the 20th. He had at that moment available Jack- 
son's brigade, about half of Bartow's and about half of 
Bee's. His artillery and cavalry were still on the road, 
but his remaining infantry was due in the course of the 
day or at latest on the morning of the 21st, although as 
a matter of fact this expectation was not realized. Still it 
was good work, in forty-eight hours since leaving Win- 
chester, to have come so near transferring his little army 
to Manassas ; and fortunately the enemy continued to 
show no sign. It was at this moment that Johnston re- 
ceived, in reply to a query he had sent from Winchester, 
a notification from President Davis that he was appointed 
to the rank of general, and this made him the senior 
officer of all the troops at Manassas. 

Johnston had had no petty object in view when he 
asked Davis to settle the question of rank as between 
himself and Beauregard. He wished to avoid the diffi- 
culties and dangers that a contested command might 
raise rather than to exalt his personal position. He did 
not wish to hamper or control Beauregard's operations, 
but he wanted a free hand to assert an individual con- 



158 BULL RUN 

trol, should the necessity for it arise. He seems to have 
arrived at Manassas bent on taking the offensive at 
once, for he still credited Patterson with more energy 
than that officer possessed. Having lost sight of him 
on the 1 8th he rightly assumed the worst, — that he should 
probably next hear of Patterson marching to join 
McDowell through Leesburg. The thing to do then, was 
to settle the issue while yet Patterson was out of the game. 

He discussed the situation with Beauregard immedi- 
ately on meeting him, and found that complete agree- 
ment existed between them in their general view of the 
situation. Beauregard produced his maps and showed 
Johnston the position of his troops between Union Mills 
and Stone Bridge, and the convergence of the roads from 
these points on Centreville. He then indicated how an 
offensive movement could be carried out along those 
roads. 

Here it may be surmised, for there is no evidence to 
show it, that the Confederate generals may have con- 
sidered what might be the meaning of McDowell's in- 
activity since about four o'clock of the afternoon of the 
1 8th. If they did so, there can be but one conclusion, that 
they decided this inactivity must be due to McDowell's 
awaiting Patterson's arrival. All the more reason, there- 
fore, for a prompt offensive. 

Since one o'clock on the morning of the i8th, Johnston 
had had scarcely any rest. He was physically exhausted. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 159 

Beauregard knew the ground and had made suitable 
plans. Johnston felt unable to face the problem, and 
therefore passed over to his subordinate the task of pre- 
paring the orders for moving the army. He then turned 
in to rest. 

Johnston apparendy expected that Beauregard would 
make the orders out immediately and send them on to 
him for approval, so as to inform the brigade com- 
manders that night. But Beauregard failed in prompt- 
ness. By the time his order was written, the proper num- 
ber of copies made, and the whole sent to Johnston for 
approval it was 4.30 A.M. of the 2ist.i It ran, in part, as 
follows : — 

. . . The following order is published for the information of divi- 
sion and brigade commanders : — ^ 

I. Brigadier-General Ewell's brigade, supported by General 
Holmes' brigade, will march via Union Mills Ford and place itself in 
position of attack upon the enemy. It will be held in readiness either 
to support the attack upon Centreville, or to move in the direction of 
Sangster's Crossroads, according to circumstances. 

The order to advance will be given by the commander-in-chief. 

II. Brigadier-General Jones' brigade, supported by Colonel Early's 
brigade, will march via McLean's Ford to place itself in position 
of attack upon the enemy on or about the Union Mills and Centre- 
ville road. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack 
upon Centreville or to move in the direction of Fairfax Station, accord- 

* Beauregard's report is obviously unreliable as to the order, the failure 
of the Confederate attack, and the movement of McDowell's right. 

2 It may be remarked that there was no division organization, and that 
the whole sentence, especially the phrase "for the information," is bad 
from the point of view of military orders. 



i6o BULL RUN 

ing to circumstances, with its right flank towards the left of Ewell's 
command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the coun- 
try and attack. 

The order to advance will be given by the commander-in-chief. 

III. Brigadier-General Longstreet's brigade, supported by Briga- 
dier-General Jackson's brigade, will march via McLean's Ford to 
place itself in position of attack upon the enemy on or about the 
Union Mills and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either 
to support the attack on Centreville or to move in the direction of 
Fairfax Court House according to circumstances, with its right flank 
towards the left of Jones' command, more or less distant, according to 
the nature of the country. 

The order to advance will be given by the commander-in-chief. 

IV. Brigadier-General Bonham's brigade, supported by Colonel 
Bartow's brigade, will march via Mitchell's Ford to the attack of Cen- 
treville, the right wing to the left of the Third Division (sic), more or 
less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack. 

The order to advance will be given by the commander-in-chief. 

V. Colonel Cocke's brigade, supported by Colonel Elzey's brigade,* 
will march via Stone Bridge and the fords on the right thereof to the 
attack of Centreville, the right wing to the left of the Fourth Division 
(sic), more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of 
the attack. 

The order to advance will be given by the commander-in-chief. 

VI. Brigadier-General Bee's brigade, ^ supported by Colonel Wil- 
cox's brigade, Colonel Stuart's regiment of cavalry, and the whole of 
Walton's battery, will form the reserve, and will march via Mitchell's 
Ford, to be used according to circumstances. 

VII. The light batteries will be distributed as follows: . . . 

VIII. Colonel Radford, commanding cavalry, will detail ... as 
follows: . . . 

IX. The Fourth and Fifth Divisions, after the fall of Centreville, 
will advance to the attack of Fairfax Court House. . . . 

1 On the assumption that Kirby Smith (Elzey) would arrive during the 
night or early in the morning. 

2 Part of Bee's and part of Bartow's, the whole temporarily under Bee. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 161 

The First, Second, and Third Divisions will, if necessary, support 
the Fourth and Fifth Divisions. 

X. In this movement the First, Second, and Third Divisions will 
form the command of Brigadier-General Holmes; the Fourth and Fifth 
Divisions that of the second in command. The reserve will move upon 
the plains between Mitchell's Ford and Stone Bridge, and, together 
with the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, will be under the immediate direc- 
tion of General Beauregard. 

By command of General Beauregard : 

Thomas Jordan, A.A.G.^ 

It would be difficult to conceive a worse drawn-up 
order. To do it full justice it must be reviewed at consid- 
erable length : — 

First, then, one may note for criticism that now, at the 
last moment, just before entering into battle, Beauregard 
realized that the splitting-up of an army of 30,000 men, 
extended over a line of eight or ten miles, into brigades, 
most of them numbering two to three thousand men, was a 
faulty organization. Divisions were clearly necessary, and 
so, confusedly, they appear in his order. Beginning with 
brigades, Beauregard presently takes to calling them 
divisions, which shows how his mind is working. Then 
at the end of his order he improvises not merely a divi- 
sional but a corps arrangement by dividing his own 
troops between himself and Holmes, — that is, on paper. 

It seems unnecessary to point out that a divisional and 
corps organization could hardly be created in such a way ; 

* O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 479. This order was dictated during the night to 
Major Whiting, of Johnston's staff. Beauregard, Commentary, 60. 



i62 BULL RUN 

but even assuming it would work, the order issued did not 
fit it. If Beauregard's First, Second, and Third Brigades 
were to be handled together as a division, or as a corps, 
by General Holmes, the first thing to do was to place that 
officer in the position of exercising this command effec- 
tively by making the necessary staff adjustments, and by 
notifying the brigadiers to look to him and not to the 
army commander for their orders. It would then be the 
case that the disposal of these three brigades would lie 
with the divisional general, receiving his orders from the 
commander-in-chief. If, then, General Holmes was to act 
as a divisional general, the orders to Ewell, Jones, and 
Longstreet were wrong because misleading and con- 
fusing, i This, however, was only a part of the difficulty. 
Even leaving out of account this vital question of divi- 
sional organization, the order could not be expected to pro- 
duce concerted and effective action among the brigades. 
Its very tone suggested delay. Some of the officers who 
read it interpreted it as a preparatory order, not implying 
action. No hour was mentioned at which the brigades 
should begin their forward movement. The positions 
they were to occupy were indicated only in the vaguest 
manner. And at the end of each instruction came the re- 

^ That Holmes never knew anything of the matter appears from his re- 
port to Beauregard: "About 9 o'clock on Sunday the 21st, I received a 
copy of your note to General Ewell directing him to hold himself in readi- 
ness to take the offensive at a moment's notice, to be supported by my bri- 
gade." O. R. Ser, I, vol. il, 565. 



JULY i8 TO JULY 21 163 

mark: "The order to advance will be given by the com- 
mander-in-chief." To advance, whence ? From the posi- 
tion occupied on the night before, or from the new one 
to be taken up in the morning? If the whole meaning 
was, as generally interpreted, that nothing was to be done 
until Johnston sent orders, then the order was next to 
meaningless except in so far as it involved a waste of 
precious time. 

The actual disposition of the brigades was very open 
to criticism, though largely governed by topographical 
considerations and the necessity of attacking at once and 
at all hazards. The line of attack was very long. It formed 
an arc circling through difficult country about the Centre- 
ville ridge, which the enemy occupied in strength. From 
the Warrenton turnpike it would be most difficult for 
Cocke to keep in touch with Bonham through the woods 
and low ground along Cub Run ; while on the left the east 
front of the Centreville ridge was awkward of access, over- 
grown with thickets, adifficult terrain through which Jones, 
Ewell, and Longstreet would have to maintain their line. 

When, at 4.30 on the morning of the 2 ist, Johnston was 
awakened to approve and countersign this order, he was 
apparently surprised and annoyed at the delay and at the 
order itself. He had supposed that the troops would march 
with the dawn, then just breaking, but apparently for 
fear of incurring further delay, he at once signed Beaure- 
gard's document and had it sent out. 



VII 

THE BATTLE; PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS' 

NORTH 

A NIGHT march is proverbially one of the most delicate 
of military operations, especially with an inexperienced 
army. In McDowell's case it was complicated by several 
facts. The troops had, for a distance of two miles, — that 
is to a point six hundred yards beyond Cub Run, — to 
defile along a single road. The leading division, Tyler's, 
which had to continue along the Warrenton road beyond 
that point, could not clear it except by advancing over 
ground not hitherto reconnoitred and that might be held 

1 For the account of the battle the official reports and the evidence of 
commanding officers before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
give the substance of the facts, create a composite picture. The reports 
must be read critically, as they vary in value; for instance, Beauregard is 
always flowery and rhetorical, constantly disguising, distorting, or omit- 
ting facts, while Johnston is restrained, clear, and definite; it is with 
such allowances as should be made, and with constant comparison and 
checking, that these reports, most of them vague and inaccurate, some- 
times wilfully misleading, have been used. Wherever a special or contro- 
versial point has been made, the specific reference to the report or other 
authority has been given. But it has not been thought necessary to enter 
into certain past controversies, as, for instance, whether Kirby Smith's 
brigade was detrained near the battlefield and marched straight to it, or 
not; the story, however widespread, reposes on no evidence, and is not 
worth discussing; Smith's brigade, without any question, detrained at 
Manassas. 



THE BATTLE; PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 165 

by the enemy. This was likely to, and in fact did, cause 
obstruction and delay. McDowell had already proved his 
inability to march in daylight ; in darkness conditions 
were bound to be worse. The road leading to Sudley 
Spring was inadequately known, and, as it proved, dif- 
ficult for the passage of artillery. 

Under these circumstances it was more than likely that 
McDowell's crude marching arrangements should im- 
mediately break down ; and they did. Of the troops that 
were to execute the flanking movement. Hunter's divi- 
sion, camping just east of Centreville, was under arms at 
2 A.M., according to orders ; but it was not until 4.30 A.M. 
that its head of column was in Centreville village, and 
not till 6 A.M. that it had covered the next two miles and 
turned oR from the Warrenton turnpike ; and that was 
the hour at which the commander-in-chief hoped to have 
his whole force at Sudley Spring. ^ Heintzelman's divi- 
sion formed column at 2.30 A.M., but found itself unable 
to advance at all until 6 A.M ; Hunter's division filling the 
road at this moment from Centreville to the junction of 
the Sudley Spring road. 

This bad beginning of the day's work was in part due 
to the slowness and timidity of Tyler's advance. Parad- 
ing at 2.30 A.M., that general had opened the movement 
along the Warrenton turnpike. Leaving Richardson on 
the Centreville ridge to take his] orders from Miles, he 

^ Barnard's report, O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 331. 



i66 BULL RUN 

pushed his remaining three brigades towards Stone 
Bridge in the following order : Schenck, Sherman, Keyes, 

Schenck's camp was one mile south of Centreville on 
the ridge, and he anticipated orders by parading at 2 A.M. 
instead of 2.30. But so great was the confusion in the 
dark that it was not till 3 A.M. that he actually got started. 
He very slowly and cautiously advanced to the village 
and turned into the Warrenton turnpike. 

Attached to Schenck's brigade was a thirty-pounder 
rifled Parrott gun, weighing no less than 6000 pounds, ^ 
and this piece was hauled along at the head of McDowell's 
army, a useless Medusa's head, less valuable than a handy 
six-pounder, and almost stopping all progress. For at 
about two miles beyond Centreville the turnpike crossed 
a steep ravine where a ramshackle wooden affair known 
as the ** Suspension Bridge" carried it over Cub Run; 
and there the advance was nearly brought to a stop. It 
was no place for a 6000-pound gun. Finally, after mighty 
efforts and nearly breaking down the bridge, the monster 
was safely hauled up to the other side of the ravine.^ 

It must have been about sunrise (4.52 A.M.), when 
Schenck reached the junction of the Sudley Spring road. 
He had now, or perhaps a little earlier, deployed a half 
battalion as skirmishers, a proper precaution. Apparently 

1 Hains, "The First Gun at Bull Run," Cosmopolitan, August, 191 1. 
^ For the delays of Schenck's brigade see the reports of Wilson and 
Fuller, O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 362; 366. 



THE BATTLE ; PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 167 

when just past Cub Run, he had fortified his courage by 
throwing a few shells along the road in the direction of 
Stone Bridge. 

Getting no response, Schenck resumed his march, and 
at six o'clock, having reached a point about a thousand 
yards from Stone Bridge, he deployed to the left of the 
road ; Sherman's brigade, which did not leave Centre- 
ville till 3.30 A.M. ,1 coming up behind Schenck, deployed 
on the right. Presently, at 6.15 A.M. ,2 the Parrott gun 
opened fire again, sending shells along the Warrenton 
turnpike beyond Stone Bridge, but eliciting no reply 
from the Confederates who remained under cover and 
refused to unmask their guns. 

Keyes' brigade, following Sherman's, was halted mid- 
way between the line Tyler had deployed and the Sudley 
Spring crossroads at a point where a road came up from 
Ball's Ford to join the Warrenton turnpike,^ As Keyes 
cleared the junction of the Sudley Spring road. Hunter's 
advance turned into it, and Heintzelman's column, back 
at Centreville, was at last enabled to make a start. 

Leaving Hunter and Heintzelman to make their long 
circuitous march to Sudley Spring, we can sum up in a 
few words the operations that were carried on meanwhile 
by the Federals at Stone Bridge and near Centreville. 

1 Kelly's report, O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 371. 

2 New York World, July 23; Nott's relation, Reb. Rec. n. Doc. 92. 
_' There is now a road from this point to Poplar Ford. 



i68 BULL RUN 

During the three or four hours that Tyler was left to face 
the Confederates at Stone Bridge, he did little more than 
push his skirmishers and infantry gradually down to the 
stream, and intermittently direct his batteries against 
supposed Confederate positions on the farther bank. He 
did so little damage and exercised so little pressure that 
a few companies of infantry with a few guns were for 
some hours a sufficient protection for that part of the 
enemy's line. 

At Centrevilie General Miles had been strengthened 
by Richardson's brigade of Tyler's division. Apparently 
his men were paraded at the same time as the other 
troops and had to wait patiently until daylight before 
moving. Blenker's brigade was then posted behind Cen- 
trevilie, two regiments facing east on either side of the 
Warrenton turnpike, another regiment facing south, and 
a fourth in reserve in the village. A half battalion was 
detached in observation along the Union Mills road. In- 
trenchments were thrown up across the turnpike, facing 
east, and the brigade batteries were placed along the 
front of the position. 

Richardson's brigade advanced towards Mitchell's 
Ford, placed its guns along the ridge, deployed two 
regiments in support and kept two in reserve. Davies 
pushed on behind Richardson, coming into line on his 
left. The position of the troops and guns about 8 A.M. is 
more fully indicated on the sketch map. 



THE BATTLE; PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 169 

The curious disposition of Blenker's brigade at Centre- 
ville serves to bring out some of the fundamental weak- 
nesses of McDowell's situation. In his effort at all costs 
to outflank the enemy he had had to swing so far to the 
northwest as practically to abandon his line of opera- 
tions. His deficiency in mounted troops tended to the 
same result ; for a few hundred sabres, with infantry sup- 
ports, thrown out towards Sangster's and Union Mills, 
would have freed Blenker and given the Warrenton 
turnpike some protection to the east of Centreville. 
These facts were all the more serious in that McDowell 
was faced by a problem in the matter of reserve artillery 
ammunition : that for his flanking divisions had been 
left at Centreville under Miles' protection ; he hoped to 
get it up along the Warrenton turnpike when Tyler 
should clear the way at Stone Bridge. But more impor- 
tant than this was the fact that there was a shortage, 
especially in the ammunition for the heavier guns.^ 

In the afternoon of the 19th, Lieutenant Hawkins, of 
the commissariat service, had been sent from Centreville 
to Fairfax Station to forward supplies. 2 On the 20th, he 
began to receive ammunition from Alexandria, the track 
being cleared to within a short distance of the station ; 
but apparently he did not succeed in sending through 

^ There is little material available for working out the facts as to the 
ammunition supplies. 

* Hawkins' interesting report is given in 0. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 341. 

3. 



lyo BULL RUN 

any of this ammunition to the army. On the 21st, the 
gap between him and Blenker at Centreville was always 
at the mercy of any Confederate detachment. 

Meanwhile, at about 8 A.M., Richardson and Davies 
opened fire with their artillery, doing litde damage, and 
revealing by the slowness of their fire and its lack of 
concentration that it was not to be taken seriously. In a 
couple of hours the heavier guns had used up most of 
their supply, and there was no reserve to fall back on. 

It is time now we turned to the Confederate side. 

SOUTH 

During the night the Confederates had caught at more 
than one point the rumbling of wheels and other noises 
denoting the movement of McDowell's army. Here and 
there a group of officers or of soldiers had guessed the 
meaning correctly. But at headquarters there was no 
definite information, nor any consequent modification of 
plans. At about 4.30 A.M., Johnston was awakened to 
find that nothing had been done and that he was re- 
quired to sign Beauregard's unsatisfactory order. This 
he did, and for the rest, on the inconclusive pretext that 
he knew nothing of the ground, he and his stafT refused 
to act,i leaving all to Beauregard, — an extraordinary 
attitude for a commander-in-chief. 

1 When, a good many years after the war, Johnston and Beauregard got 
into a controversy as to their respective shares in the event, the latter did 



I 



THE BATTLE; PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 171 

Beauregard, meanwhile, sent out the order that was 
supposed to hurl the Confederates on to the Centreville 
ridge. Longstreet, at Blackburn's Ford, received it at 
five, just as Schenck with Tyler's advance was reaching 
the junction of the Sudley Spring road. Longstreet un- 
derstood that the order was " preliminary," but got his 
troops over the run into the woods under the Centreville 
ridge, and, there lying close, awaited further instructions.^ 
One of his volunteer aides. Colonel Terry, made his way 
to the left through the woods and succeeded in getting 
a view of the Warrenton road about three miles to the 
northwest, probably at about half-past six, and reported 
it full of troops marching west, — Hunter's or Heintzel- 
man's column. This information was promptly sent back 
to Beauregard. 

Farther to the left Bonham was on the alert. His officers 
had suspected McDowell's move during the night, and 
he himself, from the height behind Mitchell's Ford, caught 
sight of Tyler's troops on the Warrenton pike at dawn. 
He reported this to headquarters and held his command 
ready. No trace of his receiving ord-ers to advance can 
be found, nor did his command make ahy forward move- 
not hesitate to impute to Johnston that his attitude in the early stages of 
the battle was governed by pessimism as to the outcome and a desire to 
shift the responsibility on to Beauregard. This is difficult to believe, and 
does not agree with Johnston's signing of Beauregard's order of battle. 
The fact that the order was dictated to Major Whiting of Johnston's staff, 
which Beauregard emphasizes, does not seem important. 

* Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 44. 



172 BULL RUN 

ment during the entire morning. The only fair inference 
is that Bonham remained during that time in personal 
contact with Beauregard, who for some hours conducted 
operations from just back of Mitchell's Ford, and received 
instructions by word of mouth. Stretching this inference 
to its utmost one might conclude that Beauregard, from 
the moment that news reached him of McDowell's ap- 
parent extension westwards, which must have been just 
about the time when his order for a general advance was 
going out, weakened in his offensive intention, while not 
abandoning it. Possibly one or two copies of the order 
were actually withheld.^ And yet McDowell's movement 
really emphasized the need for the Confederate offensive : 
the Federals were stretching northwest, the direction 
from which Patterson might be expected, and by stretch- 
ing northwest were rendering more vulnerable their line 
of communications and the very positions which the 
strong Confederate right wing was best placed for 
attacking. 

On the Confederate right were Jones, at McLean's 
Ford, and Ewell at Union Mills, with other troops in 
second line. Here is the account given by these two 
generals, in their reports,^ of the orders that reached them 
from Beauregard. Ewell says : — 

I first received orders to hold myself in readiness to advance at a 
moment's notice. 

^ There were vague stories of orders going astray* 
2 O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 536-39. 



THE BATTLE; PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 173 
This was presumably the general order, received about 
the same time as Longstreet had received it, say five 
o'clock. 

I next received a copy of an order sent to General Jones and fur- 
nished me by him, in which it was stated I had been ordered at once 
to proceed to his support. 

So far as Jones is concerned, nothing whatever is re- 
ported as happening before 7.10 A.M., making it possible 
that the general order never reached Jones at all. 

At 7.10 A.M. the following order was received, viz: — 

July 21, 1861. 
Brig.-Gen. D. R. Jones, 

Commanding Third Brigade: 
General: General Ewell has been ordered to take the ofifensive upon 
Centreville. You will follow the movement at once by attacking him in 
your front. Respectfully, 

G. T. Beauregard, 
Brigadier-General, Commanding. 

I immediately placed my brigade in readiness to advance, and dis- 
patched a messenger to communicate with General Ewell, whose 
movement I was to follow. Not receiving a prompt reply I crossed 
McLean's Ford and took position with my artillery in battery on the 
Union Mills road, ... I here awaited the advance of General Ewell 
for about two hours and a half at the end of which time I received a 
somewhat discretionary order . . . and a few minutes after the follow- 
ing positive order. . . . 

10.30 a.m. 
General Jones: On account of the difficulties in our front it is thought 
preferable to countermand the advance of the right wing. Resume your 

former position. 

G. T. Beauregard. 

On this Jones recrossed McLean's Ford, and then re- 
ceived from Ewell what was presumably Beauregard's 



174 BULL RUN 

general order, on which Fitz Lee, his A.A.G., had in- 
dorsed : — 

The general says this is the only order he has received. It implies 
he has to receive another. Send this to General Beauregard if you 
think proper. 1 

To add to this hopeless confusion, Ewell had mean- 
while, in leisurely fashion, crossed Union Mills Ford, 
following Jones' previous movement across Bull Run, 
" but whilst so doing received an order to fall back to 
my former position, which I did. ..." 2 The time was 
now about 11 to 11.30 A.M. 

To make this record of bungling complete we may add 
Early's account of how, about an hour later, Beaure- 
gard's order to march in support of the left wing reached 
him : — 

General Jones asked me if I had received an order from General 
Beauregard, directing that I should go to him with my brigade. Upon 
my stating that I had received no such order, he said that he had re- 
ceived a note from General Beauregard in which he was directed to 
send me to the General. The note, which was in the hands of one of 
Jones' staff officers, was sent for and shown to me. It was in pencil, 
and after giving brief directions for the withdrawal across the Run 
and stating the general purpose to go to the left where the heavy firing 
was, there was a direction at the foot in very nearly these words, — 
"Send Early to me." This information was given to me some time be- 
tween 12 M. and I P.M. The note did not state to what point I was to go. 
. . . I . . . directed . . . Captain Gardner to ride to Mitchell's Ford 
and ascertain where General Beauregard was, as well as the route I 
was to pursue.^ 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 538. ^ Ewell's report, O. R. Ser. I, vol. ll, 536. 
' Early, Autobiography, 19. 



THE BATTLE; PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 175 

With such a system of command, and such a method of 
writing orders, it was truly a wonder that the Confeder- 
ates ever got any of their reinforcements into Hne. 

Comment on the miscarriage of Beauregard's orders 
appears almost superfluous. It may best be summed up, 
perhaps, by saying that his staff arrangements were as 
crude as his orders. The offensive of the Confederates 
had now failed ; it remains to be seen how they dealt with 
the developments that McDowell's flank march threat- 
ened. 

The explanation of why Jones did not receive Beaure- 
gard's first orders is possibly to be found in Johnston's 
words, when he writes : " Soon after sunrise, and before 
the distribution of these orders could have been com- 
pleted, a light cannonade was opened upon our troops 
at Stone Bridge." ^ This clearly refers to the shots fired 
by Schenck along the Warrenton turnpike shortly after 
he passed Cub Run at about 5 A.M. Half an hour later 
Evans signalled from Stone Bridge that the enemy was 
in sight and deploying on the opposite side of the run ; 
and at 6.15 A.M., Tyler's artillery opened at Stone 
Bridge. This was the first sign of activity by the Federals 
since their repulse at Blackburn's Ford on the i8th; 
coming as it did with reports of movements of troops on 
the Warrenton turnpike, it probably made Beauregard 
1 Johnston, Narrative, 41. 



176 BULL RUN 

hesitate for a moment whether or not to carry out his 
projected attack, 

Johnston apparently first joined Beauregard soon after 
sunrise at the latter's headquarters which lay well back 
from Bull Run on the edge of the Manassas plateau. At 
about 8.30 A.M., however, we find the two generals, ac- 
companied by their staffs, on the high land behind 
Mitchell's Ford, where it seems probable that General 
Bonham joined them. Meanwhile the continued strength 
displayed by McDowell in the direction of Stone Bridge 
had produced a modification in the Confederate arrange- 
ments. Jackson's brigade was ordered to move from 
between Manassas and Blackburn's Ford to an interme- 
diate position between Bonham and Cocke; General 
Bee's brigade, lying farther west, was sent to Cocke at 
the Lewis house ; and Colonel Wade Hampton, who had 
just arrived at the Junction after a thirty hours' journey 
from Richmond, was at once ordered with his legion to 
the same point. 

This reinforcing of the centre and left was for the mo- 
ment intended to coincide with an offensive on the right. 
This was the intention evidenced by Beauregard's dis- 
patch to Jones at 7.10 A.M., already quoted. ^ 

At nine o'clock, or perhaps a little later, Captain Alex- 
ander, Beauregard's able signal officer, 2 who was keep- 

^ Johnston in his Narrative repeatedly blames Beauregard for the staff 
failure to get the right wing attack delivered. 

* The chief signal station was near Manassas Station, about two miles 



THE BATTLE; PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 177 

ing his glass on the semaphore near the Van Pelt house, 
behind Stone Bridge, distinguished a considerable body 
of troops about two miles above the bridge. This he im- 
mediately reported to Beauregard, while he semaphored 
to Evans : " Look out for your left, you are turned." ^ 
Almost simultaneously with this signal, Evans received a 
scout's report that conveyed the same intelligence. 

It was probably on receipt of Alexander's message, 
although it may have been previously, on the succession 
of reports as to the movement along the Warrenton 
road, that the order was issued for Jackson, Bee, and 
Hampton to move to the left. For about an hour more 
the Confederate generals awaited developments, and 
then came another message from Alexander reporting a 
heavy cloud of dust, from well back of the Confederate 
left, as though the Federal troops first reported had de- 
scribed a wide semicircle, or as though Patterson's col- 
umns were approaching from Aldie Gap. This seemed 
alarming, though, in truth, it was only Johnston's trans- 
port train nearing Gainesville on its way to Manassas. 

Johnston, at first, was disinclined to believe that Mc- 
Dowell would venture on a wide turning movement ; 2 

from the first position of Johnston and Beauregard. Alexander communi- 
cated with headquarters by couriers. In his Memoirs, and articles, he re- 
fers to the Van Pelt house as the Van Ness house. 

* South. Hist. Sac. Paps, xvi, 94; Alexander, Military Memoirs, 30; re- 
ports of Beauregard and Johnston, O. R. 

2 Richmond Dispatch, July 29. 



T78 BULL RUN 

he was far more inclined to believe that the cloud of dust 
to the northwest might be caused by Patterson arriving 
from the Valley. In any case he was restless, and dis- 
satisfied as to Beauregard's would-be offensive operation. 
He urged him to proceed to the left wing, but Beaure- 
gard for the moment insisted on carrying out his pro- 
jected attack on the Centre ville ridge. ^ 

Presently a staff officer arrived at headquarters from 

General Ewell informing me [Beauregard], to my profound disap- 
pointment, that my orders for his advance had miscarried, but that in 
consequence of a communication from General D. R. Jones he had 
just thrown his brigade across the stream at Union Mills. But in my 
judgment it was now too late for the effective execution of the con- 
templated movement ... it became immediately necessary to de- 
pend on new combinations and other dispositions suited to the now 
pressing exigency. The movement of the right and centre . . . was at 
once countermanded with the sanction of General Johnston, and we 
arranged to meet the enemy on the field upon which he had chosen to 
give us battle.^ 

This statement of Beauregard glosses over some awk- 
ward facts. It is doubtless true that at some time be- 
tween 10.30 A.M. and 11.30 A.M. he received information 
which showed that his orders had miscarried, but he should 
have known this much earlier. The fact undoubtedly was 
that the sound of cannonade and musketry could now 
be heard away to the left and was becoming more and 
more insistent, until at 11.30 A.M. Johnston could stand 

^ Alexander, Military Memoirs, 32. 

* Beauregard's report, O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 491. 



THE BATTLE; PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS 179 

it no longer. "The battle is there!" he said; "I am go- 
ing ! " With that he walked rapidly to his horse, jumped 
into the saddle, and rode away at a gallop followed by 
his staff. ^ 

Probably at the moment that Johnston started for the 
point of danger, he instructed Beauregard to issue orders 
shifting a considerable part of the army to the left. How 
hastily and badly Beauregard did this has already ap- 
peared from Early's statement previously quoted. In 
addition to Early's brigade, Holmes' was ordered to the 
Lewis house, and the 2d and 8th South Carolina, with 
Kemper's section of artillery, were detached from Bon- 
ham and moved in the same direction. But before he 
followed Johnston to the left, Beauregard's fixed idea of 
operating against Centreville reasserted itself, and he 
again issued orders for the movement forward of Ewell, 
Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham ; but this time the attack 
was not to be pushed home, it was to be merely a " dem- 
onstration" to amuse the enemy.2 He then hurried off 
to overtake Johnston. 

While the Confederate right, insufficiently organized 
and badly led, thus remained inert or making aimless 
movements, the left at Stone Bridge was threatened with 

* Alexander, Military Memoirs, 34. 

2 Beauregard's report, O. R. Ser. i, vol. il, 491. It would seem from 
Johnston's report, O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii,'475, that these dispositions were 
made, as has been suggested, after some assertion of authority on the 
part of Johnston. 



i8o BULL RUN 

disaster. Colonel Evans was in command at that point, 
with eleven hundred bayonets and two smoothbore six- 
pounders. His position lay about six hundred yards back 
of the river on a little hill over which the Warrenton 
turnpike ran, and where stood the Van Pelt i house. His 
infantry and guns were lying close under cover at this 
point, not replying to Tyler's cannonading, and watch- 
ing the bridge, where a considerable obstacle had been 
formed during the few days preceding by a dense abatis 
about one hundred yards long.^ Although it was reported 
at McDowell's headquarters that the bridge was mined, 
this was not the case. It does not appear that Beaure- 
gard had ever considered the question either of destroy- 
ing or of fortifying the bridge. Evans' position was well 
chosen for a small post of observation and defence. 

Schenck's thirty-pounder gave Evans plenty of warn- 
ing, from about five o'clock, that an advance towards 
Stone Bridge was in progress ; and when Schenck, and 
then Sherman, deployed, Evans sent word to head- 
quarters. But he took care not to reply to the Federals' 
harmless fire, to a certain extent because his guns were 
considerably out-ranged by those of his opponents and 
were placed to command the bridge and not the country 
beyond. 3 

1 Also referred to as the Van Ness or Van Vliet house. 

2 South. Hist. Soc. Paps, xxxii, 743; " Eppa Hunton at Bull Run." 
* Sloan's report, 0. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 560. 



THE BATTLE ; PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS i8i 

Evans soon realized that the movement in his front 
was merely a demonstration. After several hours' desul- 
tory fusillade in the woods along Bull Run, information 
reached him, as we have already seen, that the Federals 
were in large force on his left in the direction of Sudley 
Spring. He immediately gathered together the greater 
part of his command, and leaving three or four com- 
panies 1 at the Van Pelt house, he marched northwards 
with the 4th South Carolina, the ist Louisiana, and David- 
son's section of Latham's battery, to oppose the Federal 
flanking movement in that direction. 

' It is variously stated. 



VIII 



McDowell turns the confederate left 

Although McDowell was unequal to the almost hope- 
less task which he had been set, although he blundered 
and weakly listened to bad advice, he deserves some de- 
gree of admiration for the real courage he displayed in 
attempting to carry out the mission that had been im- 
posed on him. He was not well at the time, sick indeed 
on the very night of the 20th to the 21st; ^ the weather 
had become oppressively hot, and he had at times to 
seek relief from the saddle by driving in a light carriage ; 
yet his actions from the beginning to the end of the long, 
cruel day on which he lost the battle of Bull Run show 
that from the early hours of the morning till he dropped 
to sleep from exhaustion at Fairfax Court House some 
twenty hours later, he never did less than his best.^ 

McDowell followed his advance closely, and apparently 
joined Tyler's division opposite Stone Bridge a little be- 

1 Report Cond. War, 11, 41 ; McDowell's evidence. He ate canned fruit on 
the evening of the 20th, and suffered a choleraic attack; Barrett Wendell, 
quoting Stedman, Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc. 3, 11, 191. 

2 The only serious reflection made against McDowell in this sense is 
in the privately printed Memoir of Tyler, by Donald Mitchell, which con- 
vinces one of little more than that by the time McDowell had got back to 
Centreville he was extremely fatigued and dejected. This does not in itself 
invalidate what has been stated above. 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 183 

fore seven o'clock.* Leaving Centreville about four, he 
had at once discovered that the attacking column was 
not advancing and that the road was blocked. He made 
his way towards the Cub Run bridge, near which the 
last brigade of Tyler's division (Keyes') was still obstruct- 
ing Hunter's advance. He ordered the regiments off 
the road and into the fields on the south side,^ and then 
hurried on to get a view of the situation near Stone 
Bridge. He directed the artillery to search the Confed- 
erate position at various points, and as Evans remained ob- 
stinately silent, he concluded that the enemy's strength 
was towards Blackburn's Ford, as in truth it was, and 
that he was in danger of being attacked by his left. He 
then rode back to the junction of the Sudley Spring road 
and turned off.^ 

Howard's brigade of Heintzelman's division, the last 
in the flanking column, was now marching by. Mc- 
Dowell stopped to watch the brigade file past, and when 
it had cleared the Warrenton turnpike, he instructed 
Howard to halt and wait further orders.^ McDowell's 

1 It is a fair inference from all the accounts that the two generals kept 
away from one another, and did not actually meet. McDowell probably 
rode from one point to another, keeping out of Tyler's way. See Tyler's 
Memoir, by Mitchell; Fry, McDowell and Tyler; and the official reports. 

2 Tyler claims to have given this order, but his evidence is very doubt- 
ful. Rep. Cond. War, ii; Tyler's evidence. 

' This paragraph is largely a matter of deduction; see the reports of Mc- 
Dowell, Tyler, and Howard in O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii. 
. * Howard should have been placed under the orders of the nearest 



1 84 BULL RUN 

object was to leave Howard within supporting distance 
of Centreville in case of an emergency ; but in the result 
he merely weakened his flank attack. At this moment, 
then, say half-past seven to eight, the Federal army pre- 
sented a remarkable tactical disposition, being broken 
into three marked groups : on the Centreville ridge, 
three brigades ; close to Stone Bridge, four brigades ; on 
the Sudley Spring road marching north, four brigades. 

McDowell followed his flanking column, but did not 
succeed in getting to its head until after Sudley Spring 
was reached. Meanwhile Burnside, with the leading bri- 
gade, had slowly advanced. At first his march took him 
through a difficult wood road, where it was necessary in 
more than one place to effect repairs before the guns 
could be got through. Had Burnside or his engineer 
guides known it, a good track through the woods led to 
a fordable and unguarded crossing of Bull Run at Pop- 
lar Ford, and another one by the Red House farm to 
Sudtey Spring at a saving of quite tw^o miles. This ford 
was indicated in McDowell's order as the ** lower " ford ; 
but no one seemed able to find the way to it until later 
in the day when Howard's brigade discovered it. So the 
troops kept on northwards, along, circuitous route. ^ Be- 

divisional general, Tyler. He would in this case probably have followed 
Sherman's movement and been of some use in the battle. Heintzelman 
apparently gave Howard no orders; so that the brigade was virtually 
detached from any divisional organization. 

^But Barnard says that the engineer officers who guided the column 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 185 

yond the woods, well to the north of Bull Run, open 
country was found. The route now led them south and 
a little west, until at half-past nine Sudley Spring was 
reached, and the men were given a rest along the banks 
of the stream. 1 

But reports of the Federal movement had already 
reached Evans, and the Federal commanders from the 
rising ground just north of Sudley Spring presently 
caught sight to the south of them, a mile or more away, 
near the Carter house, of Confederate troops coming into 
position. Then presently these troops moved across far- 
ther west towards the Sudley Spring and Manassas road. 
Burnside immediately advanced along the Manassas 
road towards them. It was then, probably, about ten 
o'clock. Before relating what followed, however, it will 
be better to consider the ground for one moment, in con- 
nection with McDowell's order of the 20th. The imme- 
diate field of operations was roughly a triangle of which 
the Warrenton turnpike was the base, Sudley Spring the 

refused to turn off to the left because they thought this would bring them 
under the fire of Confederate batteries on the farther bank of Bull Run. 
O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 331. 

^ Burnside reached Sudley Spring at 9.30; his head of column was en- 
gaged at 10.30. Franklin reached Sudley Spring at 1 1 ; and found Porter, 
or the rear of Porter, still there. Willcox reached Sudley Spring at 12.30. 
Each of these brigades stretched, therefore, over an hour of road, and, as 
their rate of advance was at least more than two miles an hour and each 
brigade averaged about 3000 men, it follows that every man took well 
over a yard of road. 



i86 BULL RUN 

apex, Bull Run the east side, and the Manassas road the 
west side. From Sudley Spring due south to the cross- 
ing of the Manassas and Warrenton roads was about a 
mile and a half ; to Stone Bridge across the Pittsylvania 
farm — hilly fields and woodlands — was almost two 
miles. From the crossing of the Manassas road to Stone 
Bridge was a little over a mile. How did McDowell's 
order fit this ground ? 

Hunter's division had been ordered to cross Bull Run 
"above the lower ford"; and Heintzelman's "at the 
lower ford," meaning presumably Poplar Ford. But, as 
already stated, the engineer officers who guided the 
columns did not succeed in discovering the road to this 
ford, so that Heintzelman followed Hunter all the way to 
Sudley Spring. 

Once across Bull Run, what was the army to do? 
"... turning down to the left, descend the stream and 
clear away the enemy who may be guarding . . . the 
bridge. It [Hunter's division] will then bear off to the 
right to make room for the succeeding division." There 
is some ambiguity here as to the precise points of cross- 
ing ; and there may be some confusion of thought as to 
the relation of Tyler's corps to the two others ; but the 
general idea, however badly expressed, is clear beyond 
the possibility of mistake. Once over Bull Run the ad- 
vance was to be left flank forward, following the stream 
down to the bridge, clearing the fords and linking the 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 187 

army up again ; and when once the all-important bridge 
and Warrenton turnpike were reached, then the exten- 
sion to the right might take place. As it happened, pre- 
cisely the contrary was about to occur. 

As Burnside crossed the ford and advanced along the 
Manassas road beyond, the Confederates were moving 
across his line of advance towards that road. For from 
the Pittsylvania or Carter house, Evans' direction was 
of necessity southwesterly if he was to prevent an ad- 
vance along the Manassas road. He judiciously picked 
a position not across the road but slightly flanking it, 
with a wide zone of fire on its front and with its right 
resting in a belt of woods ; there he awaited developments./ 

Hunter, with Burnside's brigade, Porter's following, 
marched straight on the enemy. He continued along the 
Manassas road, which was the obvious thing to do. 
When he reached a point within six or seven hundred 
yards from the Confederates he found that to the left of 
the road the ground was broken and wooded while to 
the right it was open farmland. Burnside's brigade was 
at this moment marching in column of route, the 2d 
Rhode Island leading, followed by the Rhode Island 
battery. Apparently an order had been given for skir- 
mishers to be thrown out, but, in effect, there were only 
flankers on each side of the road.i 

1 For this, and the movements of the Rhode Island battery generally, 
see Monroe, Rhode Island Artillery. 



i88 BULL RUN 

The Confederates opened fire at about six hundred 
yards. Immediately, Hunter ordered the Rhode Island 
battery forward through a fringe of trees to the left of 
the road. The infantry apparently broke back at once. 
They were soon formed into line, however, on the right 
of the road, and without waiting for the deployment of 
Burnside's other regiments, Hunter pushed up the 2d 
Rhode Island diagonally across the road to support the 
guns. These had opened fire, but were in an obviously 
exposed situation, their safety being due, in fact, to the 
weakness of Evans' line. To the south and west of the 
point where Hunter had begun his deployment, open 
fields extended towards the Warrenton turnpike. 

While getting the 2d Rhode Island into action. Hunter 
was shot down severely wounded, as was also its colonel, 
Slocum. The command of the division devolved on Por- 
ter, who was not yet at the front, so Burnside continued 
the work of getting his brigade engaged. This took 
time, and was at first a somewhat piecemeal affair ; yet 
a line was formed, as shown in the diagram. Its right 

2 howitz. -H- +^^-H^- R.I. Batt. 



2d N.H. 


1st R.I. 


71st N.Y. 


2d R.I. 



was near the Sudley Spring road, and it faced about 
southeast. Porter was now fast coming up behind, mov- 
ing his own brigade forward under cover of Burnside's, 
which was exchanging volleys with Evans. Porter de- 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 189 

ployed his troops in the open ground to the right of 
the road, prolonging Burnside's right along a crest that 
ran southwest to the Dogan house. Thus began a gen- 
eral shift of the whole column towards the right, instead 
of towards the left, that was to continue through all the 
operations and that played an important part in the de- 
velopments of the battle. 

It was about this time that McDowell arrived on the 
scene. From Sudley Spring he had seen the dust clouds 
made by the troops that Johnston was hurrying to his 
menaced flank. He judged it necessary to quicken and 
strengthen his attack before the Confederates should 
have time to ward it off. He therefore sent orders to 
Howard to march on Sudley Spring, and to Tyler to 
press the attack at Stone Bridge ; this order the latter 
in fact anticipated, as we shall presently see. McDowell 
then rapidly proceeded to the front, urging the troops of 
Franklin and Porter as he passed by them to quicken 
their march. ^ But the small Confederate force was well 
posted, and offered a remarkably stubborn resistance to 
the Federal advance. Even after Porter had prolonged 
Burnside to the southwest towards the Warrenton turn- 
pike, Evans succeeded in holding on for a while. Pres- 
ently reinforcements reached him under Bee, momen- 
tarily relieving the pressure. 

* At eleven o'clock McDowell got prisoners from Johnston's corps and 
knew as a fact that he had to face the combined Confederate army. Rep. 
Cond. War, II, 40 ; McDowell's evidence. 



I90 BULL RUN 

The Federal infantry showed little inclination to move 
forward to the attack, which was not unnatural in view 
of their lack of training and of competent officers. The 
theory most acted on was that the troops should be saved 
when exposed to fire by having the men lie on the 
ground. This was good sense, but only up to a certain 
point ; for the muzzle-loader is difficult to load in such a 
position, and if the troops are too constantly kept under 
cover they are quickly demoralized when exposed to 
direct fire.i It was probably the Federal preponderance 
in artillery that decided the issue, for the infantry was ly- 
ing down most of the time, and when efforts were made to 
carry it forward, broke back ; its musketry was probably 
ineffective. On the Federal line, after Griffin's battery, 
of Porter's brigade, came into action, were six thirteen- 
pounders and four ten-pounders all rifled, together with 
two twelve-pounders and tw^o small howitzers ; to this all 
the Confederates could at first oppose were two smooth- 
bore six-pounders and, after Bee came up, four more. 

It was about a quarter past eleven w^hen Porter came 
into action. Burnside's line was wavering badly at this 
moment, and Porter detached to his left Sykes' bat- 
talion of regulars to stiffen it and support the guns. At 
the same time Griffin's battery was coming into action 

^ Part of the zouave drill then taught was the acrobatic feat of rolling 
over on the back, placing the musket between the knees, and then loading 
it; a very unsafe performance it would seem ! This was taught only to the 
so-called zouave organizations. 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 191 

farther to the right, and poured in a very hot and effec- 
tive fire, before which the Confederate line immediately 
showed symptoms of breaking up. 

The fight was not yet over, for Bee had now arrived. 
He succeeded in maintaining the resistance for another 
half-hour or so before the end came. 

But the Federal line kept extending. Franklin's bri- 
gade, of Heintzelman's corps, had followed the general 
movement by deploying still farther to the right and pro- 
longing Porter's line. Rickett's battery was quickly to 
the front, and from a position to the right of the road 
not far from the Dogan farm played effectively on Evans 
and Bee. 

The I St Minnesota was detached to support Burn- 
side's left, which was getting more and more shaky, and 
Franklin's two other regiments, the 5th and nth Massa- 
chusetts, were hurried along the road and deployed into 
line near the Warrenton turnpike ; but they were imme- 
diately thrown into confusion on coming within the zone 
of fire of Imboden's battery on the Henry house plateau. ^ 

Willcox, following Franklin, reached Sudley Spring 
about 12.30 P.M. and received orders to leave Arnold's 
battery there to cover the ford. This was done, and the 
I St Michigan was detached in support. The 4th Michi- 
gan had stayed behind at Fairfax Court House, which 
left only the nth (zouaves) and 38th New York with 

* Supporting Bee from the Henry house hill. 



192 BULL RUN 

which to continue the advance. With these two regi- 
ments, Willcox appears to have reached the crossing of 
the Warrenton and Manassas roads between 1.30 and 
2 P.M., after the Confederate line had at last given away. 
He thus describes the situation at that moment : — 

We . . . came upon the left of what I supposed to have been Frank- 
lin's line. . . . The troops on our left were engaged in a desultory fire 
with the enemy posted in the thicket and ravine across the Warrenton 
road, not far from the Robinson house.' 

Ricketts meanwhile had moved to the Dogan house, 
overlooking the crossroads, whence he was throwing 
shells, none too effectively because of the distance, at 
any target he could find on the Henry house plateau. 
Franklin, following in support, eventually descended to 
the Warrenton turnpike, crossed Young's Branch and 
began to move up the hill on the farther side. The 2d 
New Hampshire, of Burnside's brigade, was moved up 
to support him ; and at about 2.30 P.M. he advanced to 
occupy the Henry house plateau. 

Just as the Confederates under Evans and Bee, no 
longer able to withstand the superior Federal artillery, 
began to stream away to the rear, another body of Fed- 
eral troops began to appear on the left ; this was Sher- 
man's brigade. 

As soon as McDowell, after arriving at Sudley Spring, 
had realized the situation, he had sent Tyler an order to 

* Wilcox's report, O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 408. 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 193 

press on against the enemy. A little previous to this, 
however, Sherman, from the right of his position, had 
observed to the north of him a horseman, doubtless one 
of Evans' scouts, riding down the hill on which stood 
the Red House farm and disappearing in the hollow. 
From this he concluded that there must be a ford, and, 
in fact. Poplar Ford lies just below the farm. When 
Tyler ordered him to cross Bull Run if possible, he 
promptly led his brigade off to his right where he hoped 
to find the ford indicated by the horseman. Once in the 
hollow, however, his soldiers soon worked their way 
down to the river bank, and there presently discovered 
a couple of fords about two hundred yards short of 
Poplar Ford and commenced to cross. It was probably 
assumed that the horseman had also passed at this point, 
though a staff or engineer officer pushing on another 
two hundred yards would have discovered the mistake. 
And the mistake had its importance, for where Sherman 
actually crossed it was found impossible to get over his 
brigade battery under Ayres, while at Poplar Ford there 
would have been not the least difficulty. ^ Ayres counter- 
marched and returned to the Warrenton turnpike, where 
he reported to Schenck near Stone Bridge. 

^ This account is based not merely on the documents but on a careful 
survey of the ground with my friend Major McAndrew, U.S.A. Not a 
doubt was left in our minds as to the point where Sherman crossed. Fry, 
McDowell and Tyler, 59, and Allen, Hist, of 2d Wisconsin, 385, appear to 
support this conclusion. 



194 BULL RUN 

Just as Sherman was crossing Bull Run, Schenck 
pushed the bulk of his infantry half a mile or so down- 
stream to a point near Lewis' Ford. A few well-aimed 
shots from the Confederate guns guarding the passage 
soon sent him back to the Warrenton turnpike near 
Stone Bridge, where, in fact, he remained until the end. 

Sherman's leading regiment, the 69th New York, was 
thrown out into a skirmishing line as it neared the Carter 
house, and exchanged shots with some stragglers from 
Bee's command, already in retreat. In this desultory fir- 
ing Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty, of the 69th, was killed. 
The brigade was then halted while Sherman rode across 
to consult McDowell ; Keyes meanwhile crossing and 
forming to the left of Sherman ; with Keyes came Tyler. 
Presently Sherman returned and the advance was 
resumed. 

By this time the first phase of the fight was over on 
the right. McDowell had had a success, but at a consid- 
erable cost. His advance had been delayed for two or 
three hours by a small detachment of the enemy ; one of 
his brigades, Burnside's, was entirely used up. It fell to 
pieces, the men taking to the woods along the Sudley 
Spring road and playing no further part in. the battle, 
with the exception of the 2d New Hampshire which kept 
its organization and presently resumed its advance. 
Burnside covered up the demoralization of his men under 
the plea that they had to replenish ammunition and re- 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 195 

tired for that purpose, but he personally followed the 2d 
New Hampshire and was in the fighting that took place 
on the Henry hill.^ 

Even among the troops that had come less directly 
under fire than Burnside's, disintegration set in during 
the lull that followed the first engagement. Many of the 
men believed a complete victory had been won. They 
were hot, tired, thirsty. The company officers were in- 
competent and had little control. The result was that 
many men dispersed, and some of them not to rally 
again. 2 

It will be better not to attempt, until after we have 
looked at the Confederate side, to do more than to indi- 
cate the general line of the Federal advance after the re- 
sistance of Evans and Bee had been overcome. It was 
from the Carter house and along the Manassas road to 
the line of the Warrenton turnpike. Two brigades were 
on the left under Tyler; Porter's brigade formed the 
centre ; Heintzelman's two brigades formed the right and 
were now farther south than the others, so that the whole 
might roughly be described as an advance right wing 
forward. 

SOUTH 

On the Warrenton Turnpike. Evans states that 
it was at nine o'clock that he marched from Stone Bridge 

^ Hayes, Hist. 2d New Hampshire, 32. • 

* King's address,, Papers Minnesota Command, Loyal Leg. 6. 



196 BULL RUN 

to oppose Hunter's advance. His scouts had informed 
him that large bodies of the enemy were higher up Bull 
Run, on the north side, and at the same time came a 
message from Alexander's signal station to the same 
effect. He immediately decided to shift the responsibility 
for guarding Stone Bridge on to Cocke, whom he notified 
that he was moving towards the enemy. He then started 
for the Carter house, with eleven companies of infantry, 
one troop of cavalry and two six-pounders. He left be- 
hind three companies and two six-pounders facing the 
bridge from the Van Pelt house. 

On arriving at the Carter house, Evans, with the enemy 
now clearly in sight at Sudley Spring, deployed his 
infantry. His position was well chosen for resisting an 
attempt by the Federals to work down Bull Run and 
uncover Stone Bridge. But presently, seeing or fearing 
a movement along the Manassas road that would turn 
his left, he decided to move over towards the road so as 
to prevent the Federals from reaching the crossing of 
the Warrenton turnpike, which seemed to be their objec- 
tive. It was this change of position that virtually turned 
McDowell's operation from an advance left flank forward 
to one right flank forward. 

Evans deployed for the second time along a ridge 
stretching northeast from the intersection of the Sudley 
Spring and Warrenton roads. His left was right over 
the crossroads. His front commanded a zone of fire five to 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 197 

six hundred yards wide, while on his right, where woods 
filled a hollow between his position and the Carter house, 
he placed the ist Louisiana under Major Wheat, a litde 
forward of his main line, which was held by Colonel Sloan 
with the 4th South Carolina. One of Davidson's guns 
was behind Sloan ; the other was placed in advance and 
a little to the left enfilading a stretch of the Sudley 
Spring road.i When Burnside attempted to advance, 
Sloan poured in a heavy fire on him ; Wheat counter- 
charged and broke the 27th New York,2 and for a while 
Evans more than held his own. Presendy, however, 
numbers began to tell. 

Meanwhile Bee, following his orders from Beauregard, 
had marched to a point about three quarters of a mile 
w^est of Stone Bridge and just south of the Warrenton 
turnpike where a well-defined elevation, since generally 
known as the Henry house plateau, induced him to de- 
ploy his brigade for defensive purposes ; he had about 
2700 bayonets with four guns of Imboden's battery. He 
judged that Evans was beaten and that a new line must 
be established. 

But Evans was too closely engaged to get clear away 
in good order. One of his staff officers rode up to Bee 
begging him to advance, and he decided to comply. 

^ This position, which does not accord with that generally given in the 
books, has been carefully reconstructed on the ground. 

2 Moved up from Porter to stiffen Burnside. Slocum, Hist, of the 27th 
New York. 



198 BULL RUN 

Coming down from the Henry house plateau, he moved 
across the Warrenton turnpike, pushed Bartow to the 
right with the 7th and 8th Georgia towards the Carter 
house, and with the rest of his brigade faced to the left 
and stiffened Evans' weakening line. The move was 
risky, and Imboden was held back, taking position on 
the northwesterly point of the hill whence he fired across 
at Porter as the Federal right stretched farther and 
farther southwest towards the Dogan house. 

Behind Bee, Hampton was marching along the Ma- 
nassas road, and Jackson, from near Island Ford, had 
already started, not waiting for orders, to the sound of 
the guns ; Holmes, Early, and Bonham's two regiments 
were also marching in the same direction ; while Kirby 
Smith, so long delayed at Piedmont, was at last reach- 
ing the army, — his first train arriving at Manassas 
Junction a little after noon. 

Bee's advance across the Warrenton turnpike was ill- 
timed. Had he waited a few minutes longer, Evans 
would have been dislodged and the occasion for ad- 
vancing would have disappeared. Could he, on the other 
hand, have reached the scene half an hour earlier, he 
might have had time to settle down to an effective de- 
fence. As it was he arrived just at the moment when 
Evans was completely beaten, and when there was 
nothing left to do but to make the best of a bad job. 
Bee did this, prolonging the hopeless resistance for some 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 199 

time ; but he, too, at last had to yield to superior force. 
When it came to retreat, his troops, like all other troops 
engaged at Bull Run, had not enough cohesion to main- 
tain their organization under fire in the open. 

As the brigades of Bee and Evans broke up, they 
streamed away almost eastwards, for McDowell's batter- 
ies had been edging farther and farther to the right, and 
played on the retreating Confederates down on the turn- 
pike which they soon reached, and for more than a mile 
along the slopes of the Henry house plateau. Some of 
the fugitives kept along the turnpike or climbed up the 
hill and, under a constant fire, moved across the plateau 
to its descent on the east side ; others kept in the hollow 
following Young's Branch, turning south beyond the 
Henry house plateau, thus rejoining the other broken 
commands. 

It may be as well, before proceeding farther, to de- 
scribe the ground towards which the conflict was now 
moving. From Stone Bridge the Warrenton turnpike 
ran about west, cutting at two points the S-like course 
of Young's Branch, a small stream of no importance 
save for the hollow it formed. Looking from north to 
south across the Warrenton turnpike the ground pre- 
sented itself in the following way : For the first half-mile 
from Stone Bridge there was open rising ground back 
of the tree-fringed hollow in which Bull Run flowed. 
To the west of this the Henry house plateau jutted out 



200 BULL RUN 

sharply northwards, rising nearly a hundred feet above 
Young's Branch and in part timbered. Farther south, 
following Young's Branch, was a considerable ravine 
running up into the Henry house plateau. Between the 
ravine and Bull Run south of Young's Branch were 
wooded heights, close to Lewis' Ford, difficult to pene- 
trate. The next half-mile of the Warrenton turnpike 
went up the projecting angle of the Henry house pla- 
teau, one hundred feet, and down again, Young's Branch 
circling nearly a quarter of a mile north and then joining 
the road again at a point just beyond which were the 
Stone house and the crossing of the Manassas-Sudley 
Spring road. Beyond this the Warrenton turnpike need 
not be followed in its westward course. 

From Stone Bridge around by the Carter house to the 
Stone house, a well-marked semicircle of rising ground 
followed Young's Branch on the north ; it was every- 
where about thirty or forty feet lower than the Henry 
house plateau and was broken by several patches of 
woodland. 

From its crossing with the Warrenton turnpike in the 
hollow of Young's Branch, the Manassas road, leading 
about south, rose gradually some seventy feet in two 
thirds of a mile diagonally across the western edge of 
the Henry house plateau; descending thence towards 
Manassas six miles or more away. West of the road at 
this point lay another hill of about the same height as 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 201 

the Henry house plateau, which was sometimes called 
Chinn's hill. This point in the Manassas road between 
the two hills was about three thousand yards as the crow 
flies southwest of Stone Bridge. The first two thousand 
yards of this line roughly coincided with the rear or 
southeasterly line of the Henry house plateau, and it 
was along that two thousand yards that the main Con- 
federate line of battle was eventually formed, facing 
rather more west than north. We can now return to the 
retreat of Evans' and Bee's brigades with better under- 
standing. 

No effort of their officers could hold up the broken 
troops as they fled over the Henry house plateau or 
along the hollow until they neared or reached the pro- 
tection of the ravine at the southeasterly corner. Even 
there the few field officers left had their hands full to 
restore order. The Confederates, like their opponents, 
had paid the price always exacted of an insufficiently 
prepared army. The officers had had to expose them- 
selves continuously. The 4th Alabama had lost all its 
field officers. Of the colonels, Sloan, Wheat, Gardner, and 
Jones had been severely wounded. Bee had exposed his 
life freely, and was now working desperately to rally the 
fugitives. It was at this moment, as he rode up and down 
trying to re-form his men near the head of the ravine 
behind the Robinson house, that he caught sight to the 
left of a long line of Confederate infantry in position 



202 BULL RUN 

across the plateau, with their general, cool and deter- 
mined, pacing his horse slowly along their front. It was 
Jackson's brigade, standing as firm as a stone wall.i 

^ The "stone wall ' ' story was apparently first printed four days after the 
battle in the form which has been generally followed since. The quotation 
is from theCha.r\cston Mercury, July 25, 1861 (special correspondence from 
Richmond): — 

GEN. BERNARD E. BEE 

The name of this officer deserves a place in the highest niche of fame. He 
displayed a gallantry that scarcely has a parallel in history. The brunt of 
the morning's battle was sustained by his command until past two o'clock. 
Overwhelmed by superior numbers and compelled to yield before a fire 
that swept everything before it, Gen. Bee rode up and down his lines, en- 
couraging his troops, by everything that was dear to them, to stand up 
and repel the tide which threatened them with destruction. At last his 
own brigade dwindled to a mere handful, with every field officer killed or 
disabled. He rode up to Gen. Jackson and said: " General, they are beat- 
ing us back." The reply was: "Sir, we'll give them the bayonet." 

Gen. Bee immediately rallied the remnant of his brigade, and his last 
words to them were: "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us 
determine to die here and we will conquer!" — 

On the face of it this account has no character of authenticity, and the 
words ascribed to Bee smack less of the battlefield than of the editorial 
sanctum. This account of the Charleston Mercury was reproduced at the 
time by a number of Southern papers, and by several pamphlets. After 
them came the historians, and without exhausting the list, the following 
may be mentioned as giving the same story, with or without slight varia- 
tions: M, Addey, Life of General T. J. Jackson, New York, 1863; "Ex- 
Cadet," Life of Thomas J. Jackson, Richmond, 1864; "A Virginian," Life 
of Stonewall Jackson, New York, 1864; R. L. Dabney, Life and Camps of 
Jackson, New York, 1866; J. E. Cooke, Stonewall Jackson, New York, x866; 
S. N. Randolph, Life of General T. J. Jackson, Philadelphia, 1876; Dr. 
McGuire, "General Jackson," South. Hist. Soc. Paps, xix, 307. Mrs. Jack- 
son in her biography of her husband. Colonel Henderson in his well-known 
life, and other writers merely echo the formulas of these early biographers. 

General D. H. Hill, though not going into any precise details, rejected 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 203 

Headquarters. Meanwhile Johnston and Beaure- 
gard had left their first position in rear of Bonham, 
under circumstances already noted. Just before doing 
so, about eleven o'clock, Johnston discovered that trees 
were being felled along the Federal front on the Centre- 
ville ridge, evidently for abatis, and this confirmed his 
opinion that nothing serious was intended by McDowell 
on that side. It was clearly up towards Stone Bridge that 
the batde was to be fought, and as Johnston galloped 
towards the Lewis house, he turned Pendleton and Al- 
burtis with their batteries ^ in the same direction, ordered 
Cocke to detach the 8th and 49th Virginia towards Stone 



the whole story as fabulous (see an article in the Century, February, 1896). 
But this is unconvincing because it was undoubtedly the case that im- 
mediately after Bull Run Jackson was known by his famous sobriquet. It 
seems inherently probable that something was said by somebody, during 
or immediately after the battle, that likened Jackson or his men or both to 
a stone wall. Alexander (Military Memoirs, 36) relates that as he rode over 
the Henry house plateau on the evening of the battle with Johnston, that 
general, pointing to what had been Jackson's position, said: "Preston's 
regiment stood there like a stone wall." This remark may have been the 
origin of the story long current about Bee. Two other variants may be 
added to the accepted story: Conrad, a combatant at Manassas, gives the 
words: " Close up, men, and stand your ground. Colonel Jackson with five 
regiments of Virginia troops is standing behind us like a stone wall and 
will support you" ("First Battle of Manassas," South. Hist. Soc. Paps. 
XIX, 90i);Robbins, a major in the 4th Alabama, writing in 1891, declares 
that he heard Bee say: "Yonder stands Jackson like a stone wall. Let us 
go to his assistance." {South. Hist. Soc. Paps, xix, 164; another account 
by J- Q. Jones in the same volume hardly deserves notice.) 

^ Pendleton's battery was actually commanded by Brockenbrough, the 
former acting as chief of artillery. Imboden, Battles and Leaders, i, 235. 



204 BULL RUN 

Bridge, sent back officers to hasten on the troops already 
marching, and an order to Ewell to move to the threat- 
ened point with his whole brigade. 

Johnston, followed by Beauregard, apparently arrived 
at the eastern edge of the Henry house plateau about 
half-past twelve, just as Bee's and Evans' broken troops 
reached the same point. Evans' two regiments were 
disbanded beyond hope of retrievement. Bee's were 
almost in as bad a plight. Johnston himself took an 
active part in re-forming the men ; he carried forward the 
flag of the 4th Alabama, made a few of the men rally, 
and appointed Colonel Gist, of his staff, to command 
them. About four companies of disorganized men were 
beaten together and placed under Colonel Thomas, John- 
ston's chief ordnance officer, who was killed at their head 
a little later. 1 

After the first flurry was over and the retreating troops 
had been partly rallied, Beauregard pressed Johnston to 
be assigned to the command of the wing there facing the 
Federal advance, and after a discussion Johnston con- 
sented to this and rode back to the Lewis house where 
he would be better placed for controlling the army as a 
whole. He was still so anxious about the situation of his 
left wing that on arriving there his first instinct was to 

^ Johnston, Narrative, 48, 49. He says that the four companies under 
Thomas was the largest of the bodies of reorganized troops. But it is clear, 
though the direct evidence is lacking, that Bartow succeeded in rallyirig 
one if not both of the Georgia regiments. 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 205 

order Cocke with the remainder of his brigade to Beau- 
regard's assistance ; but on looking over the ground 
with Cocke he decided that troops must be left to guard 
Ball's Ford and Lewis' Ford, against which Schenck had 
already made a demonstration earlier in the day. 

Let us now examine more closely the situation of the 
Confederates at the moment when Beauregard took com- 
mand of what may be described as the left wing of the 
army. 

Evans and Bee had held their positions just long 
enough to enable Wade Hampton and Jackson to reach 
the Henry house plateau. Hampton received orders at 
Manassas Junction to move in the direction of Stone 
Bridge. He accordingly marched towards Lewis' house, 
and when near there learnt that the enemy was ap- 
proaching. The sound of Evans' and Burnside's guns 
was presently heard, and Hampton moved straight in 
that direction. This took him across the Henry house 
plateau diagonally, and he appears to have reached the 
western edge of it at the precise moment when Evans 
and Bee were breaking back, and when the Federal 
troops were beginning to show in pursuit on the hillsides 
beyond Young's Branch. Hampton threw himself into 
the breach. He moved to the Robinson house, just north 
of which the turnpike crosses the plateau, and from there 
checked the pursuit of Bee and Evans and covered the 
ravine in which their troops were in part re-formed. He 



2o6 BULL RUN 

was exposed to a galling fire, losing his lieutenant- 
colonel, Johnson, and presently fell back a couple of hun- 
dred yards towards the ravine, where he was presently 
supported by the re-formed troops that Bee and Johnston 
led forward to his assistance. 

Jackson came up immediately behind Hampton and 
by the same route. But instead of crossing the plateau 
he stopped short at the point where it began to dip 
northwesterly. There was an irregular belt of trees in un- 
dulating ground where he deployed his brigade in the 
order shown. ^ He was joined by Imboden's battery as it 
retreated, leaving behind one of its guns disabled on the 
edge of the plateau. Jackson placed Imboden, with his 
brigade battery, Stannard's, in front of his centre, where 
Pendleton on arriving also formed Brockenbrough with 
his four guns ; Pendleton taking command of the whole. 
Alburtis unlimbered to the right. Imboden, however, soon 
went back to the rear, having exhausted his am- 
munition. ^ Jackson's line faced a little north of west, 

1 This order is variously given. The positions of the 5th on the right 
and of the 33d on the left, with the guns massed about in front of the 
centre, seem most certain. 



33d Virg. 


Brockenbrough, 
4 guns 


Stannard, 

4 guns 


Imboden, 
3 guns 


Sth Virg. 


Alburtis, 
4 guns 


2d Virg. 


4th Virg. 


27th Virg. 





* Imboden, Battles and Leaders, i, 235. 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 207 

towards the crossing of the Warrenton and Manassas 
roads.i 

The deployment of Jackson's brigade came in the nick 
of time and was extremely well judged. He avoided the 
mistake of attempting to hold the plateau from the edge 
nearest to the enemy where their batteries would have had 
an easy target ; he preferred to take up a position partly 
sheltered and to attack which his opponents would have 
to cross a fire-swept zone; the issue justified him. 

Jackson's left was about three or four hundred yards 
short of the Manassas road, and as the Federals now 
held this road as far as its crossing with the Warren- 
ton turnpike, there was evident danger of his being 
outflanked. This was to prove a critical point, and 

^ The diagram below represents roughly a section of the Henry house 




plateau at the chief point of conflict. Jackson's infantry was at ^; his guns 
and gunners could just get protection from a slight swell of ground at B. 
At C, in a saucer-like fold southeast of the Henry house.were the Federal 
batteries, and just behind them at D was the edge of the plateau lined by 
the Federal infantry. From A to D was about three hundred yards. The 
Federal guns were firing over the heads of the Confederates, their shells 
apparently bursting a considerable distance behind Jackson's line, or 
burying themselves in the ground in front of it. (Conrad's statement that 
the fire must have been ineffective because uncut fuses were found on the 
ground hardly affects the issue. South. Hist. Soc. Paps, xix, 89.) The 
Confederate guns were similarly firing over the heads of the Federals. But 
the use of canister on either side would create a zone that infantry could 
not easily move in. 



2o8 BULL RUN 

Beauregard at once began strengthening it. He sent 
Bee to take command, with the 4th Alabama and 7th 
Georgia, with which he prolonged Jackson's left just 
in time to face Heintzelman's advance. Then Johnston 
sent the 49th Virginia from Cocke, and Beauregard the 
2d Mississippi ; at 2.30 P.M. the 6th North Carolina, 
a strong regiment with 634 bayonets, came up from 
Manassas Junction.^ 

On the right Hampton, unable to withstand the fire 
of the Federal batteries, presently fell back across the 
ravine to a spur of the plateau prolonging Jackson's po- 
sition and was there supported by the 8th Virginia, the 
first of Cocke's regiments to reach the scene. But the 
Federal batteries now changed position and began to 
play against Jackson, so that from this moment pressure 
towards the ravine relaxed, the Confederate right was 
no longer threatened, and later it became possible to 
shift Hampton's legion across behind Jackson to support 
the hard-pressed left. 

We have already seen that Jackson had massed in his 
front three of the five batteries of the army of the Shen- 
andoah. Of the others, Beckham's was soon to come into 
action with Stuart's cavalry on the extreme left, while 
that of Alburtis, which we have seen ordered forward by 

^ It does not seem possible to accept the statement in Colonel Peters' 
relation that the ist Maryland fought at this point. There is no corrobo- 
ration, and the regiment was undoubtedly with Ewell. South. Hist. Soc. 
Paps. XXXIV, 170. 



Mcdowell turns confederate left 209 

Johnston, appears to have reached a position on the 
Henry house plateau to the right of Jaclcson, from where 
it was shifted still farther towards the right, whence it 
apparently swept the turnpike just beyond the Robin- 
son house. Of Beauregard's guns, Rogers' battery ^ was 
guarding Lewis' Ford with the support of Cocke, whose 
numbers gradually dwindled as his regiments were 
moved by Johnston to the left, so that by three o'clock 
only one company of the 19th Virginia remained in sup- 
port of these guns. Walton, with three smooth and two 
rifled six-pounders, was sent to the scene early. At 8.30 
A.M. he was at the Lewis house, whence he detached his 
two rifled guns to the spurs overlooking Stone Bridge, 
whence later they played effectively against the ad- 
vance of Keyes. The three others moved to the right 
of Jackson on the Henry house plateau, thus concen- 
trating eighteen guns on the main line of battle, to be 
reduced presently by Imboden taking three to the rear, 
and increased later by six more, Beckham's and Kem- 
per's. This preponderance of artillery proved a consider- 
able factor in the result. And it should be kept in mind 
that so long as the artillery was being used at short 
ranges on the Henry house plateau, the Confederate 
smoothbores were just as effective as the long ranging 
rifled pieces of the Federals. 

; * Now commanded by Heaton. Imboden, Battles and Leaders, i, 235. 



IX 

THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 

NORTH 

At the very moment that Bee and Evans gave way 
under the fire of the Federal batteries, Burnside's men 
were apparently done with. They made no attempt at 
pursuit, but on the contrary fell back ; Burnside's official 
euphemism runs : — 

I withdrew my brigade into the woods in rear of the line for the pur- 
pose of supplying the troops with ammunition. . . . The 2d New 
Hampshire . . . was sent forward to assist one of Colonel Heintzel- 
man's brigades, at that time three quarters of a mile distant. 

Porter, on Burnside's right, had been less exposed 
and had done better. Two of his regiments, however, 
had broken, the 14th New York and 8th New York 
MiHtia. The former was apparently rallied ; the latter 
took little part in the subsequent proceedings and pre- 
sumably went to replenish ammunition along with Burn- 
side's men in the woods. But as the Confederates fell 
back to the hollow of Young's Branch and up on to the 
Henry house plateau, Porter followed, until he reached 
the rising ground where Evans had formed his line. To 
his right Heintzelman's infantry was working down to- 
wards the Warrenton turnpike ; to his left Sherman was 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 211 

closing in towards him and in the direction of the apex 
of the Henry house plateau. Griffin's and Ricketts' guns 
on the right continued firing on the retreating Confed- 
erates, sweeping them off the plateau towards the ravine, 
and driving Imboden's guns back towards Jackson. 

Farther to the left, Keyes, following Sherman, was 
diverging towards Bull Run, opening an ugly gap be- 
tween the main part of the Federal line and Stone Bridge. 
Neither Sherman nor Keyes had any guns, nor could 
any reach them from across the run until Keyes should 
clear a w^ay for Schenck to cross the bridge. The artil- 
lery, therefore, was, for practical purposes, concentrated 
on McDowell's right. 

McDowell's situation at this juncture was far from 
good. The configuration of the ground and the Confed- 
erate dispositions had constantly deflected him towards 
his right along the Manassas road to the west of the 
wedgelike point of the Henry house plateau. He was 
fast tending to face backwards towards Centreville, and 
the constant and rapid weakening of his numbers from 
the difficulty of keeping the men with the colors made it 
doubtful whether his long curving line could be main- 
tained without breaking. He had little choice but to strike 
as quickly as he could at the Confederate forces on the 
Henry house hill, and this he set about doing after a 
pause made inevitable by the fatigue and disorder of his 
troops. But the infantry had already revealed its lack of 



212 BULL RUN 

offensive power, while the disorder of the men and lack 
of a proper system of command made it difficult to 
handle them. McDowell therefore decided to continue 
the attack by throwing forward his artillery on to the 
plateau and by edging around the enemy's position to- 
wards the right. 

There was much to justify McDowell's decision. His 
infantry was clearly not to be relied on for a frontal at- 
tack, and might therefore prove most useful in outflank- 
ing the enemy. His regular batteries had proved their 
quality and seemed to give promise that they could 
break down the enemy's line. And yet the decision 
proved fatal. The ground was not known. The enemy's 
line was not located. The risk of the guns being lost for 
want of support was fairly obvious. Jackson had not dis- 
closed the position either of his infantry or of his artil- 
lery. The edge of the plateau was well forward of the 
Federal line, and there was no certainty of what support 
the infantry would be able to give. Yet McDowell or- 
dered his guns forward, — " the fatal blunder of the 
day."i 

Of the four batteries with McDowell, we can first dis- 
pose of the Rhode Island. It did not follow the retro- 
grade movement of Burnside's brigade, but apparently 
moved forward under McDowell's orders to a position 
immediately northeast of the crossroads, whence it be- 

* Imboden, Battles and Leaders, i, 234. 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 213 

gan firing over the depression of Young's Branch at the 
Henry house plateau. One gun, however, had been dis- 
abled ; another gun soon used up its ammunition and was 
sent back to the rear ; and of the four remaining, two 
moved to the right and took position near the Dogan 
house. The two that remained w^ere eventually ordered 
by Governor Sprague of Rhode Island to cross Young's 
Branch and take position on the Henry house plateau. 
This they did at the moment when the Federal army 
had just begun its retreat, so that they played no part in 
the struggle at that point.^ 

It was Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries that were chosen 
to deal the blow ; and McDowell apparently instructed 
Major Barry to direct the movement in person. 2 Barry 
rode over to Griffin, — the two officers were not on good 
terms personally, — and ordered him to limber up and 
move to the Henry house plateau. Griffin objected. " I 
hesitated . . . because I had no support." ^ He even 
argued the case, having no confidence in the infantry, 
and believing the position he was being sent to far too 
advanced. But Barry was positive, and Grif^n, leaving 
a disabled gun behind, started for a point to the right 
of the Henry house in column of pieces. Porter, who saw 

^ Monroe, Rhode Island Artillery, 19. This points to defective organiza- 
tion in the matter of reserve artillery ammunition. The intervention of 
Governor Sprague is too characteristic to require comment. 

2 O. R. Sen i, vol. 11, 346; Rep. Cond. War, 11, 143. 

^ Rep. Cond. War, 11, 168; Griffin's evidence. 



214 BULL RUN 

his brigade battery going forward, became veiy anxious 
when it started up the hillside ; after the action he began 
to reprimand Griffin until it was explained that he had 
acted by superior order. ^ 

The order to Ricketts did not come through Barry, 
but was delivered by Lieutenant Kingsbury, McDowell's 
A.D.C. According to one rather doubtful witness Mc- 
Dowell himself rode up at this moment, and on Ricketts' 
querying : " By whose orders am I to go there ? " the 
general replied : " By mine, sir." ^ On this the battery 
moved forward, climbed the plateau, not without diffi- 
culty, went over the crest and unlimbered just beyond, 
a little to the left and in advance of Griffin. The two 
batteries were well sheltered by a depression of the 
ground, but were for the moment without support. Mc- 
Dowell, who was constantly changing position,^ and 
therefore not keeping in close touch with his divisional 
commanders, went up the hill immediately after the 
batteries and climbed to the roof of the Henry house 
where he stayed for a few minutes studying the battle- 
field.* At his feet were the eleven powerful guns of Grif- 
fin and Ricketts firing rapidly, while in front and to his 
left, among the undulations and patches of pine and 
scrub, he could have seen nothing much beyond the 

1 Rep. Cond. War, ii, 172; Griffin's evidence. 

2 Barrett, What I saw at Bull Run, 18. 

3 Barrett, What I saw at Bull Run, 18. 
* Fry, Battles and Leaders, i, 188. 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 215 
flash of Pendleton's guns replying vigorously. To his 
right the ground became denser and the hidden Con- 
federate line was nearer and nearer as it stretched out 
towards the Manassas road, out of sight beyond the trees. 
It was there that the crisis of the battle was to arise, 
but McDowell could not guess it. Now let us turn to the 
infantry that was to make secure the risky position into 
which Griffin and Ricketts had been sent. 

Willcox had already been ordered to push along the 
Manassas road and then to oblique up the slopes of the 
Henry house plateau to his left. Franklin followed Will- 
cox, and his regiments were pushed up the hill to the 
left at intervals. Behind Griffin and a little to his left, the 
nth New York took cover under the crest ; farther along, 
still under the crest, were other regiments, the 5th and 
nth Massachusetts, the 14th New York, the Marines. 

All this infantry came up rather badly and irregularly ; 
the supports forming from the left slowly towards the 
right ; but the batteries held their own, though with some 
difficulty, for about half an hour. Then, less than two 
hundred yards to the right of the guns, a body of infantry 
appeared which Griffin quickly decided to face and meet 
with canister; but Barry at once declared that it was 
a supporting regiment and must not be fired on. There 
was much confusion all through the battle owing to the 
fact that there were some blue uniforms among the Con- 
federates, while on the Federal side many regiments 



2i6 BULL RUN 

wore gray ; with no wind stirring, the flags were mostly 
undistinguishable. 

As a matter of fact it was Cumming's 33d Virginia that 
had advanced through the scrub and outflanked the 
Federal guns. Their colonel spoke to his men, brought 
them on a few more yards, and then poured in a terrible 
volley. " It seemed as though every man and horse of 
that battery just laid right down and died right off. . . . 
The destruction of the battery was so complete that the 
marines and zouaves seemed to be struck with such 
astonishment, such consternation, that they could not do 
anything." 1 What they did do, we shall see presently ; 
but first it will be better to turn to the other sections of 
McDowell's Hne. 

On the left Tyler, with Keyes' brigade, diverging 
steadily from Sherman and bearing towards Stone 
Bridge, came to the little height on which stood Van 
Pelt's house, six hundred yards from the stream and just 
north of the Warrenton road. This had been Evans' 
original position and it was still held by some small Con- 
federate detachments that promptly opened fire. Keyes, 
with no guns to help him, made headway very slowly ; 
but he succeeded in pushing his infantry up to the Van 
Pelt house. There, however, it at once came under fire 
of the Confederate guns farther back towards the Lewis 
house. Keyes thereupon obliqued rapidly to the left and 
1 Rep. Cond. War, ii, 216; Averell's evidence. 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 217 
got his troops under the wooded bank of Bull Run. 
Along- this he now cautiously pushed his way towards 
Stone Bridge.^ 

Sherman bore away somewhat to the right, coming 
down the declivity from the Carter house to Young's 
Branch at the apex of the Henry house plateau. He 
formed the 13th New York in column by divisions, and 
behind it deployed his three other regiments in line. In 
this formation, apparently, he held on until he crossed 
Young's Branch and rose the hill, inclining still farther 
to the right and so reaching the Warrenton turnpike at 
its descent from the plateau westwards. Sherman says, 
and this seems to fix his position : " At the point where 
this road crossed the ridge to our left front, the ground 
was swept by a most severe fire of artillery, rifles, and 
musketry. ..." 2 Sherman did not attempt, therefore, 
to maintain contact with Keyes, or even to gain the 
plateau at the apex where the Warrenton turnpike 
crossed it, but bore over towards McDowell and ad- 
vanced from his shelter by once more inclining to the 
right in the direction of the Henry house, reaching the 
plateau well to the left of Ricketts' battery. 

The situation may be described in a general way as 
follows : From where Sherman had brought his brigade 

^ There is a humorous contemporary account of this skirmish called 
Wooden Nutmegs, by " Frinkle Fry." 
2 O. R. Ser. i, vol. n, 369. 



2i8 BULL RUN 

on the Warrenton turnpike to a point on the Manassas 
road seven hundred yards south of the crossroads, the 
whole attacking line of McDowell was concentrated 
within less than three quarters of a mile, with Griffin's 
and Ricketts' batteries thrown forward towards its centre, 
and the Rhode Island battery and Arnold's, — ordered 
up from Sudley Spring, — in support behind Young's 
Branch. Burnside's brigade was out of action ; Howard's 
was now coming up from the rear. Of Porter's, most re- 
mained on the north side of Young's Branch, the rest 
went forward to Sherman's right. Willcox and Franklin 
were farther to the right. The whole of this force was 
facing almost east. Beyond Sherman's left there was a 
gap a mile wide. For Keyes, as we have seen, was shel- 
tering under the bank of Bull Run, while Schenck was 
still on the other side of Stone Bridge. The adjustment 
was bad and the reverse of what McDowell had contem- 
plated. 

It is difficult, really impossible, to give a co-ordinated 
and chronological account of McDowell's efforts to gain 
possession of the Henry house plateau. Clearly the first 
real attack was the throwing forward of Griffin's and 
Ricketts' batteries. For the rest it will be clearest, per- 
haps, neglecting for a while Keyes and Schenck at Stone 
Bridge, to follow the movement point by point from Sher- 
man towards the right. 

Sherman's attack consisted in a sending-up of his 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 219 
regiments one at a time beyond the crest on to the plat- 
eau. The direction of this attack was from between the 
Robinson and Henry houses to about the centre or right 
of Jackson. Of Sherman's four strong regiments some 
did better than others, but none was firm enough to 
stand long against the musketry and grape that Jackson 
and the batteries to his right dealt out to them. One 
after the other was beaten and came back in disorder. 
After all four had been punished, and this consumed 
some time, Sherman succeeded in forming the remnants 
into a brigade line under shelter of the crest. But by this 
time the battle was nearly over, and there was no of- 
fensive vigor left in the troops. ^ 

McDowell, on leaving the Henry house, appears to 
have been near Porter's brigade for a while, and was not 
far behind Sherman when that general advanced to the 
attack. Soon after this, and just before Griffin and 
Ricketts were disabled, he moved across to the Manassas 
road to supervise operations towards the right. He had 
already pushed forward in that direction the 14th and 

' Sherman's attack was made on an order from McDowell delivered by 
Major Wadsworth, of his staff. What the terms of the order were is not 
known. The 13th New York was the first regiment sent up. Then followed 
the 2d Wisconsin, which succeeded in advancing some distance. It was 
driven back, re-formed, and driven back again, in much confusion, height- 
ened by the fact that Sherman's other regiments fired into it, taking it for 
Confederate because of its gray uniform. The New York 79th, and then 
the New York 69th, were in turn sent in to continue this piecemeal 
attack. 



220 BULL RUN 

27th New York and the battalion of marines, all from 
Porter's brigade. The ist Michigan was also reaching 
the scene now from Sudley Spring, with Arnold's bat- 
tery, which was left near the Dogan house and thence 
fired over the hollow towards Jackson's left and centre.^ 
It was while McDowell was just below the plateau be- 
hind the guns that the fatal charge of the 33d Virginia 
took place. The batteries, as we have seen, were put out 
of action at a single volley. And now the struggle at 
this point was to resolve itself into who should obtain 
possession of the disabled guns. General Heintzelman 
was on the spot and began a series of efforts to regain 
control of the guns. First he got the zouaves over the 
crest where the Virginians faced them at comparatively 
short range, perhaps two hundred yards. The red- 
trowsered New York firemen advanced twenty yards 
and fired, as did their opponents, " and both parties 
broke and ran." 2 

At the first fire they broke, and the greater portion fled to the rear, 
keeping up a desultory firing over the heads of their comrades in front. 
At the same moment they were charged by a company of Secession 
cavalry on their rear. ... I then led up the Minnesota regiment 

^ The position taken up by Arnold is difficult to fix. He says that he was 
ordered up to the support of Ricketts and that he took position eight hun- 
dred yards from the enemy. Accepting his estimate of the distance, — for 
an artillery officer should be a good witness on such a point, — this 
suggests that from the Dogan house he was firing across at the space be- 
tween Jackson's left and Ricketts' and Griffin's guns. O. R. Ser. I, vol. ll, 
416. 

^ Rep. Cond, War. 11, 30; Heintzelman's evidence. 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 221 

which was also repulsed, but retired in tolerably good order. . . . Next 
was led forward the ist Michigan which was also repulsed and retired 
in considerable confusion. ^ 

Then the 14th New York was brought up. 

Soon after the firing commenced the regiment broke and ran — says 
Heintzelman. — The want of discipline in these regiments was so great 
that the most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards 
to the rear and continue to fire — fortunately for the braver ones very 
high in the air — compelling those in front to retreat. During this 
time Ricketts' battery had been taken and retaken three times by us, 
but was finally lost.^ 

As Heintzelman, Hke Sherman, used up his regiments 
one by one in his unavaiHng effort to recover the guns 
and to press on against the Confederate left, many of 
the men as they disbanded passed into the woods on the 
right along the Manassas road, where some of the troops, 
notably the ist Michigan, rallied and did well; a con- 
siderable but confused struggle took place at that point 
which can be best related later from the Confederate side. 

A great many of our regiments, — says an eyewitness, — turned right 
off the field as they delivered their fire, turning even as they delivered 
their volleys. They did not go off in any system at all, but went right 
off as a crowd would walking the street. . . .^ 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 403. 

2 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 403. Many claims are put forward in contem- 
porary accounts that this or that regiment captured or re-captured the 
guns. They were certainly put out of action by the 33d Virginia, and 
after that were several times in the temporary possession of advancing 
Federals or advancing Confederates. They remained, however, where 
they had been unlimbered until the close of the action when, of course, 
they were in Confederate hands. 

3 Rep. Cond. War. 11, 170; Griffin's evidence. 



222 BULL RUN 

And in general they moved to the woods about the Ma- 
nassas road and beyond it. 

In the valley below, McDowell, Barry, and other offi- 
cers struggled hard to rally the men, seized flags and 
bore them forward, and with little result.^ Farther up the 
slope and to the right men were edging away from Jack- 
son's front to the woods lying between the Henry house 
and the Chinn hill. 

Franklin, meanwhile, with the 5th and nth Massa- 
chusetts, a little to the left and nearer Sherman, was 
doing his best to drive these regiments up to the enemy. 
On several occasions he got them over the crest to de- 
liver their fire, but they would not remain to protect or 
to drag away Ricketts' guns.^ Their officers could do 
little with them.3 

For two hours, more or less, this struggle continued. 
There was no wind, it was intensely hot, and the sul- 
phurous smoke hung heavy on the ground. The ex- 
haustion of the Northern troops was extreme. Thirsty, 
weary, and discouraged men were moving to the rear in 
increasing numbers. The turn of the tide had come, and 
the Confederates were now about to assume the offen- 
sive. While reinforcements were coming up on their 

^ Rep. Cond. War, ii, 147; Barry's evidence. 

2 Rep. Cond. War, 11, 34; Franklin's evidence. 

* The regimental histories contain accounts that may, after careful com- 
parison with the official reports, especially Franklin's, be dismissed as 
purely fantastic. 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 223 
extreme left, Jackson's infantry advanced towards the 
Henry house "in large force with heavy and well-aimed 
volleys." 1 The Massachusetts regiments melted rapidly 
away. For a while the ist Minnesota stood its ground; 
"friends and foes were for a time confounded" ; 2 and 
then presently it followed the general movement back- 
wards. 

Through a great stream of stragglers setting back 
from the battlefield towards Sudley Spring, panting from 
their forced marching, Howard's troops were just ar- 
riving. Instead of being used, as they should have been, 
to cover the retreat of what was clearly a defeated army, 
they were sent straight up the contested hill where the 
disabled Federal guns fatally drew every effort ; Mc- 
Dowell went up with them.^ It would appear that How- 
ard did a little better than most of the brigade com- 
manders. He succeeded in deploying two lines, the 4th 
Maine and 2d Vermont in the first, the 3d and 5th Maine 
in the second. 

On rising the hill Howard met Lieutenant Kirby, 
"with his face covered with blood, on a horse that had 

^ Franklin's report, O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 406. 

"^ O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 406. 

' Fry, Battles and Leaders, i, 190. Bicknell (Hist, of the ^th Maine, 58) 
gives the following account of Howard's march: "Unaccustomed to such 
severe marches, suffering intensely from thirst and heat, pressed on at as 
rapid a rate as possible, our thinning ranks began to show the effects of 
overexertion. Men seemed to fall in squads by the roadside, some sun- 
struck, some bleeding at nose, mouth, ears." 



224 BULL RUN 

been shot through the nose." ^ He was the only officer 
not killed or disabled of Ricketts' battery, and was bring- 
ing off a caisson, all that was saved. The troops ad- 
vanced into the fire zone, to find the Confederate in- 
fantry facing them within two hundred yards of the 
crest. Howard claims that his men stood their ground 
while they fired twenty to thirty rounds. He quickly 
brought up the second line to strengthen the first. But 
with no artillery, no supports, a victorious enemy to face, 
and McDowell's army streaming away on all sides, it is 
not surprising that before many minutes had passed his 
brigade also broke up and joined the procession of 
fugitives. And at that moment the Federal right was 
already turned by the advance of two fresh Confederate 
brigades, Kirby Smith's and Early's. 

Napoleon once remarked to Chaptal : " After fighting 
for six hours a soldier will seize on any pretext to quit, if 
it can be done honorably ; and the appearance of a re- 
serve is almost always a sufficient reason." 

SOUTH 

On the Confederate side we have to trace the phases 
of a defensive action for the space of about two hours, 
during which reinforcements were marching, to play an 
important part when at last the moment came for taking 
the offensive. 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 418. 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 225 
On the morning of the 21st, Stuart was stationed, with 
his three hundred sabres, between the Lewis house and 
Manassas ; and it does not appear that he received any 
orders changing his position. Stuart, however, moved up 
to the Lewis house, possibly at the sound of the cannon 
of the first engagement, and there Johnston met him 
after he had left Beauregard in charge on the Henry 
house hill. Apparently Johnston first thought that he 
could take advantage of McDowell's overextension 
by attempting to counterattack him through Ball's 
Ford, coming out on the Warrenton turnpike midway 
between Centreville and Stone Bridge. But the pressure 
on the Henry house plateau was too great to allow of 
any counterstroke for the moment. Presently Johnston 
turned Stuart westward to cover the Confederate left, 
whence Jackson had already called for his assistance. On 
his way Stuart fell in with Beckham's battery of John- 
ston's corps, and kept it with him during his further 
movements. He reached the end of Jackson's line close 
to the Manassas road just as the nth New York had 
exchanged volleys with the 33d Virginia, and he charged 
it in its retreat. A confused struggle ensued of which 
both sides claimed to have had the best. Stuart with- 
drew, however, and moved away farther still to the left. 
Jackson's brigade, stiffened by Pendleton's strong bat- 
tery and resolutely commanded, was standing the Fed- 
eral shock wel.1. The perfectly timed advance of the 33d 



226 BULL RUN 

Virginia, which put the Federal batteries out of action, re- 
lieved the pressure immensely. Now that the guns were 
silenced it was possible for Jackson to attempt the occa- 
sional advance of his infantry for a counterstroke, a 
manoeuvre he appears to have several times indulged 
in.i But beyond Jackson the situation was more difficult. 

To the left, as the Federals extended away from 
Griffin's guns towards their right, the few weak units 
that Bee at first ranged in line were hard put to it to 
withstand the pressure of Heintzelman. Bee and Bartow 
did their best to keep their men up to the work, and both 
paid for it with their lives. The 4th Alabama melted 
entirely away. The Georgians and Mississippians were 
not much better off. The i8th Virginia was moved 
around from the right, and only just succeeded in closing 
up the gaps. Had the Federals been able to deploy a 
whole brigade in line, instead of sending a succession 
of regiments to the attack, or had they moved directly 
along the Manassas road, they must have overlapped 
and swept away the Confederate left. 

On the right, Radford's cavalry, the 30th Virginia, 
was early up in support, and Beauregard placed it in 
reserve of his right, notwithstanding Jackson's demand 
that it should be sent to him. But the 2d and 8th South 
Carolina, of Bonham's brigade, with Kemper's two guns, 
arriving at about 3.30 P.M., were thrown in at the critical 

* This is a doubtful statement, but probabilities point that way. 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 227 
point on the left and helped to continue the struggle. 
They soon found themselves engaged with a part of the 
New York zouaves that had rallied. 

At the ravine Beauregard was in the thick of the fight, 
and had a horse killed under him. Yet the pressure here 
was on the whole far less severe. Alburtis' battery, with 
Walton's five guns and Heaton's section, made up astrong 
line of artillery on this wing ; these pieces played mostly 
on Sherman's advance and swept the northern end of 
the plateau. Cocke's brigade was gradually sent in by 
Johnston, as we have seen. The i8th Virginia, which 
had been stationed in front of Ball's Ford, was with- 
drawn across the run at two o'clock, and about half 
an hour later was sent across to the left to help resist 
Heintzelman's attack ; it reached there just in time to 
throw back the advance of the 14th New York. The 
28th followed the iSth, arriving too late to take any very 
active part in the engagement. 

As the battle progressed the pressure had become 
more marked on the Confederate left, less marked on 
the Confederate right. For east of Sherman the gap in 
the Federal line remained unfilled, and at Stone Bridge, 
Tyler, with Keyes' brigade, still hugged the bank of 
Bull Run, and Schenck remained a fixture beyond the 
bridge, while the guns from the Lewis house hill easily 
checked the Federals farther south. The general effect of 
this distribution of pressure was that the Confederate 



228 BULL RUN 

line tended to slue around until it faced almost due 
west. 

From the Lewis house, Johnston could see in the 
direction of Manassas clouds of dust that indicated the 
advance of his reinforcements, of which Kirby Smith's 
and Early's brigades were to arrive in time to play a 
part in the battle. There was a momentary alarm on a 
false report — and false reports were continuous — that 
the approaching troops belonged to the enemy ; ^ but 
this presently proved untrue, and Johnston, who realized 
how bad the situation was on his left, now rode across 
from the Lewis house to take his position behind the 
threatened point and to dispose the reinforcements to 
best advantage. It was time they arrived. General Bee 
had been killed early, and after him Colonel Bartow, 
Colonel Thomas, and Colonel Jones. The thinnest of 
lines remained, while the woods were full of Federal 
troops and an ever-increasing current of stragglers, just 
as with the Federals, was flowing away to the rear. 

But the Federal line was spent and could not be rein- 
forced with fresh troops, while Kirby Smith was just 

1 At 1. 1 5 P.M. Alexander sent the following alarming message to head- 
quarters from his observation post near the Junction: "Large reinforce- 
ments are pushing towards the enemy crossing Bull Run far above Stone 
Bridge. The column of dust . . . is going straight towards Manassas Junc- 
tion. . . . Another column is visible in the far distance near Paris." Alex- 
ander, Military Memoirs, 41. He might almost have added that he could 
see General Patterson riding at the head of the column! As a matter of 
fact it was Johnston's baggage train arriving from the Shenandoah. 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 229 
reaching the scene. His brigade had been detrained as 
rapidly as possible at Manassas Junction between twelve 
and one o'clock, and had then pushed along the Sudley 
Spring road. It reached the scene of action about half- 
past three, and Johnston personally directed its deploy- 
ment to the left of the road and ordered Kirby Smith to 
advance towards Chinn's hill. 

It is difficult to state what Federal troops were in 
position on McDowell's extreme right at this moment. 
Fractions of the regiments of Franklin, Willcox, and 
Porter, which Heintzelman had unsuccessfully sent up 
against the Confederate left, had been rallied below the 
crest and formed into a line extending farther westwards. 
There was a Federal line facing Kirby Smith as he de- 
ployed, but it offered little resistance, though the first 
shots fired resulted in his being severely wounded and 
handing over the command to Colonel Elzey. That offi- 
cer continued to advance steadily through the woods 
on the left of the road pushing back such bodies of Fed- 
erals as appeared in his front. 

Meanwhile Early had come up, first to the Lewis 
house, then along the rear of the fighting line, picking 
up the 19th Virginia of Cocke's brigade, and moving 
towards the Manassas road. Johnston directed him to 
cross that road behind Kirby Smith and to deploy farther 
to the left in the pastures of the Chinn farm. Eariy soon 
established contact with Elzey's advance, while beyond 



230 BULL RUN 

him he found Stuart and Beckham. As Elzey and then 
Early came into action, Stuart shifted farther along until 
he found a good position for Beckham's battery, and 
opened fire in reverse on McDowell's right. 

It was just previously^ to this that Jackson assumed the 
offensive. To his left the Confederate battalions were 
nearly spent. He judged that the crisis of the battle was 
reached and that a strong push might drive either side 
off the field. He ordered the 4th and 27th Virginia to 
charge. With loud yells — Ha ! ha ! ha ! ha ! — the Con- 
federates advanced. Wade Hampton and the 5th Vir- 
ginia on the right moved towards Ricketts' and Griffin's 
guns. Beauregard sent orders for all the troops to come 
forward. And before this movement the Federals at last 
broke up. Howard staved off defeat for a few minutes. 
Sykes' battalion of regulars came bravely and steadily 
up among the broken regiments towards Chinn's hill, 
where the ist Michigan and other troops were still hold- 
ing on under Willcox.^ But nothing now could serve to 
rally the broken army, and all Sykes could do was to 
retard the advance of Elzey and Early, while Stuart and 
Beckham continued to overlap his flank and to force 
him back. 

McDowell and his officers made desperate efforts to 

* Willcox had his horse shot under him; then his arm was wounded, his 
A.D.C., Captain Withington, being killed as he was binding it up. Finally 
he was captured with a small party of the ist Michigan. 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 231 
re-establish their broken line beyond Young's Branch 
between the Dogan house and the Carter house. But 
Pendleton galloped his guns to the northern edge of the 
Henry house plateau whence he opened a brisk fire, and 
the two fresh brigades with Stuart's cavalry kept steadily 
pushing up towards Sudley Spring. The Federals drew 
off a few of their guns ; a few regiments attempted to re- 
form north of Young's Branch, but soon broke ; Sykes, 
however, kept his formation and left the field in good 
order with the support of Arnold's battery, which helped 
to cover the retreat. The defeated troops moved at a walk 
— for there was apparently little or no running — to- 
wards the fords, some for Poplar Ford, others for Sud- 
ley Spring. From these points they made their way 
along the road they had travelled in the morning, or 
across country, circling around to the Warrenton turn- 
pike at points near Centreville. McDowell hurried around 
to Stone Bridge in time to give orders for saving Tyler's 
thirty-pounder.^ Sherman, some minutes later, found the 
Confederate cavalry already near Cub Run bridge and 
had to turn back and make a detour around to the north. 

As soon as Johnston judged that McDowell was 
beaten, he sent orders for Radford with the 30th Vir- 
ginia Cavalry to cross at Ball's Ford and strike the re- 
treating enemy on the Warrenton road near Cub Run. 
Kershaw, with Bonham's two regiments and Kemper's 

* Hains, "The First Gun at Bull Run," Cosmopolitan, August, 191 1. ■ 



232 BULL RUN 

guns, had arrived so late on the Henry house plateau 
as to be very lightly engaged. Still ready for action he 
moved ^ to near the Robinson house, whence, under 
Jackson's orders, Kemper shelled the retreating troops 
towards Stone Bridge, He then resumed the advance, 
with Kershaw's infantry, towards Stone Bridge, found 
the abatis cut through, and continued along the War- 
renton turnpike. He reached the rise above Cub Run 
about half an hour later than Radford, say at about six, 
and there saw immediately before him a stream of Fed- 
erals pouring along the Sudley Spring road and turning 
into the Warrenton turnpike. He promptly shelled them, 
sending the stream of fugitives back north, to find their 
way through the fields and woods around to Centreville. 
There had already been a stampede along the Warren- 
ton turnpike between Stone Bridge and Cub Run bridge. 
The attack of Radford, followed by that of Kershaw, con- 
tinued this stampede along towards Centreville. But 
Radford was weak in numbers and not overbold. Ker- 
shaw was held up by orders from Beauregard first to use 
caution, and later to stop the pursuit.^ This attack, how- 
ever, following Radford's, created a jam on Cub Run 
bridge, which broke down, thus preventing the Federals 

1 " During the action . . . Kershaw received no orders and saw none 
of our generals, but fought it out on his own plan. ..." Charleston 
Mercury, July 29. 

"^ First order carried by Alexander, "to advance very carefully and not 
to attack "; second order by Ferguson. Alexander, Military Memoirs, 45. 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 233 

from drawing off the guns that had reached this point. 
The unfortunate thirty-pounder stuck in the ford. 

THE FEDERALS AT STONE BRIDGE 

We have neglected, so far, to follow out the not very 
important movements of Keyes and of Schenck imme- 
diately preceding the break-up of McDowell's army. 

At Stone Bridge, Captain Alexander, of McDowell's 
staff, succeeded in clearing a way through the abatis 
at about the moment when, over a mile to the west, 
Howard was nearing the scene of action. Tyler was on 
the west bank near the bridge; just south of him was 
Keyes skirmishing with the enemy; and to the east, 
across Bull Run, Schenck still lay. At this moment the 
prospect was none too reassuring. Keyes' position was 
false and dangerous, and the farther he advanced the 
more he widened the gap between Sherman and him- 
self. However urgent it might be to establish a connec- 
tion with McDowell along the Warrenton turnpike, it 
looked a risky step to order Schenck across for that 
purpose. And so Tyler, instead of acting as a connect- 
ing link and instead of creating a useful diversion, sim- 
ply remained inactive and awaited developments. He 
did not have to wait long. 

Already Tyler could see to the west of him streams 
of disbanded men crossing Young's Branch and going 
back up the slopes to the north. Some of these, though 



234 BULL RUN 

probably a small proportion only, worked their way 
around to the Warrenton turnpike so as to cross Bull 
Run at Stone Bridge. Presently their numbers began to 
increase rapidly, and it became clear that McDowell was 
in full retreat. Tyler now ordered Keyes back to the 
bridge, crossing himself to look after Schenck. 

Apparently it never occurred to Tyler or to his sub- 
ordinates that, with the main part of the defeated army 
retreating by the fords above Stone Bridge, it was their 
business to attempt to hold that point so as to protect the 
retreat and form a screen behind which the disbanded 
troops might reach Centreville. As it was, Schenck ap- 
parently ordered his brigade back to Centreville without 
awaiting orders as soon as he perceived the symptoms 
of retreat, and Tyler ordered back such guns as he hap- 
pened to see. But before the retirement could be effected, 
the Confederates were on them. 

Jackson had promptly ordered Kemper's battery to 
the apex of the Henry house hill, whence he opened fire 
along the turnpike eastward. Other guns joined in from 
near the Lewis house, including Walker's rifled pieces 
of Holmes' brigade which had just come up. Radford's 
cavalry, moving with great rapidity, soon struck Schenck 
in flank near Cub Run bridge. Although Schenck, de- 
ploying two companies of the 2d Ohio, for the moment 
held Radford back, yet he did not retain the position, 
but, unmindful of the troops in his rear, continued 



THE FIGHT AT THE HENRY HOUSE 235 

the retreat, which rapidly became disordered, to Cen- 
treville. 

Radford's attack, together with the searching of the 
turnpike by the Confederate shells, resulted in a stam- 
pede. In this were involved Schenck's brigade, Keyes' 
brigade, a number of fugitives from Sherman, and other 
troops that had crossed Bull Run close to Stone Bridge 
or that had moved very fast around from Sudley Spring, 
and, together with these, troops, civilians, sight-seers, 
transport wagons, politicians, and journalists. The panic 
spurred them the whole four miles from Stone Bridge to 
Centreville, notwithstanding the utmost efforts made by 
a few brave men to stop the rout, among whom must 
be specially mentioned Captain Alexander, Colonel 
Speidel, and the Hon. Elihu Washburne.^ 

This rout of a fraction of McDowell's forces along 
the road from Stone Bridge to Centreville was far less 
excusable than the breaking-up of Heintzelman's and 
Porter's troops. The latter had accomplished a very hard 
day's work and had for some time faced a hot fire, while 
the losses and labors of Schenck and Keyes had been 
comparatively light. The stampede brought out, inevi- 
tably, the worst side of human nature. The newspapers, 
so indulgent for the logrolling, moral cowardice and 
ineptitude of politicians, were severe enough on the 

* Of Illinois, afterwards Minister to France. New York World, July the 
23d. 



236 BULL RUN 

demoralized mob of exhausted, undisciplined men, who 
were after all merely seeking safety by the only obvious 
method they knew. "All sense of manhood," said the 
New York Tribune, " seemed to be forgotten . . . the 
sentiment of shame had gone. . . . All was lost to the 
American army even its honor." ^ Leaving rhetoric and 
coming to fact, it does not appear that the rout was 
marked by much loss of life, but the jam at the bridge 
at Cub Run prevented the escape of the Rhode Island 
guns, together with those of Arnold and Carlisle.^ 

1 July the 26th. 

^ The number of guns lost at this point is variously stated and impossi- 
ble to fix. Probably four of Carlisle's, the thirty-pounder Parrott, five of 
the Rhode Island battery and four of Arnold's were in the number. It is 
possible, though unlikely, that one or two of Griffin's and Ricketts' guns 
were got back as far as this, and the same remark applies to the howitzers 
of the 71st New York. The loss at this point may fairly be put down at 
fourteen guns, and possibly one or two more. 



AT CENTREVILLE, AND BACK TO WASHINGTON 

NORTH 

We left Davies and Richardson keeping up a mild can- 
nonade from the height near Blackburn's Ford, with 
Blenker behind them, snugly ensconced in Centreville. 
At about half-past ten or eleven, under the direction of 
Lieutenant Prime, of the Engineers, acting under in- 
structions from McDowell, intrenchments and abatis were 
begun, and the Confederates, as we have seen, concluded 
from this that no offensive was to be looked for at this 
point. 

Until four o'clock nothing of moment occurred. Then 
came a Confederate movement in the hollow on Davies' 
front, which was greeted with a prolonged fire of artil- 
lery from Hunt's and Edwards' guns under which the 
enemy retired without effecting anything ; Davies suffer- 
ing no losses. It was at about the same time that the first 
information was reaching General Miles at Centreville 
that things were not progressing as they should beyond 
Stone Bridge. 

It is not possible to identify which was the first mes- 
sage Miles received. But the written documents that have 
been preserved, telling part of the story, are perhaps 



238 BULL RUN 

worth setting out. They may tentatively be fixed as 
having been sent from a Httle before 4 P.M. until 5.45. 
Here, then, is a telegraphic dispatch of Miles to Wash- 
ington sent oflE from Centreville, on receiving a note from 
McDowell's chief of staff, sent from the field : — 

Colonel Townsend: — 

Captain Fry writes to me to say — Telegraph to Washington: — 
Send on immediately all the troops that can be spared. — Colonel Hunter 
has just arrived badly wounded. 

D. S. Miles, Colonel.^ 

Immediately afterwards followed another dispatch : — 

Centreville, July 21 — 4 p.m. 
Adjutant-General Thomas: — 

General McDowell wishes all the troops that can be sent to come 
here without delay. He has ordered the reserve now here under Colo- 
nel Miles to advance to the bridge over Bull Run, on the Warrenton 
road, having driven the enemy before him. Colonel Miles is now 
about three or four miles from here directing the operations near 
Blackburn's Ford, and in his absence I communicate. 

G. H. Mendell. . . . 

McDowell's order was, in fact, that one of Miles' 
brigades should be moved to the junction of the War- 
renton and Sudley Spring roads, just beyond the Cub 
Run bridge, to protect the retreat by covering that point ; ^ 
this order was entirely reasonable, but could not have 
been executed even had Miles made the attempt owing 
to the stream of fugitives that already blocked the turn- 

* O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 747. According to Barnard, Fry's note to Miles was 
written on his own responsibility. 

2 McDowell's report, O. R. Ser. i, vol. ll, 321. 



CENTREVILLE, BACK TO WASHINGTON 239 
pike and made any advance in the opposite direction 
impossible. Miles did issue an order, which was de- 
livered by Lieutenant Prime, for Blenker's brigade to 
move to Stone Bridge ; but Blenker did not get more than 
half a mile west of Centreville.* 

McDowell left the field about 4.40 P.M., and reached 
Centreville an hour later. We find him at 5.45 p.m., tele- 
graphing as follows to Colonel Townsend at Washing- 
ton : — 

Centreville, July 21, 1861 — 5.45 p.m. 

We passed Bull Run. Engaged the enemy, who, it seems, had just 
been reinforced by General Johnston. We drove them for several 
hours, and finally routed them. They rallied and repulsed us, but only 
to give us again the victory, which seemed complete. But our men, 
exhausted with fatigue and thirst and confused by firing into each 
other, were attacked by the enemy's reserves, and driven from the po- 
sition which we had gained, overlooking Manassas. After this the men 
could not be rallied, but slowly left the field. In the meantime the 
enemy outflanked Richardson at Blackburn's Ford, and we have now 
to hold Centreville till our men can get behind it. Miles' division is 
holding the town. It is reported Colonel Cameron is killed, Hunter and 
Heintzelman wounded, neither dangerously. ^ 

Miles, meanwhile, had after a fashion been attempting 
to carry out orders. He had brought Blenker's brigade 
from the east to the west of Centreville, where it deployed 
across the Warrenton turnpike. He then galloped to the 
brigades at the south end of the ridge. Without reflection 
as to any offensive movement the Confederates might 

1 Prime's report, O. R. Ser. I, vol. ii, 335. 

2 O. R. Ser. i, vol. li, 316. 



240 BULL RUN 

attempt from Blackburn's or Mitchell's Ford, he ordered 
Richardson and Davies to march in to Centreville at 
once, thus leaving the enemy an opportunity of striking 
at the army's line of retreat. Galloping here and there, 
confused and irregular in his instructions, he soon came 
into open conflict with his subordinates. The fact was 
that Miles was drunk. Richardson's account of the inci- 
dent runs as follows : — 

I , , . found this regiment [3d Michigan] deployed in line of battle 
and in another position. I inquired of Colonel Stevens the reason 
of their position being altered. He told me that Colonel Miles had 
directed this movement. I asked him why. Colonel Stevens replied — 
" I do not know, but we have no confidence in Colonel Miles." — I in- 
quired the reason, and Colonel Stevens replied, — "Because Colonel 
Miles is drunk." — That closed the conversation. . . . I then reported 
to Captain Alexander . . . that I could not carry out General Mc- 
Dowell's orders as long as I was interfered with by a drunken man.^ 

McDowell had now reached Centreville, as we have 
seen, and was much alarmed to find that Miles had 
withdrawn the two brigades from the fords. He rode 
up to Richardson and exclaimed: "Great God, Colonel 
Richardson, why did n't you hold on to the position at 
Blackburn's Ford?'" 

McDowell worked desperately to rally the troops. At 
first he appears to have hoped that he might establish 
the army at Centreville. But Tyler had done nothing to 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 376. His evidence before the Congressional Com- 
mittee is even more specific, and was supported by that of other officers. 
^ Rep. Cond. War, 11, 26; Richardson's evidence. 



CENTREVILLE, BACK TO WASHINGTON 241 
cover the Warrenton turnpike; panic prevailed from 
Stone Bridge to Centreville, and even beyond ; and it was 
clear that the most that could be hoped for was to pro- 
tect some part of the army during its retreat. Miles was 
relieved from command ; McDowell assumed direct con- 
trol of the brigades at Centreville, and personally placed 
Richardson's in position across the ridge south of the vil- 
lage to meet any possible advance of the Confederates. ^ 

By half-past seven the stream of fugitives had passed 
through Centreville, where Blenker, Richardson, and 
Davies, together with three regiments that had come up 
from Runyon,2 stood awaiting an attack. 

There was now no alternative for McDowell : he could 
only order a retreat back to Washington. His own re- 
port states : — 

The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of 
food for the men who had generally abandoned or thrown away all 
that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and 
consequent demoralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who 
were near enough to be consulted, division and brigade commanders 
and staff, to admit of no alternative but to fall back. 

He left for Fairfax Court House in the course of the even- 
ing, and from there wrote to Townsend the two following 
dispatches : — 

1 Richardson, on a narrow front, formed a double line, placing regi- 
ments ployed in column of divisions closed in mass, in the intervals of the 
deployed regiments of the first line. 

2 1st and 2d New Jersey, that had passed through Vienna, and the de 
Kalb regiment. 



242 BULL RUN 

Fairfax Court House, July 21, 1861. 
The men having thrown away their haversacks in the battle and 
left them behind, they are without food; have eaten nothing since 
breakfast. We are without artillery ammunition. The larger part of 
the men are a confused mob, entirely demoralized. It was the opinion 
of all the commanders that no stand could be made this side of 
the Potomac. We will, however, make the attempt at Fairfax Court 
House. From a prisoner we learn that 20,000 from Johnston joined 
last night, and they march on us to-night. 

Irvin McDowell. 

A few hours later he wrote : — 

Many of the volunteers did not wait for authority to proceed to 
the Potomac, but left on their own decision. They are now pouring 
through this place in a state of utter disorganization. They could not 
be prepared for action by to-morrow morning even were they willing. 
I learn from prisoners that we are to be pressed here to-night and 
to-morrow morning, as the enemy's force is very large and they are 
elated. I think we heard cannon on our rear guard. I think now, as 
all of my commanders thought at Centreville, there is no alternative 
but to fall back to the Potomac, and I shall proceed to do so with as 
much regularity as possible. 

Irvin McDowell.^ 

The retirement was, in fact, continuous from the Henry 
house plateau back to the Potomac, and no efforts of 
any general could have stayed it. Richardson's brigade, 
bringing up the rear, left Centreville at 2.30 in the morn- 
ing of the 22d, and that night all of the Federal troops 
were back in the positions from which they had started 
on the 1 6th. 

Before dealing with the army's losses and attempting 

» O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 316. 



CENTREVILLE, BACK TO WASHINGTON 243 
a critique of its operations, we must return to the Con- 
federate side and trace the movements of the victorious 
army, and especially of its right wing which we have 
lost sight of since the morning. 

SOUTH 

Let us turn to the right wing and see what happened 
to Ewell's, Longstreet's, Bonham's, and Jones' brigades, 
while the battle on the Henry house plateau was raging. 

Twice in the course of the morning had Ewell taken 
his brigade over Bull Run at Union Mills Ford, each time 
to be recalled. On his second return, as previously stated, 
he was ordered to the support of the left. 

There appears to have been considerable delay about 

the delivery of this order, and for the rest it is as well to 

give Ewell's own account : — 

I deem it proper to state that the courier said he had been accompa- 
nied by an aide-de-camp whose horse had given out before reaching me. 
I countermarched and marched at once to headquarters in the field, 
remained in reserve at that point until ordered back to Union Mills, 
which I reached after a long and fatiguing march that same night. ^ 

This statement is a little difficult to interpret, but it 
would seem that by " headquarters in the field " Ewell 
meant Johnston's actual position during most of the 
afternoon, near the Lewis house. Ewell reached that 
point between 5 and 6 P.M., after Holmes' brigade; he 
was ordered back to Union Mills Ford, nearly at once, 

1 O. R. Ser. I, vol. II, 537- 



244 BULL RUN 

on a false report of a Federal counterstroke at Black- 
burn's Ford, having played no part in the operations. 

We left Bonham's brigade at Mitchell's Ford, just as 
Kemper's battery and two regiments of infantry were 
being detached from it towards the left under Kershaw. 
From that moment till nearly five o'clock in the after- 
noon Bonham remained under cover within his lines 
at Mitchell's Ford where Richardson's guns kept him 
under an intermittent but harmless fire. Farther down- 
stream Longstreet crossed and recrossed Blackburn's 
Ford four times in the course of the day, as conflicting 
instructions reached him. He received orders from John- 
ston about five, as did Bonham, to advance on Centreville 
and intercept the retreating Federals. 

From about three o'clock of the afternoon Johnston 
had last assumed the functions of general-in-chief. From 
that moment he in fact directed the Confederate army, 
although its deficient organization largely neutralized 
his action. We have seen his move to the left wing 
and his disposition of Kirby Smith and Early on that 
wing as they arrived just in time to play an effective 
part. As soon as Johnston was assured of victory he ap- 
pears to have returned to the Lewis house, directing 
Radford to move over Ball's Ford towards the Warren- 
ton turnpike and sending orders to Bonham and Long- 
street to strike at Centreville. 

This last order was feebly executed ; Bonham in par- 



CENTREVILLE, BACK TO WASHINGTON 245 
ticular showing extreme timidity. Advancing at the very 
instant when Miles' ill-judged retirement gave the Con- 
federates a splendid opportunity of seizing the ridge 
and pressing right in on Centreville, Bonham, and in 
less degree Longstreet, felt their way so slowly that Mc- 
Dowell had time to rectify Miles' mistake and to deploy 
Richardson across the ridge while the Confederates were 
still a mile or more from the village. Bonham was to 
the left, Longstreet to the right ; it was now past seven ; 
their artillery was just in position ; they were within 
cannon shot of Centreville, and about to launch their 
attack. In plain sight, along the turnpike, the routed 
troops were still pouring. But at this juncture Bonham's 
courage oozed out, and, unfortunately for the Confeder- 
ates, he was the senior officer. 

As the guns were about to open, — says Longstreet, — there came a 
message that the enemy instead of being in a precipitate retreat was 
marching around to attack the Confederate right. With this report 
came orders, or reports of orders, for the brigades to return to their 
positions behind the Run. I denounced the report as absurd, claimed 
to know a retreat such as was before me, and ordered that the batteries 
open fire, when Major Whiting, of General Johnston's staff, rising in 
his stirrups, said : 

— "in the name of General Johnston I order that the batteries 
shall not open." — 

I inquired, — "Did General Johnston send you to communicate 
that order?" — 
, Whiting replied, — " No; but I take the responsibility to give it.—" 

I claimed the privilege of responsibility under the circumstances, 
and when in the act of renewing the order to fire, General Bonham 



246 BULL RUN 

rode to my side and asked that the batteries should not open. As the 
ranking officer present this settled the question."- 

Even if we discount Longstreet's statement, it is evi- 
dent that the Confederates had a wonderful opportunity 
to strike the retreating army a heavy flank blow at Cen- 
treville. But just as Miles had blundered in withdraw- 
ing Richardson and Davies, so did the Confederates 
blunder in not pushing in vigorously when their oppo- 
nents had presented them with such an opportunity. 
Even so, when Bonham at last was ready to open fire, 
it was probably too late to effect anything, as the bulk 
of the retreating troops had already filed through the 
village. Presently, with darkness coming on, Bonham 
decided he must go back to Bull Run to water his 
troops, and so the Confederates marched down the hill 
again, having accomplished nothing. 

Beyond Longstreet, at McLean's Ford, was the brigade 

of D. R. Jones, whose crossings and recrossings of Bull 

Run we have already followed up to the moment when, 

late in the forenoon, an order was once more sent that 

he should cross Bull Run and advance towards the Cen- 

treville ridge, connecting on his left with Longstreet and 

on his right with Ewell ; this order probably reached 

Jones between twelve and one. 

I recrossed the ford, — says Jones, — my men much fatigued by the 
morning's march, many just convalescing from the measles, and re- 

^ Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 52. See also Johnston's 
Narrative, 53. 



CENTREVILLE, BACK TO WASHINGTON 247 

traced my route to the position I had occupied in the morning, and 
thence endeavored to communicate with General Ewell.^ 

By this time, however, Ewell was toiling westwards to- 
wards Stone Bridge, a fact of which, in the absence of 
a divisional stafi to co-ordinate the movements of these 
brigades, Jones knew nothing. He appears to have spent 
some time attempting to link up on either side ; finally 
he decided to push on by himself. Taking no measures for 
locating the enemy, he came out under the ridge close to 
where Davies' brigade was posted at about four o'clock and 
was received by a galling fire of artillery. His regiments, 
except the 5th North Carolina, were broken, and finding 
no support at hand, he decided to fall back towards Mc- 
Lean's Ford. Jones took no further part in the operations. 

When Bonham and Whiting had overruled Longstreet 
and fallen back from in front of Centreville, they had 
imagined that the mass of men they could see in the dis- 
tance moving along the Warrenton road represented not 
a rout but a strong column advancing — backwards — to 
attack the Confederate centre ; this intelligence they sent 
back to Johnston. Two brigades not yet in action, 
Holmes' and Ewell's, were then just coming to hand at 
the Lewis house, and might well have been employed 
in pressing after the enemy along the Warrenton road, 
together with Kershaw. Johnston, however, accepted 
Bonham' s report at its face value and grossly misjudged 

» O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 538. 



248 BULL RUN 

the situation. He at once ordered Ewell, as we have 
seen, back to Union Mills Ford. Walker's battery of 
Holmes' brigade arrived in time to unlimber and send a 
few shells after the fugitives along the pike ; but the in- 
fantry was held back near Ball's Ford. 

Farther to the left pursuit was not practicable. Stuart, 
with less than three hundred sabres, did all that so small 
a force could accomplish, and kept up the chase to a 
point a mile or two beyond Sudley Spring. 

I followed with the cavalry, — he says, — as rapidly as possible, but 
was so much encumbered with prisoners, whom I sent back as fast as 
possible to the infantry, that my command was soon too much reduced 
to encounter any odds, but I nevertheless followed our success until 
I reached a point twelve miles from Manassas, when, by sending back 
so many detachments with prisoners, I had but a squad left. The rear 
of the enemy was protected by a squadron of cavalry and some artil- 
lery. We cut off a great many squads, many of whom fired on us as we 
approached. ... I have no idea how many prisoners were taken. ^ 

Of the infantry brigades Early's seems to have marched 
farthest in pursuit; at nightfall it bivouacked at a 
point between the Carter house and Sudley Spring. Be- 
hind, at the Henry house plateau, lay the bulk of the 
victorious troops, exhausted, confused, disorganized ; 
many of the regiments had lost all formation. Jackson 
was given general command of all infantry and artillery 
at this point, but did not, in fact could not, make any 
attempt at pursuit. On the Warrenton road there was 
only Radford to press the retreating Federals, Kershaw 
1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. n, 483. 



CENTREVILLE, BACK TO WASHINGTON 249 
having been held back by Beauregard, and when, after 
his first check, he eventually moved towards Centreville 
after sundown, a volley or two from Blenker's troops 
sent him back again. 

Summing up what the Confederates did, then, in the 
way of an immediate counter-attack and pursuit of their 
defeated opponents, it may be said that towards Sudley 
Spring, Stuart and Early did about all that could be 
done ; towards Stone Bridge, the Confederates were too 
far spent and in confusion to accomplish much ; towards 
Centreville, they failed very badly, and that mostly for 
lack of organization and proper staff work. 

Immediate pursuit, however, was not the only question. 
Should the victorious army follow up its success on the 
morrow? That was the anxious problem that the Con- 
federate leaders had to solve on the night of the battle. 

As the last shots were being fired, Jefferson Davis 
reached Manassas Junction, and thence rode to the 
battlefield.! He remained at headquarters until the 
morning of the 23d, but it does not appear that he in- 
terfered in any way with Johnston's decisions. The latter 
says, referring to the clamor of the Southern press against 
him for not following up his success : — 

My failure to capture Washington received strong and general con- 
demnation. Many erroneously attributed it to the President's prohi- 
bition ; but he gave no orders, and expressed neither wish nor opinion 

1 Johnston's statement is specific and entirely credible, as to the battle 
being over when Davis reached the field. Narrative, 54. 



250 BULL RUN 

on the subject that ever came to my knowledge. Considering the rela- 
tive strength of the belligerents on the field the Southern people could 
not reasonably have expected greater results from their victory. , . . 
All the military conditions we knew forbade an attempt on Washing- 
ton. The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than 
that of the United States by defeat. . . . Many [volunteers] in ignor- 
ance of their army obligations left the army. . . . Besides this the 
reasons for the course condemned by the non-combatant military 
critics were : — 

The unfitness of our raw troops for marching or assailing intrench- 
ments. 

The want of the necessary supplies of food and ammunition and 
means of transporting them. Until near the loth of August we never 
had rations for more than two days, and sometimes none; nor half 
enough ammunition for a battle. 

The fortifications upon which skilful engineers . . . had been engaged 
since April, manned by at least fifty thousand Federal troops . . . 

The Potomac, a mile wide, bearing United States vessels-of-war, the 
heavy guns of which commanded the wooden bridges and southern 
shore. ^ 

There is only one possible answer to Johnston's argu- 
ment. It is true that his army lacked numbers, cohesion, 
mobility, organization, food, and ammunition. But his 
opponents, though better off in some respects, were worse 
off in others, while a moral difference had been estab- 
lished between the two armies which to the mind of 
one of the Confederate commanders might be decisively 
increased by a bold offensive — " Give me ten thousand 
fresh troops and I would be in Washington to-morrow," 
Stonewall Jackson is reported to have said on the night 
of the battle. 

^ Johnston, Narrative, 59-61. 



CENTREVILLE, BACK TO WASHINGTON 251 

That Jackson said this, or that there was even a remote 
chance of success for a direct advance on Washington, 
may be doubted. If he did say it, one may surmise that 
he meant ten thousand well-supplied, well-organized, and 
well-commanded troops, which would rob his utterance 
of any immediate significance. Taking the Confederate 
army as it actually was, it could not have accomplished 
the march within twenty-four hours, especially as a heavy 
rainstorm came on that night. Nor had it sufficient 
weight of artillery to force a crossing of the Potomac 
against even a half-hearted resistance. The real question 
is whether an advance through Leesburg and Frederick, 
or, aiming at Patterson, through Harper's Ferry into 
Maryland, might not have succeeded. A move towards 
Baltimore might have led to the abandonment of Wash- 
ington and the placing of the Confederate boundary along 
the Maryland-Pennsylvania line. This is the only case 
that seems arguable ; but even that does not seem strong. 
The verdict must be, without qualification, that Johnston 
was right in his decision, — and that the Confederate 
army was not fit to take up the offensive. 

There was a midnight conference at Beauregard's 
headquarters between the two generals and the President 
of the Confederate States. None would take the responsi- 
bility of an advance on Washington. Presendy a report 
came in. One of Beauregard's staff had reached Centre- 
ville, which was deserted. On this Davis drew up an in- 



252 BULL RUN 

struction ordering a pursuit ; but before he had finished, 
it came out that the officer was a well-known character 
known as "Crazy" Hill. Everything looked too un- 
certain ; everybody was exhausted ; sheets of rain were 
falling ; and Davis reluctantly decided that all had been 
done that could be done.^ 
• ^ Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 352 ; Roman, Beauregard, 114. 



XI 



STATISTICS 



NORTH 



McDowell's official report shows a total of 481 killed, 
loii wounded, and 12 16 missing for the battle of Bull 
Run;i but these figures require some correction and, 



1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, 327. 





Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 






2 


!H 



•0 

^« 
.2 <u 

•a e 
w 




T3 


m 

8 

56 




■0 

a a 
w 


Remarks 


General Staff 


I 

3 
3 


19 

16 
117 


4 
IS 


46 

15 

193 


5 

I 
13 


149 




First Division, General Tyler 

First Brigade, Colonel Keyes . . . 

Second Brigade, General Schenck 
Third Brigade, Colonel Sherman 
Fourth Brigade, Colonel Richard- 


Eighteen others 
slightly wounded- 

Not engaged; 
guarding Black- 




burn's Ford. 


Total, First Division 

Second Division, Colonel Hunter . . 
First Brigade, Colonel Porter . . . 

Second Brigade, Colonel Bum- 


6 

I 
5 


152 
83 
35 


19 
9 
3 


254 
139 
85 


19 
9 
2 


404 

236 

59 

295 

22 
186 

174 


Four surgeons 
missing., ^ 

Five surgeons 




missmg. 


Total, Second Division 

Third Division, Colonel Heintzel- 

man, Division Headquarters. . 

First Brigade, Colonel Franklin. 

Second Brigade, Colonel Willcox 

Third Brigade, Colonel Howard 


6 

3 

I 
2 


118 

68 
70 
48 


12 

I 
13 
II 

7 


224 

183 
161 
108 


II 

4 
6 




Total, Third Division 


6 


186 


32 


452 


10 


382 





254 BULL RUN 

even corrected, cannot be made to tally altogether 
with those of the Confederates. By comparing Mc- 
Dowell's reports with those of his subordinates ^ the 
corrected number would be 491 killed, 1072 wounded. 





Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 






at 




•5 B 
W 





1. 





•a 


Remarks 


Fourth Division, General Runyon 

Fifth Division, Colonel Miles 

First Brigade, Colonel Blenker . 
Second Brigade, Colonel Davies . 


— 


6 


I 


16 

I 


— 


94 

I 


In reserve on the 
Potomac. 


Total, Fifth Division 


— 


6 


I 


17 


— 


95 




Grand Total 


19 


462 


64 


947 


40 


1176 









JAMES A. FRY, 
Assistant Adjutant-General. 

' In Schenck's brigade the losses of the ist and 2d Ohio in killed and 
wounded are apparently omitted, adding 2 killed and 6 wounded to the 
total; while in the 2d New York, a very poor and demoralized regiment, 
the missing should apparently be 141. In Sherman's, 11 reported " killed 
and missing " from the 2d U.S. Artillery, Company E, and i killed from 
Company M, are omitted from the total, and for statistical purposes will be 
averaged as 6 killed, 6 missing (for these two brigades see the official reports 
of Tyler's division). In Porter's brigade, the aggregates in the divisional 
returns give 80 killed, 174 wounded, and 228 missing; which gives 4 less 
killed, 26 more wounded, and 8 less missing; while in Burnside's, the dif- 
ferences are 10 more killed, 35 more wounded, 62 more missing, but with 
no report from the 71st New York. In Franklin's brigade, according to 
Heintzelman's report, the variations are 4 less killed, 7 less wounded, 72 
more missing; in Willcox's, loofficers missing do not figure in McDowell's 
report; in Howard's, i more wounded and 342 more missing have to 
be added. In Miles' division, 2 more missing must be added. The sum 
of these differences would add 10 killed, 61 wounded and 624 missing to 
McDowell's total, without any allowance for missing returns. 



STATISTICS 255 

and 1040 missing, with some returns actually lacking. 
This difference in reality amounts to little. Allowing for 
slight variations and errors, it may be said that some of 
the missing should presumably figure as dead, so that it 
would be quite safe to say that the loss in that respect 
was something over 500. The number of missing is, on 
the other hand, more properly to be reduced than in- 
creased, were it not for the prisoners claimed by the 
Confederates. For there was little chance of actual de- 
sertion until the men could get to Washington; and 
some of the regimental returns were made so soon after 
the battle that the men had not yet had time to return to 
their colors. ^ The discrepancy as to missing arises from 
lack of or from incomplete returns. Summing up, then, 
it is safe to say that McDowell lost about 500 killed, 1000 
wounded, and between 1500 and 1800 missing. 

The distribution of these losses is of much interest. 

Several brigades were virtually not in action. At 
Blackburn's Ford, Davies reported only two wounded, 
and Richardson no casualties at all. 2 Blenker, at Centre- 
ville, or on the retreat, had only 6 killed and 16 wounded, 
but missed 94 men. In other words, the three brigades 
near Centreville were practically not under fire. 

1 A very suggestive report on this question of the missing is that of 
Major Reynolds, commanding the Marine battalion. O. R. Ser. i, vol. ll, 

392. 

* It is possible that this is owing to an omission; yet the loss, if any, 

must have been trifling. 



256 BULL RUN 

At Stone Bridge Schenck reported 21 killed and 21 
wounded, the latter figure being apparently incomplete ; 
19 of the killed were in the 2d New York, and this re- 
presents a demonstration made in the morning, about 
eleven o'clock, toward Lewis' Ford that was checked by 
the Confederate artillery beyond Bull Run. The ist and 
2d Ohio each had only one man killed, from which it 
may be fairly inferred that their deployment to check 
Radford's advance on the Cub Run bridge was not a 
very serious affair, and that they were quickly on the 
way to Centreville again. On the whole Schenck's bri- 
gade saw hardly any fighting. 

Keyes did little more. The 2d Maine was in the lead 
when the Van Pelt house was taken, and lost 13 killed. 
The ist, 2d, and 3d Connecticut together had 6 killed as 
their total for the day. They proved adepts at taking cover. 

The six brigades that fought on the Sudley Spring 
road and the Henry house hill were, in fact, the only 
part of McDowell's army seriously engaged, and even 
among these considerable variations will be found. So 
far as statistics go, it was Sherman's brigade that did 
the hardest fighting; and in that brigade the 13th New 
York suffered appreciably less than the others. The 69th 
and 79th New York, two very strong regiments, had re- 
spectively 38 and 32 killed, with 59 and 51 wounded. 
The 69th is stated to have gone into action 1000 strong; 
assuming 900 to have been present when it deployed on 



STATISTICS 257 

the Henry house plateau, its loss in killed and wounded 
would be nearly 1 1 per cent ; the 79th may be placed on a 
similar level, and the 2d Wisconsin not very far behind. 
In Burnside's brigade of Hunter's division, the report 
of the 71st New York, a poor regiment that seems to 
have broken up completely, is missing. The three other 
regiments had 9, 13, and 24 killed. We may assume 
that these losses were mosdy sustained in the attack on 
Evans, and in any case the impression is strengthened 
that this brigade would have done little but for the ar- 
tillery support which it received. The 2d Rhode Island 
had decidedly the best record, most killed and wounded, 
least missing. In Porter's brigade, the 14th (Brooklyn) 
and 27th New York incurred the heaviest losses. Sykes' 
battalion of regulars, which retired steadily and in good 
order from the field, had only 10 killed and 20 wounded ; 
so that it is not its well-ordered retirement that gives 
cause for surprise, but rather that it was not better em- 
ployed. Who knows that the superior discipline of this 
regiment, with its complement of regular officers, would 
not have pierced the Confederate line where the Zouaves 
or the Highlanders failed? Save for the steadying of 
Burnside's line at a critical moment in the morning, the 
Federal commanders failed to turn to advantage their 
one valuable unit of infantry. The marines were raw re- 
cruits, enlisted on the ist of July ^ and they made no better 

^ They should never have been sent to the front. 



258 BULL RUN 

showing than many of the volunteer regiments, which 
was not surprising. The 8th New York militia had but 
8 killed and 1 7 wounded, no officers figuring in the list. 

Turning to Heintzelman, the record presents some 
very uneven results. In Franklin's brigade the ist Min- 
nesota suffered heavier loss in killed or wounded than 
any other Federal regiment in the field, 42 killed and 108 
wounded ; a record all the more notable and honorable 
in that the missing numbered not more than 30. But his 
other two regiments, the 5th and nth Massachusetts, 
were not good, and only had 13 killed between them, 
which confirms what is said of them earlier. In Willcox's 
brigade the statistics show something very similar. The 
nth New York had 48 killed and 75 wounded ; twice as 
many killed as the rest of the brigade; the ist Michi- 
gan 1 and 38th New York apparently did little fighting. 
Howard's shows results ranging from 5 killed, 8 wounded, 
and 74 missing for the 3d Maine, to 26 killed, 46 
wounded, and 121 missing for the 4th Maine. 

Although the loss in officers was litde out of propor- 
tion, yet it must not be forgotten that only a very few 
of those officers were of the regular army, as the vol- 
unteer regiments were officered almost exclusively by 
civilians. Bearing this in mind, the statistics confirm what 
all other evidence tends to show, that the regular officers 

^ Detached for a while at Sudley Spring, and one of the last regiments 
to maintain the struggle. 



STATISTICS 259 

displayed the utmost courage and suffered heavily in con- 
sequence. Among the killed and wounded, almost all of 
them West Pointers, were the following officers holding 
the rank of colonel or lieutenant-colonel : Haggerty, Cam- 
eron, Ballou, and Slocum (2d Rhode Island), killed, and 
Wood, Marston, Farnham, Lawrence, Slocum (27th New 
York), Hunter, Heintzelman, and Willcox, wounded. 
The loss in artillery was officially returned as follows : ^ 



Batteries 




Guns lost 























J3 






x: 




•n 




.— . 




n 




« 






« 


m 


H 


I 


- 


I 


6 


_ 


6 


2 


2 


4 


2 


2 


4 


I 


4 


5 


5 


- 


5 


17 


8 


25 



Remarks 



ist U.S. Artillery, Company G; two 20- 
pounder Parrotts, one 30-pounder 
Parrott 



1st U.S. Artillery, Company I; six 10- 
pounder Parrotts 

2d U.S. Artillery, Company D 

2d U.S. Artillery, Company E; two 13- 
pounder James, two 6-pounders (old), 
two i2-pounder howitzers 



Sth U.S. Artillery, Company D ; two 
lo-pounder Parrotts, two 6-pounders 
(old), two i2-pounder howitzers 



Rhode Island battery, six 13-pounder 
James 



Lieutenant 
Edwards 



Captain Ricketts 
Captain Arnold 



Captain Carlisle 



Captain Griffin 



Colonel Monroe 



Total lost. 



20-pounders 
saved. 

None saved. 
None saved. 



Two 6-pound- 
ers saved. 



One lO-pound- 
er saved. 

One saved. 



To this list should be added, however, the two small 
howitzers of the 71st New York, bringing the total up to 
twenty-seven guns. 

Of the missing, the Confederates claimed over 1400 as 

prisoners. 

1 O. R. Ser. i. vol. 11, 328. 



26o 



BULL RUN 



SOUTH 

On the Southern side the statistics are far more defec- 
tive. The total of casualties shown by the Official Records ^ 
is 387 killed, 1582 wounded, and 13 missing ; which 
might be described as about equal, save in the matter of 
missing, to McDowell's. 

FIRST CORPS 

(Confederate statistics, from O. R. Ser. i, vol. ii, sio. The column "Aggregate" has 
been omitted. It will be noticed that for the Second Corps there are no returns for 
artillery or cavalry: i.e., for Stuart and Pendleton.) 



Command 



Killed 


Wounded 


Mis 




•o 




•T3 




c 


■a c 




- E 




iS 


==e 


!E 


==a 


iE 





w 





w 






CO D 

=56 

w 



Infantry — I 

ist Louisiana Battalion I — 

7th Louisiana — 

13th Mississippi : — 

17th Mississippi ■ — 

i8th Mississippi 2 

Sth North Carolina ' — 

2d South Carolina — 

4th South Carolina I I 

5th South Carolina — 

Sth South Carolina ' — 

Hampton Legion — 

1st Virginia — 

7th \'irginia — 

Sth \'irginia | — 

I7th V'irginia — 

iSth Virginia i — 

lOth \'irginia I — 

2Sth Virginia | — 

40th Virginia I I 

Artillery — 1 

Ale.\ander's Light Artillery — 

Latham's j — 

Loudoun 

Washington 

Cavalry — 

30th Virginia 

Hanover 



Total . 



8 


5 


33 




3 


— 


23 

6 
9 


— 


2 


— 





6 


2 


28 


— 


I 





3 


— 


S 


6 


37 


— 


10 


9 


70 


— 


3 


— 


23 


— 


5 


3 


20 


— 


19 


— 


100 

6 
37 


— 


9 


r 


— 


6 


— 


23 


— 


I 


— 


3 


— 


6 


I 


12 


— 


1 


— 


4 
9 

29 


— 


9 


I 


— 


I 


z 


2 
I 


z 


I 


- 


3 

2 


- 


3 


— 


4 


— 




I 


3 


— 


99 


29 


490 





1 In the Official Records, Ser. i, vol. ii, 570, is a statement headed "No. 



STATISTICS 

SECOND CORPS 



261 





Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Command 


e 




1. 


2 


•0 

II 

w 


i£ 



•0 


Infantry — 

4th Alabama 


4 
I 
3 

4 

I 

3 

I 

I 

I 

19 


36 
18 
38 

I 
21 

7 
22 

I 

IS 

30 

6 

6 

18 

44 

263 


6 
12 
6 

3 

4 

3 


iSi 

122 

IS3 

S 

79 

21 

46 

3 

69 

100 

47 

10 

122 

lOI 


I 

I 
I 




7th Georgia 




8th Georgia 




ist Maryland 




2d Mississippi 




nth Mississippi 




6th North Carolina 




3d Tennessee 




2d Virginia 




4th Virginia 




Sth Virginia 




lOth Virginia 




27th Virginia 




33d Virginia 








Total 


34 


1029 










25 


362 


63 


1519 


12 





These figures are both incomplete and incorrect, and 
require some adjustments.^ It would be fair to say that 

121. Casualties in the Army of the Potomac (Confederate) July 21, 1861." 
A footnote adds: "Compiled from the several reports and returns. . . ." 
This is one of the numerous examples of improper editing with which 
these costly volumes abound. Is this, as on its face it appears to be, the 
text of an original document, or is it not? Or is it merely a compilation 
from certain unspecified originals made by the editors ? 

^ The reports of Jackson and his colonels as to casualties are not to be 
found; so, at least, it is stated at the foot of page 482 in O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11; 
but in his report on the battle he says that his brigade lost 1 1 officers killed, 
22 wounded, 100 enlisted men killed and 346 wounded, which is quite 
unlike the official figure. (See previous note.) The discrepancies in the 
number of men wounded are perhaps not important ; but as to the officers 
killed and wounded Jackson's statement is, on the face of it, far the more 
probable, and the official compilation may be set down as incomplete. 

In Stuart's report he alludes to his having 10 men killed; these do not 
figure In the official compilation. 

Johnston, in his report, gives the grand total as, killed 378, wounded 



262 BULL RUN 

the Confederate figures of killed and wounded should be 
taken as an understatement on much the same scale as 
that of the Federals. It is not profitable to attempt any 
nearer approximation to the actual total. 

Coming now to what the casualties show in relation 
to the fighting, it may first of all be pointed out that the 
three brigades of the army of the Shenandoah suffered 
more than two thirds of the total losses, and that of these 
three Bee's was the most severely, Kirby Smith's the 
least, cut up. 

The part that Kirby Smith's brigade played was im- 
portant because of the direction in which his advance 
was made ; but the statistics reveal clearly that he met 
with little resistance. Two of the three regiments he ac- 
tually brought into action lost each of them only one 
m.an killed ; the loth Virginia had 6 killed and lo 
wounded ; yet this regiment was in second line as the 
brigade was first deployed, which points to the loss 
being incurred during the pursuit, — perhaps when 
Arnold unlimbered near Sudley Spring and fired a few 
rounds. 

1489, missing 30; while Beauregard makes it 369 and 1483, omitting men- 
tion of any missing. 

The report of the 30th Virginia, giving the names of men killed, adds 
two privates to the official total. In D. R. Jones' brigade there are two or 
three trifling rectifications of the same sort to be made. 

An editor's footnote in the Official Records states that the loss of the 
1 8th Virginia was 5 killed, 16 wounded, I missing; it is officially given as 
6 killed, 13 wounded. 



STATISTICS 263 

Jackson's brigade suffered much more heavily. The 
33d Virginia on his left, the regiment that charged Griffin 
and Ricketts and put their guns out of action, lost 45 
killed and loi wounded, out of less than 500 men. This 
was very severe, and tends to show how nearly spent the 
Confederate left must have been at the close of the fight- 
ing. The 2d Virginia, next in line from the left, also suf- 
fered severely, 18 killed, 77 wounded ; the 4th Virginia 
even more, 31 killed and 100 wounded. The 27th Vir- 
ginia lost 19 killed and 122 wounded; but the 5th Vir- 
ginia, on the right of the line, came off lighdy with 6 
killed and 10 wounded. Jackson himself gives 100 killed 
and 368 wounded (the official figures are a little higher) ^ 
as his total loss, which was nearly 20 per cent of his 
numbers. 

While Jackson averaged a loss of 112 killed and 
wounded per regiment, with Bee the figure rose to 164. 
All his regiments returned heavy casualties, from the 
8th Georgia with 41 killed and 159 wounded to the 2d 
Mississippi with 25 killed and 82 wounded. The nth 
Mississippi had only two companies present but lost 7 
killed and 21 wounded. But it should be remembered 
that Bee's losses were accompanied by the complete 
breaking up of his brigade ; while Jackson's brigade re- 
tained its organization at the close of the battle. 

Turning now to Beauregard's troops, Evans and 

1 See note above. 



264 BULL RUN 

Cocke bore the brunt of the fighting ; but the former, 
with about iioo bayonets, lost less heavily than might 
be supposed : the 4th S. Carolina had 1 1 killed and 79 
wounded, the ist Louisiana, 8 killed and 38 wounded. 
Cocke's five regiments were all eventually drawn into 
the fighting : the 49th Virginia, with 10 killed and 30 
wounded, out of only 210 present, suffered most and the 
28th Virginia, with 9 wounded and no killed, suffered 
least. Bonham's two regiments that went to Jackson's 
left and eventually pursued as far as Cub Run, the 2d 
and 8th South Carolina, lost respectively 5 killed, 43 
wounded, and 5 killed, 23 wounded. 

Hampton's Legion lost nearly 20 per cent, 19 killed 
and 100 wounded, and the 6th North Carolina, 23 killed 
and 50 wounded, a less proportion. Early's brigade, which 
got in on Kirby Smith's left at the very end of the action 
and turned McDowell's line, had, in 3 regiments, 12 killed 
and 67 wounded, most of these probably in the pursuit, 
which tends to show that the account of his brigade's 
operations given by Early in his " Memoirs " is exag- 
gerated. 

The brigades of Bonham (save for Kershaw's two 
regiments), Longstreet, Ewell, and Holmes were not en- 
gaged. That of Jones moved across Davies' front in the 
afternoon and suffered, in a few minutes, a loss of 14 
killed and 62 wounded. 

On the whole it may be said that the brigades of Bee 



STATISTICS 265 

and Jackson did the bulk of the fighting on the Con- 
federate side and suffered really heavy losses ; they re- 
ceived good support from several individual units ; while 
the brigades of Kirby Smith and Early, while they came 
in for no heavy fighting, played a great part tactically. 
The trifling loss of the Confederate artillery deserves no 
special note.i 

The Confederate loss in field officers was exceed- 
ingly heavy. Of the three brigade commanders of 
Johnston's corps, General Bee was killed ; while Jackson 
and Kirby Smith were wounded, the latter severely. 
Among the colonels and lieutenant-colonels, Johnson, 
Thomas, Bartow, Fisher, and Jones were killed or 
mortally wounded; Wheat, Gardner, Law, W. Smith, 
and Wade Hampton were wounded. 

There is a slight discrepancy in the Confederate ac- 
counts of their captures. Johnston and Beauregard both 
claim 28 guns. Captain Alexander, the staff officer spe- 
cially charged with reporting on this matter, makes it 27, 
but his statement contains obvious inaccuracies, though 
his total is probably correct.^ Beauregard makes the 

^ One gets the impression that owing to the inferior calibre of their guns 
the Confederate artillery men were very careful to get cover, and reserved 
their fire as much as possible. At the short range which the configuration 
of the Henry house plateau gave, the smoothbore six-pounders were prob- 
ably quite as effective as the more powerful Federal guns. It seems that 
wherever the ground had a slight up grade the Federal shells dug in on 
striking, thus getting small results. 

2 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 57 1- 



266 BULL RUN 

total of prisoners, including one brigade commander, 
Willcox,and two colonels, 1460; Alexander reports 1421. 

NUMBERS ENGAGED 

The question of the numbers engaged must, in the 
nature of things, be resolved in a tentative manner. 
Making allowance for desertion, for troops left behind in 
camp,i for those who fell out by the way (one regiment 
was left at Fairfax Court House), it is doubtful whether 
McDowell disposed of any more than 27,000 men at 
Centreville on the 20th ; while on the morning of the 21st, 
when the Pennsylvanians and New Yorkers left him, he 
lost about another 700 or 800 men.^ Of his total, the 
three brigades near Centreville would account for 7000 
and Schenck at Stone Bridge for about 2200, leaving 
about 17,000 men that crossed Bull Run.^ Of these again, 
Keyes and Howard played no real part in the crisis of 
the battle, and it was probably less than 13,000 men — 
Sherman, Burnside, Porter, Willcox, and Franklin — that 
did the fighting from Sudley Spring to the Henry house. 

' The 2d Wisconsin left 100 men behind. Allen, Hist, of the 2d Wiscon- 
sin, 379. 

2 Livermore, Numbers and Losses, i, 76, makes a rough calculation, by 
deducting three per cent from McDowell's return, and gives the effective 
total as 28,452; but this figure is much too high. 

' MpDowell, in his report, states that 18,000 crossed Bull Run, but he 
probably did not make sufficient allowance for the great wastage of his 
army. It is quite possible that the actual figure was even less than the 
17,000 given in the text. 



STATISTICS 267 

The Confederate figures are not so easy to establish. 
Beauregard, without counting a force of militia in the 
fortifications at Manassas which played no part, but 
adding Hunton, Holmes, Hampton, and the 6th North 
Carolina, had a little over 24,000 men, from which it 
might be fair to deduct 1000 for sick and missing, leaving 
23,000 present for duty. Of these the following were ac- 
tually used on the left: Kershaw's detachment from 
Bonham's brigade, say 1250; the Fifth Brigade, Cocke, 
including Hunton, 3000 ; the Sixth Brigade, Early, 1 700 ; ^ 
the Seventh Brigade, Evans, iioo; making in all, of 
Beauregard's corps actually engaged, 7050 men. In ad- 
dition, it may be recalled that Jones' brigade, with prob- 
ably about 2000 present, was under fire near the Centre- 
ville ridge ; while Hampton, and Fisher with the 6th 
North Carolina, might account for iioo more between 
them. The remaining 13,000 men of Beauregard either ar- 
rived too late at the scene of action or were guarding the 
fords and uselessly demonstrating towards Centreville. 

The three brigades of Johnston's corps present totalled 
7593,2 of which Kirby Smith lost 550 by leaving the 13th 
Virginia behind at Manassas ; so that the total may be 
placed at about 7000. ^ 

1 Allowing for various changes, and counting the 19th Virginia with 
Cocke. 

2 Johnston in his report gives nearly a thousand more, but apparently 
counted in the 6th North Carolina and perhaps some other units. 

^ Livermore, in his Numbers and Losses, takes the Confederates at the 
highest figures, making no deduction as he does for the Federals. 



268 BULL RUN 

From these figures the reader can deduce his own 
conclusions as to when, where, and in what degree the 
preponderance of numbers inclined first to one side then 
to another. We must examine now what skill the generals 
displayed in utilizing their numbers, and other matters 
that belong to the field of tactics and of strategy. 



XII 

CONCLUSION 

A CURIOUS thing about McDowell's enterprise at Bull 
Run is that one may fairly say that it was foreordained 
to failure, and yet conclude that it came within inches of 
success. Wholly untrained in the higher branches of the 
military art, he was compelled, by the force of circum- 
stances, to operate with an army that was entirely unfit 
for active campaigning; but he had an opponent no 
better than himself, and the chief difference between 
two armies that both lacked the distinctive qualities of 
a field force resolved itself into that which lay between 
the disadvantage of the offensive and the benefit of the 
defensive. 

In some ways McDowell did better than his critics 
have allowed. To move such an army at all, to get it con- 
centrated at Centreville, to throw a wing of 1 7,000 men 
over Bull Run, meant much hard work and hard driving. 
And yet, as we have seen, all this fell entirely short of 
what was needed for success. Rapidity of action was es- 
sential, and at no moment, at no point, did McDowell 
show any tendency of the sort, — rather the contrary. 

It is perhaps fairer to emphasize that McDowell had 
had no training or experience in the difficult art of 



270 BULL RUN 

generalship, than to say that he displayed no sign of pos- 
sessing military qualities. It was certainly not easy for a 
junior officer in a military service that gave neither prac- 
tical nor theoretical training to its higher ranks, when 
suddenly promoted to the command of an army to as- 
sume all the superiority and decision, to display all the 
science, that such a function demands. It is not surpris- 
ing that he took too much advice, and deferred too 
much to the views of subordinates whose judgments, 
on the whole, do not appear to have been as good as 
his own. 

In bringing his troops into contact with the enemy 
McDowell showed little tactical sense. His order of the 
20th of July showed gross inability to handle marching 
arrangements. But he did better than his opponents in 
utilizing a considerable part of his forces for delivering 
his blow. His employment both of his guns and of his 
infantry was far from good. Griffin's and Ricketts' bat- 
teries were recklessly exposed ; his infantry brigades 
were, allowed to become mere supports for the artillery, 
and to go into action as strings of regiments employed 
one at a time. For these failings, the configuration of 
the ground, the superior tactics of the Confederates, the 
general lack of ability of McDowell's subordinates, the 
want of a proper system of command, and the general 
ignorance of staff work, were in part responsible. 

Several of the Federal commanders ascribed their ill 



CONCLUSION 271 

success to what they believed to be the inferiority of 
their musketry. Thus Franklin says : — 

It is my firm belief that a great deal of the misfortune of the day at 
Bull Run is due to the fact that the troops knew very little of the prin- 
ciples and practice of firing. In every case I believe that the firing of 
the rebels was better than ours.^ 

The truth appears to be this. The Federal infantry as 
it advanced was too carefully nursed by its officers ; as 
soon as it reached the fire zone it was ordered to lie down 
and keep covered while the artillery did the work. So 
long as the artillery was successful in breaking down re- 
sistance the plan succeeded, but when the infantry was 
called on — after the hard day's work and much lying 
out of sight of the enemy in the sun — to advance into 
the open, firing at the enemy's line at short range, it 
jibbed away, fired wildly, and eventually broke. 

Far more important than this was the complete and 
miserable failure of the regimental officers. Quite one 
half of McDowell's regiments were good stuff so far as 
the men went ; all they needed was to be led and com- 
manded. McDowell himself relates that on the field 
disorganized bodies of soldiers called to him asking 
to be led. 2 Colonel Biddle, speaking of the volunteers 
after their return to camp, says : ** They had a per- 
fect dread of going into battle with their officers, and 

1 O. R. Ser. i, vol. 11, 407. 

* Rep. Cond. War, i, 132; McDoweU's evidence. 



272 BULL RUN 

they wanted to go back and enter into new organi- 
zations." 1 

If the regimental officers were for the most part worse 
than useless, the field and staff officers were not much 
better, though in a different way. The West-Pointers 
were fearless enough, and fit to lead any troops into 
battle ; but they had no more knowledge of the art 
of high command than the regimental officers had of 
the art of company leading. This subject has already 
been dealt with. Suffice it to say that on the field the 
confusion of orders and of organization was almost com- 
plete. Everybody gave orders, and nobody gave orders. 
McDowell's staff in large part disintegrated. No one 
knew what to do, where to find headquarters. At the 
moment when the attack on the Henry house plateau 
began, Averell says : " this feeling was uppermost : want 
of orders." ^ Later, even civilians like Governor Sprague 
took it on themselves to order troops about. 

It was the rout of the army back to Centreville and 
Washington that attracted most attention at the time. 
On the whole that was a mere incident of a not abnormal 
character when all the facts of the case are considered. 
That rout really began when, on the advance, the columns 
were kept standing long hours in the sun and the officers 
proved unable to prevent their men from going of? into 
the woods after blackberries ; or when the Pennsylvania 

1 Rep. Cond. War, ii, 198. 2 ^gp Cond. War, 11, 215. 



CONCLUSION 273 

and New York troops were allowed shamefully to aban- 
don the army, with hardly a word of reproof, at the mo- 
ment of battle ; or even when Lincoln 'proclaimed that 
only the common soldier could be trusted and his officer 
was a leader not entitled to confidence. The rout at Stone 
Bridge was good newspaper copy, and little more. 

It should be added that McDowell showed his 
even, steady bravery, in that disheartening hour. He con- 
tinued to do all that was in him to the bitter end. At 
Young's Branch, at Centreville, and again at Fairfax 
Court House, he did his best to turn the stream of fugi- 
tives, he continued to take every measure he could to 
fulfil his duty as a soldier ; from that high and honorable 
standard he never for a moment wavered. And his re- 
port is on the whole a straightforward and honest con- 
fession of failure, very little colored or distorted in an 
endeavor to evade responsibility. 

On the Southern side the superiority of Johnston's 
corps in leadership, organization, and mobility stands 
out conspicuously. Bee got much out of his troops. 
Jackson showed the highest tactical ability, and great 
firmness of character, in the way he chose his position and 
handled his infantry and guns together on the Henry 
. house plateau ; he earned and he deserved the honors of 
the day. Johnston himself showed too much diffidence till 
about twelve o'clock, and it was not till about 2.30 or 
3 P.M. that he really assumed control of operations. He 



274 BULL RUN 

displayed courage and at times judgment. Yet on the 
whole his conduct in the battle was far less creditable to 
him than the degree of organization and fighting quality 
he had succeeded in imparting to his little army, and the 
way in which he brought it from the Valley to Manassas. 

Beauregard's errors, and his lack of the logic, system, 
and clearness of vision which are called for in the higher 
command of armies, have already been sufhciently em- 
phasized. It is doubtful whether he did any one single 
thing that helped to bring success to the Confederate 
arms on the 21st of July, while his blunders would re- 
quire a lengthy enumeration. 

The defensive was assuredly a great advantage to the 
Confederate commanders. When their turn came to take 
the offensive on the Henry hill, — and they timed the mo- 
ment skilfully, — their opponents were spent. Beaure- 
gard's orders and staf! work certainly give one the im- 
pression that a Confederate offensive towards Centreville 
would probably have been marked by even less cohesion 
than McDowell's movement was. For although the Fed- 
eral general failed to keep his brigades marching by the 
left after they passed Sudley Spring, he did at all events 
keep them together and strike a concerted blow. The 
movements of Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet do not sug- 
gest that Beauregard could have done as much. 

Johnston himself wrote as follows : — 

A large proportion of it [Beauregard's army] was not engaged in the 



CONCLUSION 275 

battle. This was a great fault on my part. When Bee's and Jackson's 
brigades were ordered to the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, those of 
Holmes and Early should have been moved to the left also, and placed 
in the interval on Bonham's left — if not then, certainly at nine 
o'clock, when a Federal column was seen turning our left; and, when 
it seemed certain that General McDowell's great effort was to be made 
there. Bonham's, Longstreet's, Jones', and Ewell's brigades, leaving 
a few regiments and their cavalry to impose on Miles' di\ision, 
should have been hurried to the left to join in the battle. If the tactics 
of the Federals had been equal to their strategy we should have been 
beaten. If, instead of being brought into action in detail, ^ their troops 
had been formed in two lines with a proper reserve, and had assailed 
Bee and Jackson in that owder, the two Southern brigades must have 
been swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped. General 
McDowell would have made such a formation, probably, had he not 
greatly underestimated the strength of his enemy. ^ 

The subsequent action of the Confederate authorities 
contains an official verdict on the generals. J. E. John- 
ston was left in charge of the main Confederate army 
at Manassas. Jackson was promoted to an independent 
command in the Shenandoah ; while Beauregard was 
sent out West and placed under A. S. Johnston, with 
whom in the following year he fought the battle of Shiloh 
against Grant. 

At Washington the scenes that followed the battle 

1 Perhaps Johnston does not make sufficient allowance for the configur- 
ation of the ground, and for the positions of Pendleton's and Walton's guns. 

^ Johnston, Narrative, 56. McDowell did not deploy a proper line of bat- 
tle to attack the Henry house plateau for the much simpler reason that his 
army was far too confused in its mechanism when that stage was reached 
to make orders of that kind effective. The most he could do was to trust to 
his brigadiers to deploy. 



276 BULL RUN 

were disheartening for the Federal cause. The city 
openly avowed its satisfaction at the Confederate vic- 
tory. The volunteers showed up badly after their defeat. 
Discipline was at an end ; drunkenness and disorder of 
the worst kind reigned supreme. The gravest anxiety 
prevailed, and a change of commanders was decided on 
that brought McClellan to Washington. Whether Mc- 
Clellan was any better than McDowell may be doubted, 
but at all events from that moment it was recognized by 
the Administration that the military problem was one 
for experts, and could not be solved by a handful of im- 
properly organized three months' volunteers. 



THE END 



APPENDIX 



APPENDIX 

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS AND MAPS 

The material for studying Bull Run has mostly been printed, and 
manuscripts are now difficult to find. I was long in hopes of getting 
access to some papers left by General McDowell which are said to con- 
tain information of importance as to his relations with the authorities 
at Washington; unfortunately I was unable to persuade those who 
have charge of them to let me see them. 

OFFICIAL AND DOCUMENTARY 

Over one hundred reports of the officers who took part in the opera- 
tions, together with other documents, have been printed in the Official 
Records; this constitutes one of the two fundamental sources for the 
facts. But the editing of the Records has been so defective that the 
counsel of perfection would be to reject the printed form and go back 
to the manuscripts themselves. This has not been done in the pres- 
ent case, but it is not believed that any substantial inaccuracy is likely 
to have resulted. The Official Records are quoted all through: O. R. 
Less bulky and detailed, but more precise and valuable for establishing 
the facts dealt with, is the evidence given before the Congressional 
Committee on the Conduct of the War; their report is quoted: Rep. 
Cond. War. Within the same category, though of less importance, may 
be reckoned the collection of documents known as the Rebellion Re- 
cord (quoted Reb. Rec). The correspondence of Lincoln is strikingly 
poor for this period. Among other documents, the only other worth 
special m.ention is the Report of the Secretary of War (Confederate), 
of December 14, 1861. The newspapers are so inaccurate, and have 
so little knowledge of the nature of military affairs, that they are 
almost valueless. I have made a few unimportant quotations from 
articles reprinted in the Rebellion Records. In more important matters, 
such as the origin of the "Stonewall" story, the original newspaper 
files have been searched. 



28o APPENDIX 

RELATIONS OF CONTEMPORARIES WRITTEN AT THE TIME 

Among these, that of Doctor Russell, My Diary North and South 
(London, 1863), is probably the best known. It is vivid and inform- 
ing, but the author did not actually reach the field and see the fighting. 
Warder and Catlett's Battle of Young s Branch (Richmond, 1862) is 
obviously a compilation from the accounts of eyewitnesses; it is par- 
ticularly good for following individual regiments. Patterson's Narra- 
tive of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah (Philadelphia, 
1862) adds little to our knowledge, and can only be read with his evi- 
dence before the Congressional Committee; while Major, later General, 
Barnard's The C.S.A. and the Battle of Bull Run (New York, 1862) is 
a pretentious and not trustworthy revamping of published reports and 
accounts. A more picturesque note is struck by an "English Com- 
batant," in his Battlefields of the South (New York, 1864). 



ACCOUNTS BY CONTEMPORARIES WRITTEN IN AFTER 

YEARS 

Chief and best among these is undoubtedly Johnston's Narrative 
(New York, 1874), which is able, clear, and probably written on the 
copies of the original documents which he had preserved. Three other 
Southern generals have given us more or less good accounts : Alexander, 
in his Military Memoirs (New York, 1907) ; Longstreet, in his From 
Manassas to Appomattox (Philadelphia, 1896); and Early in his 
Memoirs (Philadelphia, 1912). Of some importance, also, are Jeffer- 
son Davis' Rise and Fall of the Confederacy (New York, 1881); J. D. 
Imboden's Incidents of the First Bull Run in the Century Company's 
Battles and Leaders ; the Memoirs of General Sherman (New York, 
1875) ; various repetitious contributions of Beauregard, chief of which 
are his Commentary on the Campaign and Battle of Manassas (New 
York, i89i)and The Fir st Battle of Btill Run, in Battles and Leaders, the 
latter containing a resume of his preceding statements. Beauregard's 
attacks on Johnston were met by the latter in his Responsibilities of the 
First Bull Run, also in Battles and Leaders, which is not nearly as con- 
vincing as his Narrative and ofificia] reports. Controversy was not con- 



APPENDIX 281 

fined to the Southern side; Donald Mitchell's untrustworthy Memoir 
of Tyler (privately printed) was met by Fry's reply, McDowell and 
Tyler (New York, 1884); the same author contributed a fair article, 
on McDowell's Advance to Bull Run, to the Battles and Leaders series. 
Among many lesser contributions I note Townsend's Anecdotes oj the 
Civil War (New York, 1884) and Wilkeson's Recollections of a Private 
(New York, 1887). Regimental histories and similar works will be 
noticed later. 

HISTORIES AND BIOGRAPHIES 

A long list of such books could be compiled, but it is not my purpose 
to inflate this enumeration for no useful purpose. Few general histor- 
ians of the epoch show any understanding of military problems; most 
of them, indeed, show a depressing inability, almost unwillingness, to 
make the necessary effort. The Comte de Paris and J. C. Ropes have 
written the best known histories of the war, and the latter has a few 
clear and good pages on Bull Run. Nicolay's Ow/ftrea^ 0} the Rebellion 
is not good, but has its uses; Roman's Military Operations of Gen- 
eral Beauregard (New York, 1884) is voluminous and valuable on the 
personal and political side, but is very poor for military affairs. A 
number of biographies of Jackson are indicated in the footnote con- 
cerning the origin of his sobriquet; that of Colonel Henderson is by far 
the best. 

REGIMENTAL HISTORIES AND PAPERS 

The material of this description is most discouraging, almost value- 
less. The most conspicuous quality of the regimental annalist is 
always loyalty, — that is, loyalty to his regiment, not to truth. Every 
regiment that has a record is a regiment of heroes, a somewhat star- 
tling, in fact quite unbelievable fact, for the dispassionate investigator. 
Book after book and paper after paper, addressed to "old comrades," 
have been turned over without adding much to my store of informa- 
tion. Cudworth's History of the ist Massachusetts is far less depressing 
than the fantastic records of the 5th and nth Regiments of the same 
State. Allen's 2d Wisconsin at Bull jRm», Monroe's Rhode Island Artil- 



282 APPENDIX 

lery at Btdl Run, H. F. Lyster's "Bull Run," Michigan Commandery 
Loyal Legion, Papers, vol. i, King's "Address," Minnesota Command- 
ery Loyal Legion, Ser. 6, all contain snippets of information. In a bet- 
ter class are Bicknell 's History of the 5th Maine; Hayne's History of the 
2d New Hampshire; Todd's jgth Highlanders; Slocum's History of the 
27th New York; and Woodbury's two books on the 1st and 2d Rhode 
Island. Less good are J. E. Smith's A Famous Battery, — a deceptive 
title, for it refers to the 8th New York; Whittemore's History of the 
yist New York; and Curtin's From Bull Run to Chancellor sville, which 
is the history of the i6th New York. On the Southern side there is 
almost nothing, and I note that the series of the Military Historical 
Society of Massachusetts is unusually poor on the present subject. 

The papers pubHshed by the Southern Historical Society are very 
similar to the above in general character, but far more voluminous 
and therefore useful. 

An occasional reference has been given to a magazine article in the 
footnotes; and one may mention, in addition, W. Nowell, "The 1st 
Battle of Bull Run," Infantry Journal, VI, 7; and T. O. Murphy, 
"Some Mistakes in Organization," Infantry Journal, vi, 217. 

MAPS 

Military maps, especially those that indicate the position of troops, 
are evidence of the same general character as books. The number of 
contemporary maps of Bull Run is very large, as the newspapers and 
speculative printers furnished the public demand for such things with 
extraordinary, but for the most part misguided, energy. Such produc- 
tions do not require cataloguing, and but few of them find place in the 
following list, which contains chiefly contemporary' maps that have 
some value as historical evidence. 
I. Map of northeastern Virginia and vicinity of Washington. Com- 
piled by the engineer officers of McDowell's staflf in the fall of 1861 
and corrected down to August, 1862. O. R. Atlas, vol. i, plate vii. 
This map is in part reproduced in the end papers of this volume. 
It seems almost certain that McDowell used it during the oper- 
ations. In that connection it is not unimportant to note that 



APPENDIX 283 

it is inaccurate in delineating the ground at Blackburn's and 
Mitchell's fords. 

2. Plan of the battlefield at Bull Run, July 21st, 1861. By Captain 
A. W. Whipple, of McDowell's staff, and assistants. O. R. Atlas, 
vol. I, plate III, I. Good for the Federal movements in the morn- 
ing; incorrect for the Confederate positions. There is a good repro- 
duction of this map in Barnard's C.S.A. and Bull Run. 

3. Map of the battlefields of Manassas. By Lieutenant W. G. Atkin- 
son, of Beauregard's staff. O. R. Atlas, vol. i, plate in, 2. Pre- 
sented by Beauregard to the city of New Orleans. Extremely good 
both for topography and movements of troops, and for the field 
of operations about the Henry house plateau. 

4. Reconnaissance of the battlefield at Bull Run. By Lieutenant 
Henry L. Abbot, March 14, 1862. O. R. Atlas, vol. I, plate V, 7. 
Excellent for the topography of the Henry house plateau and 
ground near by. A better version of this map, more detailed, ap- 
pears in Barnard, C.S.A. arid Bull Run. 

5. Battlefield of Young's Branch, or Manassas Plains. By Major 
Michler (?). O. R. Atlas, vol. i, plate v, i. Good for topography 
and position of Confederate troops; untrustworthy for Federal 
positions. 

6. Map of the ground of occupation and defence of the Division 
of the U.S. Army in Virginia in command of Brig.-Gen. Irvin 
McDowell. By H. C. Whiting; field work done in June and July, 
1861. 0. R. Atlas, vol. I, plate vi, i. Good for the Federal fortifi- 
cations on both sides of the Potomac. 

7. Map of the battlefield near the Henry house in Warder and 
Catlett's Battle of Young's Branch. (Richmond, 1862.) A very 
useful map for position of Confederate regiments. 

8. Map of the battlefield of Bull Run. By Solomon Bamberger; in 
Barnard's C.S.A . and Bull Run. A curious map reproduced from a 
Richmond publication. 

9. Topographical map of Bull Run. By Captain Harris and J. Grant. 
Made for Beauregard and reproduced by the Century Company 
in Battles and Leaders, vol. I. Good for the topography of the 
Henry house plateau and neighborhood. 



284 APPENDIX 

10. Map of the battlefield of Bull Run; compiled from maps accom- 
panying the reports of Generals McDowell and Beauregard. 
(Washington, 1877.) An excellent map, of which the Military 
Historical Society of Massachusetts has a copy. 

11. Plan of the battle of Bull Run. By Captain Mitchell, ist Vir- 
ginia. (White, Richmond.) Inaccurate. 

12. Map of the seat of war. By V. P. Corbett. (Washington.) 
Inaccurate. 

13. Volume of lithographed maps from an original of McDowell's used 
at the trial of Fitzjohn Porter, and preserved by the Military 
Historical Society of Massachusetts. These maps refer to the 
Second Manassas, but are excellent for the topography of Bull 
Run. 

14. Military map showing the works erected at Manassas Junction. 
By Colonel Thomas H. Williamson. (Richmond, 1861.) Not very 
important. There is a copy in the Confederate Museum at 
Richmond. 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Abbot, Lt., 90, 91. 

Accotink, 37, 65. 

Aittler's Run, 78. 

Alburtis, Capt., 108, 203, 206, 227. 

Aldrich, Col., 104. 

Alexander, Capt. (Conf.), 103, 176, 

177, 228. 
Alexander, Capt. (Fed.), 91, 233, 235. 
Alexandria, 19, 24-27, 31, 84, 169. 
Allen, Col., 107. 
Anson, Capt., 93. 

Arlington, 13, 19, 21, 22, 24, 31, 86. 
Armistead, Lt., 105. 
Arnold, Capt., 94, 191, 218, 231, 236. 
Arnold, J. W., 92. 
Ashby's Gap, 80, 151, 152. 
Audenried, Lt., 91. 
Averell, Lt., 93. 
Ayres, Capt., 92, 131, 193. 

Bache, Lt., 93. 

Bacon, Col., 83, 104. 

Bagley, Lt.. 92. 

Baird, Capt., 91. 

Baker, Lt., 94. 

Balch, Maj., 93. 

Ballou, Col., 259. 

Ball's Ford, 41. 

Baltimore, 14, 19, 23. 

Banks, Gen., 77. 

Barksdale, Col., 105. 

Barnard, Maj., 90, 126, 131, 135, 

140, 141, 152. 
Barry, Col., 95. 
Barry, Maj., 90, loi, 119, 213, 215, 

222. 
Bartow, Col., 108, 153, 157. 198, 

226, 228, 265. 
Bate, Col., 106. 
Beaumont, Lt., 93. 
Beauregard, Gen., 34-36, 38, 43, 

44, 82, 84, 103, III, 127-30, 148, 

149, 158, 163, 171-80, 203, 204, 



226, 227, 230, 232, 251, 274, 275. 
Beckham, Capt., 109, 208, 225, 230. 
Bee, Gen., 108, 157, 176, 189, 191, 

197. 199. 201, 204, 208, 226, 228, 

265, 273. 
Bell, Lt., 139. 
Benjamin, Lt., 95, 132. 
Berry ville, 150. 
Biddle, Col., 271. 
Bidwell, Maj., 94. 
Blackburn's Ford, 39, 40, 42, 82, 

126-35. 
Blenker, Col., 95, 148, 168, 169, 237, 

239- 
Bonham, Gen., 49, 83, 84, 104, 112, 

127, 129, 130, 132, 171, 172, 176, 

179, 198, 244-46. 
Bookwood, Capt., 95. 
Brackett, Capt., 92. 
Bradford, Lt., 95. 
Brethschneider, Capt., 92. 
Brightly, Lt., 92. 
Bristoe, 42. 
Broad Run, 42. 
Brodie, Surg., 103. 
Brown, Maj., 90. 
Buchanan, Pres., 8. 
Buel, Lt., 95. 
Buist, Lt., 108. 
Bull Run, 34, 36-39, 42, 61. 
Bunker Hill, 75, 79. I50- 
Burnside, Col., 93, 184, 185, 187, 

188, 190, 197, 210. 
Burt, Lt., 94. 
Burt, Col., 83, 104. 
Butler, Gen., 23. 
Butler, Maj., 104. 

Cabell, Maj., 103. 

Cameron, Hon. Simon, 17, 21, 148. 

Cameron, Col., 92, 259. 

Carlyle, Capt., 91- 

Carter house, 185, 197, 198. 



288 



INDEX 



Cash, Col., 83, 104. 

Centreville, 24, 38-41, 66, 116, 123- 

26, 130, 136-39, 146, 168, 169, 184, 

239-41, 245. 
Chain Bridge, 38. 
Chambersburg, 52. 
Charlestown, 72, 73, 75, 79, 80. 
Chatficld, Col., 91. 
Chentney, Lt., 108. 
Chesnut, Col., 85-87, 103. 
Chichester, Capt., 105. 
Chisholm, Col., 103, 148, 149. 
Clark, Col., 94. 
Clarke, Capt., 90, 102, 139. 
Cocke, Col., 32, 33, 83, 84, 105, 127, 

130, 205. 
Cole, Col., 107. 
Contee, Lt., 108. 
Coon, Col., 92. 

Cooper, Col., 17, 32, 50, 51, 80, 87. 
Corcoran, Col., 92. 
Corse, Col., 83, 105. 
Coward, Capt., 104. 
Cowdin, Col., 92. 
Cowdrey, Lt., 95. 
Cross, Lt., 92. 
Cub Run, 41, 166, 167. 
Culpeper, 32. 
Cummings, Col., 107, 216. 
Cunningham, Capt., 108. 
Curfell, Capt., 104. 
Curtis, Lt., 138. 
Gushing, Lt., 95. 

Darkesville, 79. 

Davidson, Capt., 106, i8i, 197. 

Davies, Col., 95, 168, 170, 237, 240, 

241. 
Davies, Maj., 104. 
Davis, President, 12, 34, 43, 44, 47, 

49, 50, 78, 87, 88, 154-57, 249-51. 
252. 
Deaneville, 34, 84. 
Deas, Col., 45. 
Dees, Maj., 107. 
Duncan, Col., 107, 108. 
Dunnell, Col., 95. 



Early, Gen., 84, 105, 112, 133, 134, 

174, 198, 228-230, 248. 
Eastman, Lt., 92. 
Echols, Col., 107. 
Edie, Lt., 94. 
Edwards, Lt., 92, 237. 
Einstein, Col., 95. 
Ellsworth, Col., 19. 
Ely, Lt., 91. 

Elzey, Col., 108, 229, 230. 
Evans, Gen., 106, 175, 181, 183, 

187, 195, 196, 198, 199, 201, 204. 
Evans, Capt., A. L., 106. 
Ewell, Gen., 36, 83, 84, 104, 112, 

127, 172, 173, 178, 179, 204, 243, 

247. 

Fagan, Col., 106. 

Fairbanks, Lt., 94. 

Fairfax, 24, 34, 36, 38, 56, 61, 84, 

1 16-18, 121, 125, 127-29, 169. 
Falkner, Col., 108. 
Falls Church, 56, 84. 
Farnham, Col., 94, 259. 
Farquhar, Lt., 94. 
Fauntleroy, Capt., 107. 
Featherston, Col., 104. 
Ferguson, Lt., 103. 
Fisher, Col., 109, 265. 
Fiske, Col., 93. 
Flagler, Lt., 92. 
Flint Hill, 121. 
Flood, Capt., 104. 
Floyd, Secretary, 8. 
Ford, Capt., 104. 
Franklin, Col., 94, loi, 191, 192, 

215, 222, 229, 271. 
Fredericksburg, 88. 
Front Royal, 21. 
Fry, Capt., 90, 116, 124, 126, 131, 

135, 238. 

Gardner, Col., 108, 201, 265. 
Gardner, Capt., 105, 174. 
Garland, Col., 83, 105. 
Garnett, Gen., 86. 
Garnett, Capt., 105. 



INDEX 



289 



Gartrell, Col., 108. 

Germantown, 121, 123. 

Gibbons, Co!., 108. 

Gibson, Lt., 94. 

Gist, Gen., 108, 204. 

Goodhue, Capt., 93. 

Gordon, Lt., 91. 

Gordonsville, 21. 

Goree, Capt., 105. 

Gorman, Col., 94. 

Grant, Gen., 118. 

Gregg, Col., 56, 83. 

Griffin, Capt., 93, 190, 211, 213- 

15- 
Grove, Capt., 108. 

Hagerstown, 52. 

Haggerty, Col., 194, 259. 

Hagood, Gen., 104. 

Hains, Lt., 91. 

Hairston, Col., 105. 

Hampton, Col., 112, 176, 198, 205, 

208, 230, 265. 
Harper, Col., 107. 
Harper's Ferry, 13-16, 21, 24, 25, 

28-31, 44, 45, 47-52, 73, 76-78, 

154- 
Harris, Capt., 103, 105. 
Harrison, Maj., 106. 
Hartranft, Col., 94. 
Hascall, Lt., 91. 
Hawkins, Lt., 95, 138, 169. 
Hays, Col., 105. 
Hayward, Col., 103. 
Heaton, Lt., 227. 
Heintzelman, Col., 19, 93, loi, 121, 

122, 126, 165, 167, 186, 220, 221, 

226, 259. 
Henry, Lt., 90. 

Henry house hill, 192, 199, 211. 
Hill, Col. A. P., 51, 108, 112. 
Hill, Capt., 108. 
Hodge, Lt., 91. 
Holmes, Gen., 87, 88, 106, 149, 161, 

162, 179, 198. 
Hopkins, Lt., 95. 
Houston, Lt., 91. 



Howard, Col. O. 0., 94, 183, 184, 
189, 218, 223, 224, 230, 233. 

Howard, Lt., 93. 

Howard, C. H., 95. 

Howland, Lt., 95. 

Hunt, Maj., 92, 237. 

Hunter, Col., 92, loi, 120, 121-25, 
165, 167, 183, 186-88, 259. 

Hunter's Station, 34. 

Hunton, Col., 34, 84, 105, 149. 

Imboden, Capt., 108, 191, 197, 198, 
206, 209, 211. 

Jackson, Gen., 44, 45, 79, 95, 107, 
112, 152, 157, 176, 198, 202, 206- 
08, 223, 225, 226, 230, 232, 234, 
248, 251, 265, 273, 275. 

Jameson, Col., 91. 

Jenkins, Col., 83, 104. 

Jenkins, Capt., 94. 

Johnson, Col., 206, 265. 

Johnston, Gen. J. E., 3, 10, 17, 30, 
33, 44, 45-51, 57, 67-69, 72, 76- 
81, 85-87, 107, III, 112, 145, 149, 
150-59, 163, 170,] 176-79, 203. 
204, 208, 225, 228, 229, 231, 244, 
247, 249, 250, 273-75. 

Johnston, Gen. A. S., 10, 46, 275. 

Jones, Col. D. R., 83, 104, 108, 172, 
173, 178, 179, 246, 247. 

Jones, Col. F. B., 107. 

Jones, Col. S., 103, 201, 228, 265. 

Jordan, Col., 103. 

Kearsley, Maj., 107. 

Kelly, Col., 106. 

Kemper, Col., 84, 104, 105. 

Kemper, Capt., 56, 104, 106, 179, 

226, 231, 232, 234. 
Kennedy, Maj., 104. 
Kershaw, Col., 83, 104, 231, 232. 
Keyes, Col., 91, loi, 136, 167, 183, 

194, 211, 216, 227, 233-235. 
King, Surg., 90. 
Kingsbury, Lt., 90, 214. 
Kirby, Lt., 223. 
Kirkland, Col., 104. 



290 



INDEX 



Langhorne, Capt., 105. 

Latham, Capt., 105, 107. 

Latham, Lt., 104. 

l^aw. Col., 264. 

Lawrence, Col., 94, 259. 

Lay, Col., 104. 

Lee, Col. R. B., 103. 

Lee, Capt. Fitzhugh, 104, 174. 

Lee, Cadet N. W., 107. 

Lee, Gen. R. E., 3, 22, 32-34, 36, 

46, 48, 49, 87, 88, 118, 155. 
Lee, Mrs. R. E., 22, 23. 
Lee, Lt. T. G., 107. 
Leesburg, 22, 27, 29, 33, 49, 57- 

60, 72, 84, 158. 
Lewis' Ford, 41, 194. 
Liddell, Col., 108. 
Lincoln, President, 17-19, 70. 
Lipscomb, Col., 104. 
Lipscomb, Maj., 104. 
Locke's Ford. See Poplar. 
Long Bridge, 22. 
Longstreet, Col., 105, 112, 132-35, 

171, 179, 244-46. 
Loudoun Heights, 14. 
Lubbock, Col., 105. 
Lyons, Col., 93. 

Magruder, Surg., 90. 

Manassas, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29-33, 3^- 

40, 42-44, 54, 57-66, 73-75, 82, 

129. 
Manning, Col., 103. 
Manning, Lt., 105. 
Mansfield, Gen., 19-21, 70. 
Marsh, Col., 95. 
Marshall, Capt., 107. 
Marston, Col., 259. 
Martin, Col., 93. 
Martinsburg, 74, 79. 
Maryland, 14, 28. 
Maryland Heights, 14. 
Mason, Col., 91. 
Mason, Capt., 107. 
Matheson, Col., 96. 
McCausland, Capt., 106. 
McClellan, Gen., 73, 86. 



McConnell, Col., 92. 

McCook, Col., 56, 91. 

McCrae, Col., 105. 

McDonald, Lt., 108. 

McDowell, Gen., 17, 30, 31, 42, 57- 
67, 70, 72, 73, 88, 90, 97, 98, 100, 
loi, 114-29, 136-47, 158, 164, 
165, 169, 172, 182-84, 186, 189, 
192, 194, 211-15, 219, 222, 223, 
230, 231, 238-42, 269-73. 

Mendell, G. H., 238. 

Midway, 150. 

Miles, Col. (Conf.), 103. 

Miles, Col. (Fed.), 95, lOI, 121, 124, 
138, 165, 168, 237-41. 

Miller, Capt., 104. 

Millwood, 152. 

Mitchell's Ford, 39, 41, 42, 82, 85, 
127-29. 

Moore, Col., 83, 105. 

Mordecai, Lt., 95. 

Moss, Capt., 104. 

Myer, Maj., 90. 

Nyles, Capt., 104. 

Occoquan, 37, 38. 
O'Rorke, Lt., 91. 

Palmer, Maj., 93. 

Parker, Lt., 94. 

Patterson, Gen., 24, 28-31, 52-58, 

67-81, 150, 151. 
Peck, Col., 92. 
Pendleton, Col., 107, 109, ill, 203, 

206, 225, 231. 
Pendleton, Lt., 107. 
Peyton, Lt., 103. 
Piedmont, 80, I5I-53. 156, 198. 
Piper, Lt., 91. 
Point of Rocks, 29, 47, 58. 
Pope, Col., 108. 
Poplar Ford, 42, 141, 142, 184, 186, 

193- 
Porter, Col., 93, loi, 187, 210, 214. 
Porter, Maj. F. J., 81. 
Pratt, Col., 95. 



INDEX 



291 



Preston, Col., 83, 87, 103, 105, 107. 
Preston, Capt. T. C., 107. 
Preston, Capt. T. L., 108. 
Prime, Lt., 92, 95, 142, 237, 239. 
Putnam, Lt., 90. 

Quimby, Col., 92. 

Radford, Col., 104, 232, 234, 235. 

Rappahannock, 15. 

Red House farm, 193. 

Red House Ford. See Poplar. 

Regiments: 

4th Alabama, 108, 153, 201, 204, 
208, 226. 

5th Alabama, 83, 104. 

6th Alabama, 83, 104. 

Alexandria Artill., 106. 

1st Arkansas, 106, 149. 

1st Connecticut, 91, 256. 

2d Connecticut, 91, 256. 

3d Connecticut, 91, 256. 

7th Georgia, 108, 153, 198, 208. 

8th Georgia, 108, 153, 198, 208, 
263. 

9th Georgia, 108. 

Hampton's Legion, 264. 

Harrison's Batt., no. 

1st Kentucky, 108. 

2d Kentucky, 108. 

Latham's Artill., 106, 107. 

Loudoun Artill., 105, 106. 

1st Louisiana, 106, 181, 197, 264. 

6th Louisiana, 83, 104. 

7th Louisiana, 105, 133. 

8th Louisiana, 106. 

2d Maine, 91, 256. 

3d Maine, 95, 223, 258. 

4th Maine, 95, 223, 258. 

5th Maine, 95, 223. 

1st Maryland, 108. 

1st Massachusetts, 92, 132, 133. 

5th Massachusetts, 94, 191, 215, 
222, 258. 

nth Massachusetts, 94, 191, 215, 
222, 258. 

1st Michigan, 94, 191, 220, 221, 
230, 258. 



Regiments: 
2d Michigan, 92, 132. 
3d Michigan, 92, 132. 
4th Michigan, 94, 191. 
1st Minnesota, 94, 191, 223, 258. 
2d Minnesota, 153. 
2d Mississippi, 108, 208, 263. 
nth Mississippi, 108, 153, 263. 
13th Mississippi, 105. 
17th Mississippi, 83, 104. 
l8th Mississippi, 83, 104. 
2d New Hampshire, 93, 188, 192, 

194, 195- 
1st New Jersey, 27, 96, 241. 
2d New Jersey, 27, 96, 241. 
2d New York, 91, 256. 
8th New York (Mil.), 93, 95, 99, 

210, 258. 
8th New York (Vol.), 95, 136, 147. 
nth New York, 94, 191, 215, 220, 

225, 227, 258. 
I2th New York, 92, 132, 133, 136. 
13th New York, 92, 217, 256. 
14th New York, 93, 210, 215, 219, 

221, 227, 257. 
1 6th New York, 93. 
1 8th New York, 96. 
27th New York, 93, 197, 220,257. 
29th New York, 95. 
31st New York, 96. 
32d New York, 96. 
38th New York, 94, 191, 258. 
3gth New York, 95. 
69th New York, 92, 194, 256. 
71st New York, 93, 99, 188, 257. 
79th New York, 92, 256, 257. 
84th New York, 93. 
5th N. Carolina, 105, 247. 
6th N. Carolina, 88, 109, 208, 264. 
nth N. Carolina, 104. 
1st Ohio, 56, 57, 91, 256. 
2d Ohio, 91, 234, 256. 
4th Pennsylvania, 94, 97, 136, 147. 
27th Pennsylvania, 95. 
Rhode Island Battery, 93, 187, 

188, 212, 236. 
1st Rhode Island, 93, 188. 



292 



INDEX 



Regiments: 
2d Rhode Island, 93, 99, 187, 188, 

257- 
1st S. Carolina, 83. 
2d S. Carolina, 83, 104, 179, 226, 

264. 
3d S. Carolina, 104. 
4th S. Carolina, 84, 106, 181, 197, 

264. 
5th S. Carolina, 83, 104. 
7th S. Carolina, 83, 104. 
8th S. Carolina, 83, 104, 179, 226, 

264. 
1st Tennessee, 108. 
2d Tennessee, 106, 149. 
3d Tennessee, 108. 
1st U.S. Art., 91, 94, 96, 98. 
2d U.S. Art., 91, 92, 98, 99. 
3d U.S. Art., 92, 99. 
5th U.S. Art., 93, 99. 
1st U.S. Cav., 93. 
2d U.S. Cav., 92, 94, 95. 
1st U.S. Inf., 93, 230, 257. 
1st U.S. Mar., 93, 215, 220, 257. 
2d Vermont, 95, 223. 
1st Virginia (Cav.), 83, 105, 109, 

133- 
2d Virginia, 107, 263. 
4th Virginia, 107, 230, 263. 
5th Virginia, 107, 263. 
7th Virginia, 84, 105, 133. 
8th Virginia, 105, 149, 203, 208. 
loth Virginia, 108, 262. 
nth Virginia, 83, 105, 133. 
13th Virginia, 108. 
17th Virginia, 83, 105, 133. 
i8th Virginia, 83, 105, 226, 227. 
19th Virginia, 83, 105, 209, 229. 
24th Virginia, 84, 105. 
27th Virginia, 107, 230, 263. 
28th Virginia, 83, 105, 227, 264. 
30th Virginia (Cav.), 104, 112, 

129, 226, 231. 
33d Virginia, 107, 216, 220, 225, 

263. 
49th Virginia, 105, 203, 208, 264. 
Walker's Battery, 106. 



Regiments: 

Washington Artill., 104-06, 112. 

1st Wisconsin, 53. 

2d Wisconsin, 92, 257. 
Reynolds, Maj., 93. 
Rhett, Maj., 107. 
Rice, Col., 103. 
Richardson, Col., 92, 120, 123, 130- 

32, 136, 137, 165-68, 170, 237, 

240-42. 
Richmond, 13, 15, 21. 
Ricketts, Capt., 94, 191, 192, 211, 

213-15, 221, 222, 224. 
Riddick, Col., 105. 
Ripley, Col., 17. 
Ritchie, Maj., 95. 
Rodes, Col., 83, 104. 
Rogers, Capt., 106, 209. 
Romney, 51. 
Rosser, Capt., 104. 
Runyon, Gen., 96, 241. 
Russell, W. H., 119, 120. 

Sandford, Gen., 19, 70. 
Sangster's, 40, 84, 122, 125-27. 
Schenck, Gen., 56, 91, 136, 166, 167, 

175, 180, 194, 227, 233-235. 
Scott, Gen., 3, 17-20, 25, 27-31, 33, 

53-60, 62, 63, 67-69, 73-77, 81. 
Seibel, Col., 83, 104. 
Seymour, Col., 83, 104. 
Shenandoah Valley, 13, 15, 44, 45. 
Sherman, Gen., 7, 65, 91, loi, 103, 

118, 136, 146, 166, 167, 193, 194. 

210, 211, 216-19, 227, 231. 
Shingler, Col., 108. 
Sibley, Maj., 17. 
Simpson, Col., 104. 
Sloan, Col., 84, 106, 197, 201. 
Slocum, Col. (N.Y.), 93, 259. 
Slocum, Col. (R.I.), 93, 188, 259. 
Smith, Gen. C. F., 46. 
Smith, Capt. C. H., 103. 
Smith, Gen. Kirby, 107, 108, 112, 

153, 154. 198, 228, 229, 265. 
Smith, Col. W., 105, 265. 
Smithfield, 150. 



INDEX 



293 



Snicker's Gap, 150. 

Snyder, Lt., 94, 141. 

Sorrel, Capt., 105. 

Speide!, Col., 91, 235. 

Sprague, Gov., 141, 213. 

Squires, Lt., 105. 

Stahel, Col., 95. 

Stannard, Capt., 107, 206. 

Staples, Maj., 95. 

Steinwehr, Col., 95. 

Stevens, Maj., 108. 

Stevens, Capt., 103, 104. 

Stewart, Col., 108. 

Stockton, Lt., 92. 

Stone, Col., 22, 29. 

Stone Bridge, 41, 42, 82, 85, 127, 140, 

141, 167, 168, 175, 179, 180, 182, 

183, 186, 196, 217. 
Stonewall, origin of story, 202. 
Stuart, Col., 78, 79, 109, iii, 112, 

150-52, 208, 225, 230, 231, 248. 
Sudley Spring, 38, 42, 140, 141, 145- 

47, 186. 
Sweet, Lt., 94. 
Sykes, Maj., 93, 190, 230, 231. 

Taylor, Capt., 104. 

Terrett, Col., 82, 83. 

Terry, Col., 91, 105, 106, 171, 

265. 
Thomas, Col. L., 17, 107, 204, 

228. 
Thompson, Capt., 105. 
Thompson, Cadet, 107. 
Tidball, Capt., 95. 
Tillinghast, Capt., 90. 
Tompkins, Maj., 104. 
Tompkins, Capt., 91. 
Townsend, Col., 17, 24, 30, 73, 

74- , 

Trowbridge, Lt., 93. 

Tupper, Capt., 108. 

Turney, Col., 108. 

Tyler, Gen., 55, 70, 91, loi, 120, 121, 
123, 125, 126, 130-32, 135. 142, 
164, 165, 168, 175, 186, 189, 193, 
194, 216, 227, 233, 234. 



Union Mills, 40, 41, 127, 128. 
Upton, Lt., 91, 102. 
Utassy, Col., 95. 

Vaughan, Col., 108. 

Van Pelt house, 177, 180, 181, 216. 

Venable, Capt., 104. 

Vienna, 27, 38, 55-57, 84. 

Vincent, Capt., 95. 

Virginia, 14-16. 

VVadsworth, Maj., 90. 
Walker, Capt., 106. 
Walker, Lt., 106, 234. 
Walreth, Col., 92. 
Walter, Lt., 91. 

Walton, Maj., 104, 106, 209, 227. 
Walton, Capt., 105. 
Ward, Col., 94. 
Washburne, Hon. E., 235. 
Washington City, 13-16,19,23,31,37. 
Washington, Lt., 104. 
Washington, Lt. J. B., 102. 
Wheat, Maj., 106, 197, 201. 
Whipple, Capt., 90, 92, 142. 
Whitehead, Capt., 105. 
Whiting, Maj., 95, 107, 151, 161. 
Wilcox, Col. (Conf.), 106. 
Willcox, Col. (Fed.), 94, 122, 191, 

192, 215, 229, 230, 259. 
Williams, Col., 104. 
Williams, Maj., 92. 
Williamson, Col., 103. 
Williamsport, 47, 52, 57. 
Willis, Lt., 105. 
Winchester, 29, 33, 67, 73, 74, 79, 

150. 
Withers, Col., 83, 105. 
Wood, Maj., 90. 
Wood, Col., 93, 259. 
Woodbury, Capt., 92, 93, 140, 141. 
Woodruff, Lt., 94. 
Woodyard's Ford, 40. 
Wright, Capt., 94, 141. 

Yates' Ford, 40. 

Young's Branch, 199, 200. 



NOV 26 1913 



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